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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Labor Force Participation among Serious and Violent Former Prisoners 
by 
Nora Ellen Wikoff 
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Work 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015 
Professor Carrie Pettus-Davis, Chair 
Professor Michael Sherraden, Co-Chair 
 
This project examines the relationship between work and crime among male former 
prisoners.  Criminological theories and observational studies suggest that work reduces crime, 
but recent studies cast doubt on the ability of employment programs to reduce recidivism among 
former prisoners.  Ongoing weak evaluations may imperil support for employment-focused 
rehabilitative programming.  Using data from the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry 
Initiative (n = 1,575), this study examines whether selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity 
contribute to weak evaluation findings. 
First, this study tests whether unobserved heterogeneity contributes to jobs programs’ 
weak treatment effects.  It uses group-based trajectory modeling and propensity score methods to 
balance participants and nonparticipants on demographic and criminal risk factors.  Lifetime 
arrest data from administrative records are used to model respondents’ prior offending 
trajectories.  Baseline interview data are used to balance respondents on the propensity to receive 
employment-focused services.  After balancing respondents, this study employs duration models 
to test the effects of educational and employment programming on time to rearrest. 
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Second, this study tests whether financial problems mediate the work-crime relationship.  
Longitudinal structural equation modeling is used to model men’s labor force attachment, job 
quality, financial needs, and emotional wellbeing.  Models test whether financial problems 
diminish the crime-reducing effects of employment for men who remain weakly attached to the 
labor force.  Multiple indicators for each latent construct reduce bias due to measurement error. 
Results of this study show that education and employment programs in United States 
prisons have limited effects on the likelihood that participants maintain employment and avoid 
criminal justice involvement.  Male prisoners recruited into the Serious and Violent Offender 
Reentry Initiative faced multiple barriers to employment before entering prison, due to extensive 
criminal records, low educational attainment, and limited work experience.  Before matching 
men on the probability of receiving employment-focused services, program participants differed 
from nonparticipants across an array of demographic and risk factors.  The group-based 
trajectory model derived three latent trajectory groups from the sample that exhibited distinctive 
demographic characteristics and pre-prison offending trajectories.  Due to significant variation at 
the state-level, a multilevel logit model was used to model the probability of receiving education 
and employment services.  Nearest neighbor matching with caliper resulted in a sample that 
exhibited balance across multiple demographic, criminal record, employment, and health 
measures. 
After matching, employment program participants were slightly more likely than 
education participants and nonparticipants to maintain stable employment, and employment 
program participants exhibited lower rates of rearrest during the first 9 months after release.  
After that point, there were no significant differences between employment-focused program 
participants and nonparticipants in labor force and criminal activity. 
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The longitudinal structural equation model results show that criminal activity has 
cascading effects on financial and emotional wellbeing, subsequent labor force activity, and 
ongoing criminal justice involvement.  Engagement in crime during the early months of release 
reduced labor force participation, limited men’s ability to obtain higher-quality employment, and 
increased their financial needs and feelings of psychological distress.  In contrast, stable 
employment led to improved job quality and reduced financial needs over time.  Employment 
did not reduce men’s later involvement in criminal activity, however.  In fact, employment 
during the first 9 months of release was associated with increased odds of reporting committing 
new crimes during the subsequent 6-month period.  Overall, the path model results provide no 
evidence to suggest that stable employment reduces criminal activity among serious and violent 
former prisoners. 
The results of this study cast doubt on theories of crime that presuppose causal 
associations between work and crime.  Observational studies that show associations between 
stable labor force participation and desistance from crime may be capturing maturation effects 
that simultaneously directed individuals toward legal work and away from crime.  If desistance 
from crime actually precedes stable labor force attachment for most former prisoners, this may 
explain the weak empirical evidence for prison-based employment programs.  The findings may 
inform modifications to employment and transitional jobs programs to identify participants on 
the path to desistance who may be most responsive to these services. 
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Chapter 1: Specific Aims 
This study examines the relationship between work and crime among newly released former 
prisoners.  Criminological theories propose various mechanisms by which work reduces crime: It 
limits opportunities for deviant behavior, strengthens prosocial attachments, and reduces 
financial incentives to engage in crime (Grogger, 1998; Hirschi, 1969; Latessa, 2012).  
Observational studies provide empirical support for these claims, suggesting that even among 
active offenders, work has a weak causal effect on crime (Bushway, 2011).  This lends credence 
to employment-focused prison programs: If work reduces crime, then increasing employment 
among reentering former prisoners should reduce recidivism.  Unfortunately, jobs programs 
show limited success in helping many prisoners gain job skills, find and maintain work, and 
reduce their involvement in crime (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Farabee, Zhang, & Wright, 2014; 
Lattimore et al., 2012; J. A. Wilson & Davis, 2006). 
Strengthening our understanding of the relationship between work and crime is critical to 
designing effective employment programs for low-skilled, low-educated former prisoners with 
limited formal work experience.  Interventions may not reduce recidivism rates if work, although 
correlated, is not causally related to reduced crime among former prisoners (Farabee et al., 2014; 
Grogger, 1998; D. B. Wilson, Gallagher, & MacKenzie, 2000).  Employment may reduce 
individuals’ incentives to engage in economically motivated crimes, but it may have limited 
effects on other crimes (Aaltonen, Macdonald, Martikainen, & Kivivuori, 2013; Felson, Osgood, 
Horney, & Wiernik, 2012).  Former prisoners who find work may continue to engage in criminal 
activity (Horney, Osgood, & Marshall, 1995), especially when workplace settings provide new 
opportunities for crime (Lochner, 2004). 
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This study examines the effects of employment-focused programs on prisoners’ post-release 
labor force participation, job quality, and criminal involvement.  Its findings will contribute 
knowledge to three broad questions at the heart of current scholarship on crime and economics: 
Does employment have a causal effect on offending among former prisoners?  What factors 
contribute to the relationship between work and crime among former prisoners?  What factors 
explain why employment programs have limited effects on labor activity and recidivism? 
I first investigate whether mixed and negative outcomes for employment programs result from 
selection effects in who receives employment services (Chamberlain, 2012; Heckman & Hotz, 
1989; Sedgley, Scott, Williams, & Derrick, 2010).  First, if treatment participants have fewer job 
skills than do people in the comparison group, then post-release outcomes in part reflect pre-
existing differences that selected people into treatment (Chamberlain, 2012; Heckman & Hotz, 
1989).  Second, when prison programs are offered à la carte to prisoners—rather than as bundled 
sets of programs—the comparison group for employment programs includes both true 
nonparticipants and people who participated in education programs or prison work.  This 
unmodeled contamination may bias estimates of the intervention under evaluation (Sedgley et 
al., 2010).  After controlling for observed heterogeneity in treatment status, I examine whether 
participation in educational or employment programs increase men’s time in the community 
(Brewster & Sharp, 2002; Farabee et al., 2014; Kim & Clark, 2013; Sedgley et al., 2010). 
Next, I use structural equation modeling (SEM) to study men’s labor force and criminal activities 
during the first 15 months of release from prison.  The cross-lagged panel model examines 
whether crime weakens men’s attachment to the labor force (Thornberry & Christenson, 1984).  
The longitudinal structural equation model (LSEM) includes factors that shape men’s incentives 
to work, to identify whether labor force participation signals men’s likelihood of reoffending 
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(Bushway, 2011; Bushway & Apel, 2012).  Finally, I examine whether financial and 
psychological stressors mediate the relationship between work and crime.  The LSEM results 
provide information about interpersonal and financial challenges that men face following release 
from prison (Bollen & Brand, 2010; Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Price, Choi, & Vinokur, 2002). 
1.1 State of Current Knowledge 
By 2008, 1 in 100 Americans were in jail or prison on any given day.  Risk of incarceration is 
exponentially higher for young, racial and ethnic minority men with less than a high school 
diploma (Beck et al., 1993; Pew Center on the States, 2008).  African Americans and Hispanics 
compose nearly 60% of prisoners incarcerated in state and federal prisons
1
 (Pettit & Western, 
2004; Western & Wildeman, 2009).  To put this in context, African American men were six 
times as likely as White men to be imprisoned in state and federal prisons in 2013 (Carson, 
2014).  African American males are now twice as likely to have been incarcerated as to have 
bachelor’s degrees, and they are more likely to be incarcerated than to be employed (37% vs. 
26%) (Western & Wildeman, 2009). 
Nearly all of these prisoners are released from prison (95%), but many of them are returned to 
prison as well (Piehl & Useem, 2011).  During their first 3 years of release, more than two-thirds 
of prisoners are rearrested, nearly half are returned to prison for any reason, and almost one-
quarter are imprisoned for a new crime (Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014; Langan & Levin, 
2002).  Between 1980 and 2006, the proportion of state prisoners admitted for parole violations 
doubled from 17% to 35% (Sabol & Couture, 2008).  By 2013, this percentage had stabilized to 
9% of federal prisoners and 28% of state prisoners (Carson, 2014).  Parolees are responsible for 
                                                 
1
 Non-Hispanic Whites comprise only 32% of the state and federal prison population (Asians, American Indians and 
Alaskan Natives, and people of two are more races comprise the remaining 8%). 
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roughly 20% of the violent and property offenses that lead to arrests (Rosenfeld, Wallman, & 
Fornango, 2005). 
1.1.1 Labor Force Participation Before and After Prison 
Appendix A summarizes important studies on post-release employment and crime.  Prisoners 
exhibit significant education and job skills deficits that diminish their job prospects and expected 
earnings (Lattimore et al., 2012).  Minorities face additional barriers to employment, due to 
racial discrimination, weak local labor markets, and macro-level structural conditions, including 
recessions and structural unemployment (Bellair & Kowalski, 2011).  Time spent out of the labor 
market while in prison reduces opportunities for men to develop prosocial ties to employment 
networks (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Hagan, 1993).  While incarcerated, few men participate in 
education and job training programs, due to the lack of availability of programming and other 
systemic issues, so they have limited opportunities to acquire job skills (Chamberlain, 2012; 
Harlow, 2003; Piehl & Useem, 2011). 
Despite this, high rates of joblessness among former prisoners reflect labor force 
nonparticipation, not just unemployment (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; 
Chamberlain, 2012; Sugie, 2014).  For most men, the difficulty lies in keeping jobs, not in 
finding jobs (Aaltonen et al., 2013; Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Sugie, 2014; van der Geest, 
Bijleveld, & Blokland, 2011).  Data consistently show that men exhibit short-term boosts in post-
release employment and earnings (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Nagin & Waldfogel, 1998).  Over 
time, declining external pressures from parole officers and family members to find work, and 
increasing frustration with low-wage work, leads former prisoners to withdraw from the labor 
market (Sugie, 2014).  Post-release employment and earnings eventually decline to pre-prison 
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levels as men supplement income through illegal activity (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Nagin & 
Waldfogel, 1998; Pettit & Lyons, 2009). 
1.1.2 Labor Force Participation and the Desistance Process 
The desistance literature presents three competing explanations for observed associations 
between labor force status and desistance from crime (Giordano, Cernkovich, & Rudolph, 2002; 
Laub & Sampson, 2001; Massoglia & Uggen, 2010; Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014).  The 
turning point hypothesis makes the strongest case for a causal association between employment 
and reduced offending.  From this perspective, stable employment facilitates the development of 
social bonds to prosocial institutions and individuals, even among active offenders who may not 
have expressed any interest in finding work.  Reoffending would imperil these social bonds, so 
employment promotes desistance by providing former prisoners a stake in conformity (Laub & 
Sampson, 2001). 
The hook-for-change hypothesis presents a more measured explanation of how employment 
promotes desistance (Giordano et al., 2002).  From this perspective, employment provides the 
scaffolding needed to help former prisoners carry forth their intentions to go straight, but internal 
cognitive transformations undergird the desistance process.  Obtaining, or receiving, paid 
employment will have limited effect on subsequent offending among men who have not 
undergone these cognitive transformations (Bushway, 2003; Giordano et al., 2002; Uggen, 
2000). 
In contrast to these causal explanations, the maturational reform hypothesis states that the 
spurious association between labor force attachment and desistance from crime reflects internal 
cognitive transformations that simultaneously shift men toward employment and away from 
crime.  Stable employment does not help former prisoners carry out their intentions to desist 
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from crime; it is the natural result of cognitive changes that led men away from criminal activity 
in the first place (Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014). 
1.1.3 Interventions to Increase Labor Force Participation 
Appendix B summarizes evaluations of employment-focused interventions.  The following 
paragraphs highlight noteworthy findings from these evaluations.  Education programs show 
greater reductions in recidivism than vocational and work programs do, but neither type of 
program significantly improves labor force outcomes (Brewster & Sharp, 2002; Lattimore et al., 
2012; D. B. Wilson et al., 2000).  Prison education programs prioritize remedial education and 
General Education Development (GED) courses over postsecondary courses that would improve 
prisoners’ employability and wages (Brown, 2015; Chamberlain, 2012).  Passing the GED test 
can increase wages among prisoners who fare worst in the labor market, but GED holders’ 
earnings often resemble high school dropouts’ earnings more closely than high school graduates’ 
earnings (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Heckman & LaFontaine, 2006; Heckman & Rubinstein, 
2001; Tyler & Kling, 2007). 
Employment readiness programs for prisoners often have limited impacts on post-release 
employment and recidivism (Bushway, 2003; Farabee et al., 2014; Lattimore et al., 2012).  
Commonly cited reasons for negative program evaluations include poor program designs, weak 
program fidelity, and selection bias (manifested by voluntary enrollment and treatment 
noncompliance) (Farabee et al., 2014; D. B. Wilson et al., 2000).  Programs are rarely designed 
and equipped to provide the comprehensive services needed to improve participants’ job 
prospects (e.g., vocational training, postsecondary education) (Bushway, 2003).  Employment 
programs vary widely in quality, content, and intensity; for example, classes that teach interview 
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skills and provide advice on discussing the criminal record are included in the same category as 
vocational training (Lattimore et al., 2012). 
Selection bias due to voluntary enrollment is commonly assumed to produce upwardly biased 
treatment estimates (D. B. Wilson et al., 2000).  However, selection bias that results from 
treatment group dropout and comparison group substitution may produce downwardly biased 
estimates: Mandated programs serve prisoners who have no interest in the topics presented, so 
the content has limited impact on treatment members’ later job searches (Bushway, 2003; 
Bushway & Apel, 2012).  At the same time, the comparison condition for most voluntary and 
randomized prison interventions permits access to treatment as usual, which often means access 
to services that are similar to the treatment services being evaluated (Farabee et al., 2014; 
Heckman, Hohmann, Smith, & Khoo, 2000; Sedgley et al., 2010).  In evaluations with high rates 
of dropout and substitution, observed differences in outcomes between the treatment and 
comparison groups reveal the effect of the program (e.g., the particular intervention being 
offered to treatment participants), not the effect of the treatment (e.g., employment services for 
former prisoners) (Farabee et al., 2014).  These attenuated estimates contribute to findings that 
employment and jobs programs do not work (Heckman et al., 2000). 
Program designs, implementation difficulties, and selection bias may have contributed to 
negative findings for employment programs implemented as part of the Severe and Violent 
Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI).  This large, multi-site reentry initiative provided states 
funding to expand existing services for reentering prisoners to be more comprehensive and to 
begin prior to release into the community.  Although SVORI programs increased the number of 
services that participants received, the programs did not appear to increase employment or 
reduce recidivism (Lattimore et al., 2012; Lattimore & Steffey, 2009).  Most men received no 
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education or employment assistance in prison, despite high rates of men indicating that they 
needed help with education and employment (Lattimore & Steffey, 2009; Lattimore, Steffey, & 
Visher, 2009). 
SVORI employment programs varied widely in terms of content, intensity, and duration 
(Lattimore & Steffey, 2009; D. B. Wilson et al., 2000), but limited data on services and 
participation kept evaluators from differentiating programs by quality (Lattimore et al., 2012).  
Employment program nonparticipants likely worked in prison or received education assistance in 
place of employment services (Chamberlain, 2012; Lattimore et al., 2012; Lattimore et al., 
2009).  To the extent that education programs improve prisoners’ human capital and soft skills, 
educational programs provide a competing treatment to employment programs.  When 
employment program nonparticipants within the comparison group opt for educational services 
(in place of no treatment), this unobserved participation in comparable services contaminates the 
sample, often reducing the observed effect of employment programs on work and recidivism 
outcomes (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Lattimore et al., 2012; Sedgley et al., 2010). 
Initial evaluations suggested that SVORI participants exhibited slightly better employment 
outcomes than non-SVORI participants, regardless of participation in education or employment 
programs:  In general, SVORI participants received more services than did non-SVORI 
participants, so these short-term effects may have reflected the cumulative benefit of receiving 
bundled services that addressed an array of needs.  At each post-release interview, SVORI 
participants were more likely to hold jobs with benefits than non-SVORI participants were.  By 
the final 15-month follow-up interview, SVORI participation increased men’s probability of 
supporting themselves through employment.  Despite these beneficial outcomes, SVORI 
participation did not increase the average number of months that men worked between interview 
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reference periods (two-thirds of months), and SVORI participants were no more likely than non-
SVORI participants to maintain employment throughout each of the 3- to 6-month interview 
reference periods (Lattimore et al., 2009). 
Subtle improvements in SVORI participants’ labor force outcomes did not translate into reduced 
rearrest and reincarceration (i.e., recidivism) during men’s first 24 months following release.  
SVORI and non-SVORI participants showed equivalent rates of recidivism during each post-
release quarter (Lattimore et al., 2009).  Multiple logistic regression models that included men’s 
SVORI status and indicators for participation in education, employment, and other reentry 
services provide limited support for education programs, and almost no support for employment 
services.  Education programs were weakly associated with improved labor outcomes over the 
follow-up waves, but they did not significantly reduce men’s odds of rearrest or reincarceration.  
Conversely, employment services were not associated with post-release employment status or 
job quality but were associated with shortened time to first rearrest (Lattimore et al., 2012). 
1.2 Gaps in Existing Research 
Employment and education programs implicitly, if not explicitly, assume that jobs function as 
crime-prevention levers for former prisoners (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Farabee et al., 2014; 
Redcross, Millenky, Rudd, & Levshin, 2012).  By increasing participants’ job skills, these 
services should increase labor force activity and reduce offending (Bushway, 2003).  Research is 
needed to confirm that associations between post-release work and desistance do not simply 
reflect an underlying common cause (e.g., maturational reform) (Maruna, 2001; Skardhamar & 
Savolainen, 2014).  Prisoners who maintain employment may differ systematically from 
persistently unemployed prisoners in ways that contribute to observed differences in recidivism 
(Flinn & Heckman, 1983).  Most observational studies that suggest employment reduces 
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recidivism among former prisoners provide correlational support (D. B. Wilson et al., 2000).  In 
contrast, findings from some experimental and randomized studies suggest that selection bias 
explains the observed negative relationship between work and crime among former offenders 
(Bushway & Apel, 2012; Skardhamar & Telle, 2012). 
Intermittent labor force detachment may reflect the cumulative impact of institutional barriers 
and personal characteristics that lead former prisoners to perceive that there are no jobs available 
for them (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b).  Persistent labor force detachment may identify men who are 
least committed to finding work, but only a few studies have examined whether labor force exit 
is associated with increased recidivism risk (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Crutchfield & Pitchford, 
1997).  Related to this, studies have not examined whether consistent attachment to the labor 
force—whether in the form of stable employment at one job, stable employment over time, or 
committed job-seeking efforts—functions as a reliable signal of offenders’ desistance from crime 
(Bushway, 2003; Bushway & Apel, 2012).  Finally, research and theory suggest that 
characteristics associated with “good” jobs (e.g., employment stability, decent wages, and fringe 
benefits) are responsible for the crime-reducing benefits of regular employment (Mocan, Billups, 
& Overland, 2005; Uggen, 1999; van der Geest et al., 2011).  Few studies provide detailed 
information about the jobs prisoners find in terms of wages, fringe benefits, and opportunities for 
growth (Crutchfield & Pitchford, 1997; Grogger, 1998; Uggen, 1999; van der Geest et al., 2011). 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives 
This chapter introduces the rational choice perspective that underpins microeconomic models of 
crime (Becker, 1968; Coleman, 1988; Ehrlich, 1973; Heckman, 1976; Heckman, Stixrud, & 
Urzua, 2006; Lochner, 2004; Sickles & Williams, 2008).  The first section presents the rational 
choice model of crime as work (Becker, 1968).  The second section illustrates how scholars have 
integrated human, social, and criminal capital into a dynamic model of crime that explains 
variations in men’s level of offending over time (Coleman, 1988; Ehrlich, 1973; Heckman, 1976; 
Heckman et al., 2006; Lochner, 2004; Mocan et al., 2005; Sickles & Williams, 2008).  The last 
section presents the current study’s proposed conceptual model. 
2.1 Rational Choice Theoretical Framework 
Rational choice models presume that people behave rationally in pursuing ends that maximize 
subjective expected utility (Apel, 2013; Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Mocan et al., 2005).  
Individuals select an optimal balance of work and crime to maximize consumption and leisure 
(Grogger, 1998; Mocan et al., 2005).  Crime and legal work are equivalent in that both produce 
income and limit time available to pursue other activities (Grogger, 1998; Mocan et al., 2005; 
Thornberry & Christenson, 1984).  Criminal activity offers marginal offenders an alternative to 
legal work (Bushway, 2011; Thornberry & Christenson, 1984). 
Men enter the labor force and seek market employment when their market wage exceeds their 
reservation wage.  Men’s reservation wage can be estimated by the marginal rate of substitution 
for their first hour of work, the point at which all time is allocated to leisure.  Their marginal rate 
of substitution is a function of their market wages, hours spent in market work, hours spent in 
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criminal activity and available sources of non-labor income (Ehrlich, 1973; Grogger, 1998; 
Williams & Sickles, 2002). 
Non-labor income reduces men’s incentives to seek wage employment, whether earned illegally 
or acquired legally in the form of savings and investments, family assistance, or social benefits 
(Grogger, 1998; Skardhamar & Telle, 2012).  Men commit crimes when the returns on their first 
hour of crime are expected to exceed their market wage.  Men will engage in crime up to the 
point at which their marginal returns to crime no longer exceed their market wage (Becker, 1968; 
Fagan & Freeman, 1999; Grogger, 1998; Williams & Sickles, 2002). 
2.1.1 Objections to the Basic Model 
The basic microeconomic model describes incentives that lead people to engage in financially 
motivated crimes, for which returns to crime can be monetized (e.g., drug sales, prostitution, 
property offenses) (Ehrlich, 1973; Grogger, 1998).  However, on the surface many crimes do not 
meet this criterion, even if financial considerations played a role (e.g., domestic violence 
exacerbated by financial problems in the home).  Strict utility maximization can be relaxed to 
include non-financial considerations: Perpetrators derive non-financial benefits from crime, 
including stress relief and social respect (Mocan et al., 2005; Sickles & Williams, 2008).  Non-
pecuniary considerations that influence individuals’ assessments of the relative utility of crime 
include emotional wellbeing, interpersonal relationships, and social standing in the community 
(Ehrlich, 1973; Grogger, 1998; Sickles & Williams, 2008; Thornberry & Christenson, 1984). 
Describing offenders’ decision-making processes as rational may seem a fundamental 
mischaracterization, as ample evidence shows that most current and former prisoners assess 
situations poorly (Apel, 2013; Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Nagin, 2007).  Expected benefits are 
more salient than perceived risks, and many people are poorly equipped to estimate both the 
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probability that they will be caught and the amount of pain they will feel if caught and punished.  
In light of uncertainty about their realistic job prospects, former prisoners employ heuristics to 
estimate perceived benefits from employment in determining whether to look for work (Apel, 
2013; Bucklen & Zajac, 2009).  Heightened emotional states reduce the extent to which they 
consider relevant costs of crime (Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Nagin, 2007). 
Nonetheless, choices that current and former prisoners make are rational in the sense that men’s 
choices are informed by this general utility-maximization framework.  Cognitive limitations, 
emotional distress, and drug use may reduce the accuracy with which former prisoners assess 
available opportunities, but these situational conditions do not undermine the basic assumption 
that men use means-end reasoning to bring about the best consequences for themselves (Apel, 
2013; Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Felson et al., 2012). 
Heckman (1976) cautions against interpreting rational choice theoretical models literally.  His 
savings model includes human capital investment, labor income, and leisure time as distinct 
activities, even though work hours and time spent on human capital investment overlap when 
people receive on-the-job training (Heckman, 1976).  Similarly, time spent in criminal activity 
may overlap with leisure time without significant challenges to the general theoretical model.  
Nonetheless, this overlap may have implications for men’s probability of recidivism.  Men who 
consider criminal activity to be a form of leisure, as well as a form of work, may derive increased 
utility from crime, and this should strengthen their resolve to persist in criminal activity. 
2.2 Dynamic Human Capital Model of Criminal Activity 
Individuals vary in their skill levels, learning ability, social networks, and criminal ability 
(Lochner, 2004; Mocan et al., 2005).  These endowments influence men’s later decisions to 
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engage in crime, work, and human capital investment.  Individuals with high learning ability will 
enjoy greater returns to human capital investment than less-skilled individuals will (Mocan et al., 
2005).  Criminal ability should not influence the return on legal human capital investment, but it 
should influence the likelihood that men invest in human capital (Lochner, 2004). 
2.2.1 Human Capital Investment 
Human capital investment should increase men’s incentives to enter the labor market and resist 
crime (Lochner, 2004).  Men invest in education or job skills training to maximize lifetime 
earnings through skills acquisition.  These investments initially reduce the time available for men 
to engage in crime or work.  However, improved earnings prospects reduces future criminal 
involvement because men perceive that they have more to lose from crime if detected (Lochner, 
2004; Mocan et al., 2005).  Even criminally involved men may decide to reallocate income from 
consumption toward savings when they perceive larger potential gains from legal employment 
than ongoing criminal activity.  Voluntarily reallocating a portion of current income from 
consumption to savings reduces men’s dependence on crime in the future and facilitates later 
investments in legal human capital (Mocan et al., 2005). 
2.2.2 Social Capital Accumulation 
Social capital is a  resource, akin to human capital, that accumulates over time and can help men 
obtain desired goods (Williams & Sickles, 2002).  Unlike human capital, it is not held within an 
individual but is instead stored in men’s relationships with other people (Coleman, 1988; Sickles 
& Williams, 2008).  As a result, this socially embedded resource both facilitates and constrains 
men’s actions.  Men who maintain close attachments to prosocial individuals and institutions 
benefit from access to financial resources and emotional support in times of need (Coleman, 
1988).  However, these embedded social networks entail obligations from men.  Failure to live 
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up to these expectations causes men to experience more serious social sanctions than if they had 
not been embedded in social support networks (Coleman, 1988; Sickles & Williams, 2008; 
Williams & Sickles, 2002). 
Men with more prosocial social capital risk greater losses from crime due to detection and 
punishment, and this process of embeddedness into prosocial networks strengthens men’s 
commitment to conformity (Sampson & Laub, 2003; Sickles & Williams, 2008).  Social norms, 
personal attachments to family and friends, and stigmatizing processes (e.g., depreciated social 
capital and loss of social support following arrest) increase the disutility from crime in 
proportion to men’s accumulated social capital and the anticipated severity of punishment 
(Sickles & Williams, 2008). 
2.2.3 Criminal Capital Accumulation 
Men acquire criminal capital in the course of engaging in crime.  Extensive criminal involvement 
increases men’s criminal capital more quickly, and skilled offenders who avoid detection 
accumulate more capital than offenders who do not evade detection (Mocan et al., 2005).  
Involvement in licit and illicit activity permits men to build human and criminal capital 
simultaneously, and criminal activity may enhance men’s legal human capital separate from any 
criminal capital gains.  As with human capital, criminal capital deteriorates over time (Lochner, 
2004; Mocan et al., 2005). 
Extensive criminal capital increases the amount of time men invest in criminal activity.  Criminal 
human capital reduces men’s relative risk of incarceration, but this is offset by increased risk of 
detection as their involvement in crime increases.  Criminal capital may increase while men are 
imprisoned if they learn skills from spending time with other prisoners; for other men, criminal 
capital declines during that time due to the reduction in available criminal opportunities.  Men 
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who leave prison with higher levels of criminal than legal human capital have greater incentives 
to engage in crime over legal employment.  Prison programs that increase men’s legal human 
capital increase men’s incentives to engage in legal employment (Mocan et al., 2005).  
Increasing former prisoners’ expected benefits from employment, thereby increasing the 
opportunity cost of crime, may reduce recidivism upon release (Mocan et al., 2005; Nagin, 
Cullen, & Jonson, 2009). 
2.3 Proposed Conceptual Model 
Figure 2.1 depicts pathways by which prison education and employment programs strive to 
reduce recidivism by strengthening men’s attachments to the labor force (Farabee et al., 2014; 
Redcross et al., 2012; Saylor & Gaes, 1997).  Education and employment programs improve 
men’s job prospects through job skills training and the acquisition of education credentials 
(Duwe & Clark, 2014; Steurer, Smith, & Tracy, 2001; Tyler & Kling, 2007; D. B. Wilson et al., 
2000).  Human capital accumulation improves men’s wage prospects and increases their 
incentives to take legal work (Thornberry & Christenson, 1984).  Full-time employment in the 
formal labor market provides men with living wages, benefits, and opportunities for growth and 
career advancement (Bloom, 2006; Hagan, 1993). 
Ongoing stable employment enhances men’s financial wellbeing.  Jobs that pay living wages 
alleviate financial strains that can lead men to commit economic crimes (Felson et al., 2012; 
Skardhamar & Telle, 2012).  Financial wellbeing contributes to enhanced emotional wellbeing 
(Harris, Evans, & Beckett, 2010).  Sustained emotional and financial wellbeing facilitate 
desistance among former prisoners who find and maintain work (Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Felson 
et al., 2012). 
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Figure 2.1 Program Participation, Labor Force Attachment, and Desistance. 
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Figure 2.2 presents the original conceptual model used to guide the structural equation path 
analytic model.  The path model tests whether labor force participation and quality employment 
reduces men’s risk of recidivism.  Entering and remaining in the labor market as an unemployed 
job candidate necessitates costs, and people who do not feel committed to finding work are 
unlikely to perceive that these costs are worth the effort (Crutchfield & Pitchford, 1997).  
Unemployed and low-wage workers are more responsive to criminal opportunities than are 
stably employed workers who earn high wages (Crutchfield & Pitchford, 1997; Sickles & 
Williams, 2006; Thornberry & Christenson, 1984; Williams & Sickles, 2002).  Individual-
specific factors, such as low expected wages, dislike of work, and wage garnishments for legal or 
child support debt, facilitate criminal activity by lowering the threshold at which benefits exceed 
costs (Harris et al., 2010). 
Larger socioeconomic conditions (weak labor markets, recession, and structural unemployment) 
can further reduce the opportunity cost of crime for some people (Thornberry & Christenson, 
1984).  Periods of unemployment and economic recessions increase the amount of time men 
spend on criminal activity.  Prolonged periods out of the labor force enable some men to gain 
sufficient criminal capital to justify persisting in crime after the recessionary period (Mocan et 
al., 2005).  Illicit activity can provide higher remuneration than legal employment for young, 
low-skilled men with prison records.  Former prisoners who cannot find legal work that meets 
their reservation wages may exit the labor force to pursue illicit opportunities (Apel & Sweeten, 
2010b; Fagan & Freeman, 1999; Pettit & Lyons, 2009; Visher, Debus-Sherrill, & Yahner, 2011). 
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Figure 2.2 General Panel Model of Post-Release Labor Force Attachment and Recidivism. 
 
Incarceration and criminal justice involvement contribute to later unemployment by severing 
men’s connections to employers (Hagan, 1993; Krohn, Ward, Thornberry, Lizotte, & Chu, 2011; 
Stewart, 2007; Western, 2002).  Removal from the legal labor market depreciates men’s stock of 
human and social capital, effectively making them less employable in the future (Heckman & 
Borjas, 1980; Mocan et al., 2005; Stewart, 2007).  Jobless applicants often need to accept 
reduced wages to reenter the labor force (Stewart, 2007).  People who experience early job loss 
experience longer, recurrent periods of unemployment (Heckman & Borjas, 1980; Thornberry & 
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Christenson, 1984).  This reduces the number of hours worked in the formal labor market and 
flattens long-term earnings trajectories (Stewart, 2007). 
Labor force detachment and unemployment expose former prisoners to financial and 
psychological strains that may explain much of the relationship between work and crime.  The 
stress associated with looking for work compounds as the length of unemployment increases 
(Krueger, Mueller, Davis, & Sahin, 2011; Sugie, 2014; Young, 2012).  Repeated job rejections 
diminish applicants’ self-confidence and reduce their motivation to continue looking for work 
(Krueger et al., 2011; Sugie, 2014; Young, 2012).  Ongoing financial and emotional stressors 
trigger a cascade of negative emotional states that reduce men’s sense of personal mastery and 
increase their risk of recidivism (Halvorsen, 1998; Maruna, 2001; Price et al., 2002; Visher et al., 
2011). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
Prior SVORI evaluations concluded that employment services failed to improve participants’ 
reentry outcomes, and in some cases appeared to increase recidivism risk (Lattimore et al., 2012; 
Lattimore et al., 2009).  I first examine whether unobserved heterogeneity contributes to 
inconsistent estimates of the effects of employment-focused programs on post-release 
employment and crime (Heckman et al., 2000; Sedgley et al., 2010).  Group-based trajectory 
modeling (GTM) and propensity score techniques (PSM) use men’s baseline interviews and 
criminal history records to control for characteristics that differentially select individuals into 
treatment (Haviland, Nagin, & Rosenbaum, 2007). 
Second, I use duration models to examine whether education and employment programs effect 
participants’ time to first rearrest (Sedgley et al., 2010).  Third, I examine whether increased 
labor force attachment leads to higher quality employment (Stewart, 2007), increased financial 
and emotional wellbeing (Price et al., 2002), and reduced offending (Thornberry & Christenson, 
1984).  The structural equation model use follow-up interview and administrative arrest data to 
test whether quality jobs increase men’s financial and emotional wellbeing and reduce their risk 
of recidivism (Thornberry & Christenson, 1984). 
3.2 Research Hypotheses 
The first set of hypotheses examines the effects of participation in employment-focused prison 
programs on men’s time to rearrest.  The services included in this definition are educational 
programs and job training/vocational education programs (Heckman, 2001; Sedgley et al., 2010). 
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1. Men who participate in vocational education, job training, or other education programs 
exhibit distinct pre-release characteristics from men who do not receive these services. 
2. After controlling for observed heterogeneity between nonparticipants and participants, 
program participants exhibit lower recidivism rates than similar nonparticipants. 
3. Participation in more than one type of employment-focused program has diminishing 
marginal benefits on recidivism. 
The second set of hypotheses examine the effects of labor force attachment and job quality on 
men’s financial and emotional wellbeing, and their risk of recidivism during the early reentry 
period (Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Price et al., 2002; Skardhamar & Telle, 2012; Stewart, 2007; 
Thornberry & Christenson, 1984). 
4. Criminal justice involvement (e.g., arrest during the prior wave) reduces men’s stock of 
human and social capital. 
5. Men who have high levels of human and social capital are more likely to participate in 
the labor market than men with low levels of capital are. 
6. Increased labor force participation leads to improved job quality. 
7. High quality employment reduces men’s experience of financial strain (e.g., unmet 
consumption needs). 
8. Unmet consumption needs increase the probability that men reoffend. 
9. Financial strain, characterized by unmet consumption needs, diminishes emotional 
wellbeing (e.g., psychological distress, personal mastery). 
10. Diminished emotional wellbeing increases the likelihood that men reoffend. 
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3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Data Collection 
The study uses data on adult male prisoners from the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry 
Initiative (SVORI) multi-site evaluation (n = 1,697).  This collaborative federal effort provided 
grant funds to 69 state agencies to design comprehensive reentry services targeting serious and 
violent offenders under 35 years old.  The SVORI evaluation tested the success of this federal 
funding stream in motivating states to develop comprehensive reentry services that reduce 
recidivism.  SVORI programs varied widely in design, curriculum, activities, intensity, and 
timeframe because agencies receiving SVORI funds could tailor services to fit the local context 
without following a specific reentry-programming model (Lattimore et al., 2012; Lattimore & 
Steffey, 2009). 
The evaluation used an intent-to-treat design, in which respondents were classified as 
participants and nonparticipants based on enrollment in SVORI programs or residence in 
facilities offering SVORI programs.  Sites recruited otherwise eligible individuals into the non-
SVORI comparison sample from facilities that did not provide SVORI programs.  They also 
recruited otherwise eligible individuals returning to communities without SVORI programs.  Not 
all SVORI participants received reentry services, and non-SVORI participants receiving 
“treatment as usual” could participate in similar non-SVORI services (Lattimore & Steffey, 
2009).  Data on program participation were not available from all SVORI sites and for all 
SVORI nonparticipants, so the evaluation uses men’s responses at the baseline interview 
(Lattimore et al., 2012). 
The 12 states offering SVORI-funded services to adult men that participated in the SVORI 
evaluation were responsible for recruiting SVORI participants and comparable nonparticipants 
  
24 
 
into the study.  Only two states randomly assigned men to the treatment and comparison groups.  
The remaining 10 states enrolled eligible and interested men into SVORI programs and then 
enrolled otherwise similar individuals into the comparison group.  The initial pool of eligible 
adult male prisoners included 2,564 adult men returning home from adult prisons between July 
2004 and November 2005.  Twelve percent of eligible men refused to participate in the study (n 
= 295), 21% were released from prison before completing the baseline interview (n = 538), and 
1% were ruled ineligible due to language or cognitive limitations (n = 34) (Lattimore & Steffey, 
2009). 
Men completed baseline interviews roughly 1 month before release from prison, and evaluators 
contacted the men at 3, 9, and 15 months after release to complete follow-up interviews.  The 
follow-up interviews were completed from October 2004-April 2006, April 2005-October 2006, 
and October 2005-April 2007.  Men received financial incentives for follow-up interviews 
completed in the community: $35 at the 3-month interview, $40 at the 9-month interview, and 
$50 at the final 15-month interview.  They received an additional $5 if they called a toll-free 
number to schedule follow-up interviews.  Men who were incarcerated at the time of follow-up 
interviews completed interviews in prison.  When possible, respondents who completed 
interviews while institutionalized received the same financial compensations.  Study participants 
who completed all four interviews received an additional $50 at the end of the study (Lattimore 
& Steffey, 2009). 
3.3.2 Sample 
The original SVORI evaluation sample included 1,697 men who were recruited from prison sites 
in 12 US states.  As part of the original evaluation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) provided lifetime arrest data for men in 11 of 12 
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states (n = 1,575).  Arrest data spanned men’s full criminal history up to 36 months after release 
from the SVORI status incarceration.  The NCIC provided the dates of each arrest as well as the 
charge and conviction offense associated with the arrest.  SVORI evaluators calculated the time 
from arrest to release from prison for each arrest recorded in the NCIC database (Lattimore et al., 
2012; Lattimore & Steffey, 2009). 
Roughly 58% of these men completed the 3-month interview (n = 919), 61% completed the 9-
month interview (n = 957), and 65% completed the 15-month interview (n = 1,030).  However, 
only 43% of men interviewed at the pre-release baseline interview completed all three waves (n 
= 670) and 21% of men completed no interviews after the pre-release interview (n = 330) 
(Lattimore et al., 2012; Lattimore & Steffey, 2009).
1
 
The initial sample for this study comprises 1,575 cases that had valid pre-SVORI arrests 
recorded in the NCIC arrest records files.  These men were included in the group-based 
trajectory model (n = 1,575) and logit participation model (n = 1,571).  Cases that were 
successfully matched using propensity scores were included in the duration models (n = 1,521).  
Figure 3.1 presents the sample selection process used to identify latent trajectory groups, model 
participation status, and select appropriate matches among participants and nonparticipants. 
The longitudinal structural equation model uses responses from three follow-up interviews.  
Individuals who completed one or more follow-up interviews were retained in the longitudinal 
structural equation model (n = 1,245). 
                                                 
1
 The original SVORI sample included 122 individuals who had no pre-SVORI arrests recorded in the NCIC arrest 
records file.  Nearly all of these men were imprisoned in Maine (n = 79), which does not report arrests to the 
National Crime Information Center.  The remaining men with no NCIC-reported arrests were released from the 
other states’ sites.  The attrition rates from the follow-up interviews for the non-NCIC sample were virtually 
indistinguishable from the NCIC sample, suggesting that attrition was not necessarily associated with state-level 
factors. 
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Initial SVORI Multi-Site Evaluation sample (n = 1,697)  
     
    Excluded from sample (n = 122) 
Pre-SVORI arrest records missing 
- Maine sites (n = 79) 
- Other sites (n = 43) 
  
     
Group-based trajectory model (n = 1,575)  
Group 1 (n = 864) 
528 Participants 
336 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 2 (n = 307) 
148 Participants 
159 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 3 (n = 404) 
133 Participants 
271 Nonparticipants 
 
     
    Excluded from sample (n = 4) 
Missing covariates 
- 4 participants 
  
     
Logit participation model (melogit) (n = 1,571)  
Group 1 (n = 862) 
526 Participants 
336 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 2 (n = 306) 
147 Participants 
159 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 3 (n = 403) 
132 Participants 
271 Nonparticipants 
 
     
    Excluded from sample (n = 40) 
- 4 G1 nonparticipants 
- 2 G2 nonparticipants 
- 34 G3 nonparticipants 
  
     
Nearest neighbor matching, .10*SD, 5 NN (n = 1,531)  
Group 1 (n = 858) 
526 Participants 
332 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 2 (n = 304) 
147 Participants 
157 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 3 (n = 369) 
132 Participants 
237 Nonparticipants 
 
N = 1,531; 805 Participants, 726 Nonparticipants  
     
   Excluded from sample (n = 10) 
Missing covariates 
- 4 participants 
- 6 nonparticipants 
 
     
Duration Models (n = 1,521)  
Group 1 (n = 855) 
523 Participants 
332 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 2 (n = 303) 
146 Participants 
157 Nonparticipants 
 
Group 3 (n = 363) 
130 Participants 
233 Nonparticipants 
 
    
Figure 3.1 Sample Selection Flowchart for Duration Models. 
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3.3.3 Missing Data Analysis 
Indicators for Missing Data on Baseline Covariates 
Certain key demographic variables that had limited numbers of missing data were recoded to 
retain cases with intermittent missing data.  Two individuals who had missing data for 
racial/ethnic status were included in a combined category: Hispanic, biracial/multiracial, other 
racial/ethnic status, or missing.  Nine individuals who were missing data on number of times 
previously imprisoned were included in the category for no previous prison terms, due to their 
young ages when entering prison to complete their SVORI-related sentences. 
Group-Based Trajectory Model 
The trajectory model retained cases that had missing data for some observation periods (in cases 
where men were too young to have been eligible for arrest), but these cases contributed fewer 
observation periods to the fitting of the trajectory model.  Approximately half of the time-
invariant explanatory variables included in the trajectory model were created using lifetime arrest 
records.  The remaining time-invariant explanatory variables come from the baseline interview, 
which was completed by all of the men recruited into the sample.  However, most items had little 
or no missing data.  Categorical variables that had missing data for a small number of cases (e.g., 
racial/ethnic status, previous imprisonments) were recoded as described above to retain cases. 
Propensity Score Matching and Duration Models 
The indicator for participation status had no missing data (n = 1,575): One man did not indicate 
whether he had received vocational education/job training, but all of the men provided 
information on educational service receipt.  The duration models use data from official arrest 
records that were compiled for all men in the original sample (n = 1,575).  The multilevel logit 
model and duration models used listwise deletion, due to incidental patterns of missing data for 
items collected at the baseline interview.  These models include race and prison variables that 
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were recoded to retain cases with missing data, as described previously.  The logit participation 
model eliminates four cases with missing data on covariates in the model (n = 1,571).  The 
duration models exclude 10 cases from the matched sample that had missing data on covariates 
(n = 1,521). 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedure retained cases with incidental missing data 
patterns, although cases with extensive missing data (e.g., attriters from all three follow-up 
interviews) were excluded from the sample. 
Structural Equation Modeling 
This study uses full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation for the structural 
equation models, which assumes that data are missing at random (Allison, 2003; Yuan, Yang-
Wallentin, & Bentler, 2012).  FIML estimation using the full sample is preferable to statistical 
techniques that use complete cases when data are not completely missing at random (Allison, 
2003).  Listwise deletion introduces the possibility of bias into estimates, while the reduced 
sample size increases the size of standard errors and reduces the power of hypothesis tests 
(Allison, 2003).  FIML generates parameter estimates that are often more efficient than multiple 
imputation techniques and do not rely on multiple random draws of data sets (Allison, 2003, 
2012; Larsen, 2011).  Because FIML addresses missing data as part of the estimation process, the 
parameter estimates, standard errors, and test statistics are stable and do not vary (Allison, 2012). 
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Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions by Analysis 
Variable GTM PSM DM LSEM 
In-person interviews     
Linear age at release X Xa Xa X 
Squared age at release X    
Cubed age at release X    
Years of education  Xa Xa X 
Racial/ethnic status (ref. African American)     
White X X X X 
Hispanic, multiracial, other, miss X X X X 
SVORI term: Sentencing offense     
Drug offense  X X X 
Property offense  X X X 
Person/violent offense  X X X 
Parole/probation violation X  X X 
SVORI term: Time served (years)  Xa X 
Log-transformed time served  Xa   
Prior prison terms  X   
No previous terms/missing X  ref. ref. 
1 previous term X  X X 
2 previous terms ref.  X X 
3 or more previous terms ref.  X X 
Pre-SVORI income: Family  X   
Pre-SVORI: Longest job (ref. Never/1 year)   
1 to under 2 years  X  X 
2 to under 5 years  X  X 
More than 5 years  X  X 
Prosocial peers (W2-W4)    X 
Job search difficulties (W2-W4)    X 
Stable employment (W2-W4)    X 
Recent job: Hours worked (W2-W4)   X 
Recent job: Permanency (W2-W4)     
Permanent position    X 
Temporary employment    X 
Recent job: Stability (W2-W4)     
Formal pay     X 
Casual pay/self-employment    X 
Financial need items (W1-W4)    X 
Personal mastery scale   X  
Average anxiety score (W1-W4)    X 
Average depression score (W1-W4)   X 
Average hostility score (W1-W4)    X 
New crime (SR, W2-W4)    X 
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Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions by Analysis 
Variable GTM PSM DM LSEM 
In-person interviews     
Pre-SVORI recent alcohol/drug use  X X 
Global Severity Index   X  
General physical health status  X   
Health limits activities (ref. None)    
A little  X   
A lot  X   
SVORI participant status  X   
Educational program participation X  
Employment program participation X  
Prison industry job  X  
Work release job  X  
SVORI site location (ref. South Carolina) Level-2   
Iowa  random X X 
Indiana  effect X X 
Kansas   X X 
Maryland   X X 
Missouri   X X 
Nevada   X X 
Ohio   X X 
Oklahoma   X X 
Pennsylvania   X X 
Washington   X X 
NCIC Arrest Files     
Pre-release arrest files     
Age at first arrest X  X  
Lagged arrest, drug offense X X   
Lagged arrest, property offense X X   
Lagged arrest, violent offense X X   
Years with any recorded arrest X    
Lifetime sum of recorded arrests X X   
Arrests count, year before prison   X X 
Post-release arrest files     
Time to first arrest  X  
Time to first drug arrest  X  
Time to first property arrest  X  
Time to first violent arrest  X  
Arrest within 3, 9, 12 months   X 
Return to prison within 3, 9, 15 months   X 
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Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions by Analysis 
Variable GTM PSM DM LSEM 
Model-Generated Variables     
Trajectory group (ref. Group 1)     
Group 2  X X X 
Group 3  X X X 
Linear age*Trajectory group  X
a
   
Education*Trajectory group  X
a
   
Prison terms*Trajectory group  X   
Prob. participation, Education/Employment services  X  
Probability of participation* Trajectory group  X  
    
Note: GTM = Group-based trajectory model.  LSEM = Longitudinal Structural Equation Model.  NCIC = 
National Crime Information Center.  PSM = Propensity score methods.  DM = Duration Models.  SR = Self-
report.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  In-person interview items were collected 
at baseline unless noted.  “a” indicates continuous variables centered on state means. 
3.4 Measures 
This section first describes the main outcomes variables for the study.  It next describes the 
explanatory and outcome variables for each set of analyses in detail.  Table 3.1 presents the 
variables included in each type of analysis.  Variables included in the analyses can be divided 
into three categories: in-person interview items, variables created from the NCIC arrest record 
files, and model-generated variables.  Most covariates from the in-person interview were 
measured at the baseline interview; variables that were obtained from the follow-up interviews 
are noted in Table 3.1. 
3.4.1 Main Outcome Variables 
This study use official records and men’s self-reported information from follow-up interviews to 
measure criminal activity and criminal justice involvement.  Arrests (for any offense and by 
specific offenses) are measured using the NCIC arrest records, and self-reported criminal activity 
(offenses committed during the 3-6 month reference period for each follow-up wave) is 
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measured using responses from each follow-up interview (Loeffler, 2013; Zweig, Yahner, & 
Redcross, 2011). 
3.4.2 Group-Based Trajectory Model 
Measures included in the trajectory model were obtained from NCIC arrest records data and 
from the baseline pre-release interview. 
Outcome Variables 
The key outcome variables (e.g., indicators of annual arrests) are derived from the NCIC arrest 
record files.  The trajectory model uses indicators of annual arrests during the 14 years leading 
up to the SVORI status incarceration to chart prisoners’ prior offending trajectories (Haviland & 
Nagin, 2005; Haviland et al., 2007; Thornberry & Christenson, 1984). 
Explanatory Variables 
The trajectory model includes time-varying and time-invariant measures created from the 
longitudinal arrest record files.  Linear, squared, and cubed forms of age at the time of the arrest 
were included to model the nonlinear effect of age on risk of arrest.  Age at arrest was estimated 
using men’s age at release from the SVORI status offense.  Time-varying covariates included in 
the model were binary indicators of drug, property, or violent arrests during the prior year (e.g., 
three lagged indicators for each year, indicating the presence of a drug, property, or violent arrest 
the previous year). 
Additional covariates for criminal history were included in the model to control for false 
desistance, observed during periods when men were imprisoned, and to control for the fact that 
the 14-year observation period excluded some men’s complete criminal records.  Time-invariant 
covariates that were created using NCIC arrest records include age at first NCIC arrest 
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(continuous), number of pre-SVORI years with any arrests (continuous), and lifetime number of 
arrests before SVORI prison term (continuous). 
Other time-invariant covariates were obtained from the baseline in-person interview.  To control 
for the possibility of false desistance during previous periods of imprisonment, the model 
includes self-report indicators for number of times imprisoned (1 = first imprisonment or 
missing, 2 = second imprisonment, ref. two or more previous imprisonments) and for parole or 
probation violation leading to the SVORI prison term (Eggleston, Laub, & Sampson, 2004).  
Racial/ethnic status is included in the model to control for differential policing practices and 
unobserved state-level differences (1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American (ref.), 3 = Hispanic, 
biracial/multiracial, other racial/ethnic status, or missing). 
3.4.3 Multilevel Logit Participation Model 
The propensity score model includes pre-release indicators of men’s demographic 
characteristics, prior employment, criminal history, and structural factors that may be correlated 
with men’s decision to participate in employment-focused prison programs (Apel & Sweeten, 
2010a; Haviland et al., 2007).  Measures included in the logit participation model were obtained 
from NCIC arrest record files and from the baseline pre-release interview. 
Outcome Variables 
Participation status was measured as participation in educational services or specific employment 
programs while imprisoned.  Educational services ranged from literacy tutoring and GED 
courses to higher education (n = 717).  Employment programs included vocational education or 
job training programs (n = 208).  Some participants received both educational and employment 
services (n = 116).  Nearly half of the sample did not participate in either type of program (n = 
766). 
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Explanatory Variables 
SVORI site location (US states) is included in the model as a level-2 random effect.  Individuals 
are nested within states from which they had been released from prison. 
Level-1 variables measure individuals’ characteristics.  Demographic variables were age at 
release (continuous), education (continuous), racial/ethnic status (ref. African American), and 
previous family income support (1 = yes).  Four items reflected the SVORI status offense: 
number of years in prison for the SVORI status offense (log-transformed) and three indicators 
for drug, property, and violent conviction.  Several items captured pre-SVORI criminal justice 
involvement: previous imprisonments, indicators for drug, property, or violent arrests during the 
year preceding prison entry (1 = yes), and total number of arrests that year (continuous). 
Other explanatory variables included SVORI participation status (1 = yes), general physical 
health (health limits moderate activity: 1 = a lot, 2 = a little, ref. not at all), and general emotional 
wellbeing (e.g., feeling calm and peaceful).  Trajectory group membership was included in the 
model as dummy variables (ref. Group 1) and as interaction terms for age, education, and 
continuous number of previous imprisonments.  Age at release, education, and prison sentence 
length were centered on state means to account for state-level differences. 
3.4.4 Duration Models 
Measures included in the duration models were obtained from NCIC arrest records data and from 
the baseline pre-release interview. 
Outcome Variables 
The main outcome measure for the duration models was time to rearrest for any offense, using 
post-release arrest records obtained from the NCIC arrest files.  Time to arrest was measured in 
days since release from the SVORI prison term.  The parametric duration models measure time 
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to arrest in five different formats: time to arrest within the first 3 years, with repeated failures 
permitted; time to first arrest for any offense; and time to first arrest for three offense subtypes 
(drug, property, and violent offense).  Prior to fitting the models, the five continuous arrest 
measures were log-transformed to normalize their distributions and improve the fit of the 
models.  The duration models use the log-transformed continuous arrest measures as outcome 
variables.  In each case, model residuals indicate that the models fit most of the observations 
well. 
Explanatory Variables 
Variables included in the duration models include indicators of program participation, men’s pre-
release demographic characteristics, work experience, prior offenses, and predicted trajectory 
group membership (Brewster & Sharp, 2002; Sedgley et al., 2010; Skardhamar & Telle, 2012).  
The duration models presented exclude interaction terms for engagement in both types of 
employment-focused programs, but results of models that include interaction terms are not 
substantively different. 
The main predictor variables were educational programming, employment programming, 
trajectory group membership, and predicted probability of participation.  Demographic and 
human capital measures included age at release (continuous), education (continuous), longest 
time employed at one job (1 = 1-2 years, 2 = 3-5 years, 3 = 5 or more years, ref. less than 1 year), 
work release employment (1 = yes), and prison industry employment (1 = yes).  Measures for the 
SVORI status offense included three indicators for having been convicted of drug, property, and 
violent offenses, an indicator for parole or probation violations leading to the SVORI prison 
term, and prison sentence length (continuous). 
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Recent criminal history was captured using men’s age at first NCIC arrest (continuous), total 
number of arrests the year preceding prison entry, and number of previous imprisonments (1 = 
one previous imprisonment, 2 = two or more previous imprisonments, ref. first imprisonment or 
missing).  Physical and mental health items included personal mastery (continuous parcel 
averaging responses from eight baseline interview items), Global Severity Index (GSI) at 
baseline, and an indicator of alcohol or drug use during the month preceding the SVORI prison 
term (1 = yes).  Racial/ethnic status (ref. African American) and state location (ref. South 
Carolina) are included in the model as controls for social structural context.  Age at release, 
education, and prison sentence length were centered on state means to account for state-level 
differences. 
3.4.5 Structural Equation Modeling 
The model includes five analysis periods: the baseline interview (before release), the first 3 
months following release, months 4-9, months 10-15, and recidivism measures for months 3-21.  
Table 3.2 presents the interview and data collection periods used to create the items included in 
the path models. 
Indicators and measures included in the structural equation model come from the baseline 
interview, three follow-up interviews, and NCIC post-release arrest files.  The LSEM uses 
measures from waves 2-4 for labor force participation, job quality, financial needs, psychological 
distress, and criminal activity (Krohn et al., 2011). 
Latent Factors 
Financial need (Time 1, 2, 3, & 4).  The latent financial need factors were modeled using 
responses to six items at each interview period.  Men stated the extent to which they needed 
financial assistance at the time (0 = not at all, 1 = a little, 2 = a lot).  These ordinal-scale items 
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were combined to form two parcels, the first of which averaged men’s responses to three items 
(place to live, clothing banks/food pantries, financial assistance).  The second parcel averaged 
men’s responses to the following three items (transportation, public financial assistance, public 
healthcare insurance). 
Table 3.2 Interview and Data Collection Periods for Longitudinal Structural Equation Model 
Data source Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 NCIC files 
Reference period 
Month 
of release 
Months 
1-3 
Months 
4-9 
Months 
10-15 
Months 
1-21 
      
Constructs      
Stable employment/ 
Job quality 
 Since 
release 
Since date 
of last 
interview 
Since date 
of last 
interview 
 
Financial needs 
Date of 
interview 
Date of 
interview 
Date of 
interview 
Date of 
interview 
 
Psychological 
distress 
7 days 
preceding 
interview 
7 days 
preceding 
interview 
7 days 
preceding 
interview 
7 days 
preceding 
interview 
 
Self-reported 
criminal activity 
 Since 
release 
Since date 
of last 
interview 
Since date 
of last 
interview 
 
Rearrest/  
Return to prison 
 Within first 
3 months 
Within first 
9 months 
Within first 
12 months 
Within first 
21 months 
Control variables 
Date of 
interview 
    
NCIC files      
Analysis periods 1 2 3 4 5 
Post-release months 0 1-3 4-9 10-15 16-21 
     
 
Psychological Distress (Time 1, 2, 3, & 4).  Psychological distress was measured for each time 
point using responses to 15 items measuring respondents’ feelings of anxiety, depression, and 
hostility during the previous week (1-5 scale).  The five items within each subscale were first 
averaged to create three parcels for each analysis period (before release, 3 months, 9 months, and 
  
38 
 
15 months after release).  These parcels were then log-transformed to normalize their 
distributions. 
Labor force attachment (Time 2, 3, & 4).  Three items were used to model men’s labor force 
attachment during the reference periods preceding each follow-up interview (van der Geest et al., 
2011).  The first item is included in the model as an observed indicator for labor force 
participation, and is not an indicator of the latent construct for job quality.  The binary indicator 
of labor force participation measures stable employment since the date of the last interview (1 = 
having worked at least once during each month that men had been living in the community).  
Men who worked intermittently during the 3-6 month reference period were coded as 0, as were 
men either who did not work at all or who were not living in the community at any point during 
the observation period. 
The latent construct for job quality is measured using two standardized items collected at each of 
the three follow-up interviews.  The first item reflected the average number of hours men had 
worked each week at their last place of employment (centered and scaled to M 0, SD 1).  The 
second item was an index of primary sector employment.  The initial score ranged from 0-6 and 
was created by summing men’s responses to three questions (Job permanency: 0 = no recent job, 
1 = temporary pay, 2 = permanent employment; Job stability: 0 = no recent job, 1 = casual 
pay/self-employment, 2 = formal pay; Job benefits: 1 = receive paid time off, 1 = receive health 
insurance from work).  This 6-point index was centered and scaled to M 0, SD 1. 
Observed Variables 
Criminal activity is measured by self-reported criminal behavior during the months leading up to 
each follow-up interview (Sickles & Williams, 2008; Williams & Sickles, 2002).  Criminal 
involvement was measured at three time points.  The first item recorded any crime committed 
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since release from prison (W2, at approximately 3 months following release), the second 
reported crimes that occurred between the second and third interviews (W3, approximately 3-9 
months after release), and the third recorded crimes committed since the third interview (W4, 
months 10-15).  To supplement findings using self-reported criminal involvement, the model 
includes indicators for arrest within 12 months and return to prison within the first 21 months 
(Thornberry & Christenson, 1984). 
Explanatory Variables 
Control variables that were collected at baseline include age at release, educational attainment, 
racial/ethnic status (ref. African American), and longest time employed at one job (1 = 1-2 years, 
2 = 3-5 years, 3 = 5 or more years, ref. less than 1 year).  Measures for the SVORI status offense 
include three indicators for having been convicted of drug, property, and violent offenses, an 
indicator for parole or probation violations leading to the SVORI prison term, and prison 
sentence length (continuous).  Criminal risk measures include trajectory group membership (ref. 
Group 1), total number of arrests the year preceding prison entry, number of previous 
imprisonments (1 = one previous imprisonment, 2 = two or more previous imprisonments, ref. 
first imprisonment or missing), and an indicator of alcohol or drug use during the month 
preceding the SVORI prison term (1 = yes).  Dummies are included to control for state-specific 
characteristics (ref. South Carolina). 
Covariates collected at follow-up waves capture men’s recent human and social capital.  These 
included parcels measuring the average number of job search difficulties respondents had faced 
during the reference period, and positive peer influences (proportion of friends employed, 
proportion of friends who stay out of trouble).  Criminal justice indicators measure rearrests and 
returns to prison within the first 9 months of release from prison. 
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3.5 Data Analysis Plan 
Persistent, chronic, and more serious offenders are less likely to have acquired work skills before 
prison entry and to pursue legal employment after release (Apel et al., 2007; Brame, Paternoster, 
& Piquero, 2012; Nagin & Tremblay, 2005).  This study employs techniques that control for 
heterogeneity in treatment (program participation, labor force attachment) and in prior 
observations of the outcome (recidivism) that can bias estimates of the average treatment effect 
(Heckman, 2001; Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997).  Group-based trajectory modeling and 
propensity score matching control for pre-SVORI factors that shaped men’s access to services 
and informed their participation decisions (Apel et al., 2007; Haviland et al., 2007; Haviland, 
Rosenbaum, Nagin, & Tremblay, 2008; Heckman et al., 1997).  Propensity score matching and 
duration models are used to test the first three hypotheses presented at the beginning of the 
chapter. 
Structural equation modeling is used to test the remaining hypotheses (4-10).  The structural 
equation model employs a cross-lagged recursive panel design to assess 1) whether labor force 
attachment is associated with self-reported criminal activity during the next interview period, and 
2) whether self-reported criminal activity is associated with labor force attachment during the 
next interview period. 
3.5.1 Group-Based Trajectory Model 
The Stata user-written command traj was used to derive latent groups within the sample, using 
men’s pre-SVORI arrest records.  The trajectory modeling procedure uses time-varying outcome 
measures (binary indicators for any arrest within a given year) to identify distinct arrest 
trajectories.  Time-varying covariates are included in the longitudinal component of the model, 
as these covariates may alter the shapes of the trajectories for certain groups.  Time-invariant 
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covariates are included in the multinomial component of the model; these characteristics 
differentiate members assigned probabilistically to each derived trajectory group.  Men are 
assigned probabilistically to one group, based on their observed characteristics.  Models’ Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values were used to 
compare competing non-nested models to determine which one provided the best fit to the data.  
Appendix C provides detailed information about the estimation process. 
Fitting the Trajectory Model 
Age is the primary time-varying predictor in the model; it was included in the final model in 
linear, squared, and cubed terms.  Including linear, squared, and cubed terms for age at time of 
arrest provided superior fit to models that included only the linear or squared terms.  Time-
varying lagged indicators for drug, property, and violent arrests were included in the model 
because their coefficients were significant for two of the three derived latent groups.  Other time-
invariant covariates were retained in the model because they improved the fit of the model and 
controlled for differences in criminal records that were not captured by the arrest records (e.g., 
prior jail/prison terms, juvenile system involvement, and lengthy criminal records that exceeded 
the 14-year pre-SVORI observation period). 
3.5.2 Multilevel Logit Participation Model 
This study uses propensity score techniques to balance individuals on the likelihood that they 
engage in employment programs (Haviland et al., 2007).  Propensity score matching should 
address violations of two key assumptions required to compare treatment and comparison group 
outcomes (Heckman et al., 1997).  The conditional independence assumption requires that the 
outcome for untreated men does not influence their participation: Men’s probability of rearrest or 
reincarceration does not influence their selection into employment-focused programming.  The 
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overlap assumption specifies that for any value of x, 0 < 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏((𝑑1 = 1|𝑥)) < 1.  At any level 
of x, there should be a similar mix of nonparticipants and participants in the sample, such that 
there is a nonparticipant who is similar to each participant in the sample (Apel & Sweeten, 
2010a; Greene, 2012; Haviland et al., 2007; Heckman et al., 1997). 
Defining Program Participation 
The original analysis plan had included prison industry work and work release employment in 
the definition of program participation, based on the expectation that prison industry work and 
work release employment provided relevant work skills (e.g., competing treatments to vocational 
education/job training).  Unfortunately, sample members holding work release/prison industry 
jobs were significantly different from the rest of the sample; they were older, more educated, 
serving shorter prison sentences, and were less likely to have been convicted of a violent offense 
(results not presented).  Diagnostic tests (traditional bivariate statistics and standardized bias 
estimates) revealed that lingering biases resulted from the inclusion of prison industry work and 
work release employment in the definition of employment-focused program participation.
2
 
Furthermore, half of the men holding these industry/work release jobs had not received any other 
educational/employment services.  Defining prison industry/work release jobholders as 
participants, many of whom had received no other employment-focused services, led to poor 
matching results.  The matched participants who held prison industry/work release employment 
remained persistently different from nonparticipants, but also from other participants.  As a 
                                                 
2
 Pre- and post-matching standardized bias tests using this original participation definition are available upon 
request.  Mean and median standardized biases after matching were smaller than before matching, but bivariate tests 
show that the matching process retained large differences between individuals who held work release/prison 
industry employment and the other sample members (nonparticipant and participant alike) who did not. 
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result, matched participants receiving the main treatments of interest (vocational education/job 
training) remained significantly different from the matched nonparticipant sample. 
Upon realizing this problem, participation was redefined to fit the narrower criteria described in 
the Measures subsection of this chapter: educational services of any kind and/or vocational 
education/job training programs.  Because roughly half of the prison industry/work-release 
jobholders also received some form of education or job training services, this group divided 
evenly among participants and nonparticipants. 
Estimating the Logit Participation Model 
Several logit models were fit to reduce standardized biases to an acceptable level (mean 
standardized bias under 5%; maximum standardized bias under 20%).  These models included a 
1-level logit model that included individual-level characteristics, SVORI participant status, and 
state dummies; a 2-level logit model, in which individuals were nested within SVORI participant 
status; a kitchen-sink logit model that included multiple measures for each construct 
(demographics, employment history, criminal history, health status, substance use, attitudinal 
measures); and a an expanded version of the kitchen-sink model that included squared, cubed, 
and interaction terms for significant predictors.  These models did not effectively capture the 
state-level variations in participation, so they were discarded in favor of the 2-level logit model 
that nests individuals within SVORI sites (US states). 
Fitting the Multilevel Logit Model 
The multilevel logit model (Stata13 melogit) estimates men’s predicted probability of 
participation in educational services, vocational education, or job training programs.  Individuals 
were nested within state sites to control for substantial state-level variation in prisoners’ 
demographic characteristics, criminal histories, and access to educational or employment-
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focused services.  State SVORI site is included in the model as a level-2 random effect, and 
baseline demographic and risk characteristics are included in the model as level-1 covariates. 
Items from the baseline interview that reflected men’s pre-prison characteristics were included in 
the logit model, and these self-report interview items were supplemented by variables that had 
been created from the NCIC arrest records.  Continuous covariates are included in the model 
after centering observations on mean values for each state.  Trajectory group membership is 
included in the model as dummy variables and as interactions with state-centered age at release, 
state-centered level of education (in years), and number of previous imprisonments.  These 
individual-level characteristics do not completely remove the state-level variation in participation 
status.  The final multilevel logit model reveals that 16% of the variation in participation status 
occurred at the state level. 
3.5.3 Propensity Score Matching 
Steps to Assess Covariate Balance 
Propensity scores that effectively remove imbalances along potential confounders satisfy the 
conditional independence assumption (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a).  Two methods assess whether 
the PSM has achieved covariate balance.  First, the distribution of scores within treatment and 
comparison groups can be compared to determine whether there is common support across levels 
of x.  Insignificant differences across most to all covariates within each bin provide supporting 
evidence that the model has achieved covariate balance (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a). 
Second, estimates of the standardized bias before and after matching can be used to compare the 
results derived from various matching methods.  Standardized bias estimates that exceed 20 
indicate covariate imbalance (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985).  To meet the 
overlap assumption, propensity scores for cases in each treatment condition should overlap, with 
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few off-support cases in tails of the score distribution and ideally common support across all 
values between 0 and 1 (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a; Heckman et al., 1997). 
Matching Estimation Techniques 
Nearest neighbor matching is the simplest method, and it permits matching to single or multiple 
cases, with or without replacement.  Matching to multiple nonparticipants reduces variance but 
can increase bias because some matches are less accurate.  Matching without replacement works 
well when untreated and treated cases are located along the whole propensity score distribution.  
Matching with replacement permits treated cases to be matched to the same untreated cases; this 
can improve the quality of the matches, although it reduces the effective sample size.  This loss 
of efficiency is preferred to the potential increase in bias that can occur when using matching 
without replacement (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a). 
Caliper matching sets an additional parameter to the nearest neighbor matching technique; the 
caliper sets the maximum area from which untreated cases can be matched to treated cases.  This 
helps ensure that matched pairs have similar propensity scores (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a).  The 
initial caliper width proposed for use in the matching model was 0.2 of the standard deviation of 
the propensity score logit (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). 
Kernel matching techniques may be preferred in cases where untreated and treated cases are less 
evenly distributed.  The finite probability distribution function used as a kernel weights untreated 
cases by their distance from the treated case.  If a uniform kernel is used, this method can 
increase the number of untreated cases to which treated cases are matched, as it matches treated 
cases to all untreated cases within a given radius.  The Epanechnikov kernel matches treated 
cases to all untreated cases located within a pre-specified bandwidth (Apel & Sweeten, 2010a). 
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Propensity Score Estimation Methods 
The Stata user-written psmatch2 command was used to implement various matching estimators.  
Matches were restricted to regions of common support.  Prior to matching, the Stata user-written 
pscore command was used to divide the sample into 5 bins of equal size.  The program showed 
that there were no significant differences between participants and nonparticipants within the 
same bin.  The pstest command was used to assess standardized biases for key predictors before 
and after matching. 
Results from multiple matching estimators were evaluated to assess which estimator produced 
optimal matches (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b).  Nearest neighbor matching with caliper, and 
permitting various numbers of matches, was used as the primary matching technique.  To 
supplement results derived from nearest neighbor matching techniques, this study implemented a 
second set of models that use kernel matching.  Various forms of kernel matching estimators 
(Epanechnikov, Gaussian, tricube and uniform kernels) were considered, but these alternatives 
resulted in greater loss of cases without any corresponding improvement in balance. 
Implementing Propensity Score Matching 
The dissertation proposal initially specified that matches would be restricted to individuals 
within the same trajectory group (Haviland & Nagin, 2005; Haviland et al., 2007; Haviland et al., 
2008).  When efforts were made to restrict matching to within the same trajectory group, 
participants and nonparticipants in the high-rate trajectory groups (Groups 1 and 3) showed 
adequate balance using most matching techniques.  Despite this, mean standardized biases 
exceeded 5% for all matching methods, and standardized biases for key predictors exceeded 10% 
(e.g., age at release, SVORI prison term).  Matching estimators failed to achieve balance when 
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matching individuals within the low-rate offending group (Group 2).  Instead, the matching 
process was modified to permit matching across trajectory groups. 
3.5.4 Duration Models 
Duration models estimate the effect of employment programs on rearrests during the first 3 years 
of release (Sedgley et al., 2010).  The repeated-events model estimates the time to each new 
arrest date that occurred within the first 3 years of release.  For men with multiple recorded 
arrests, the time to subsequent arrests was adjusted to reflect the time that had lapsed since the 
preceding arrest.  In the single-event duration models, respondents remain in the sample until 
they experience the event, at which point they are removed from the sample as failures (Zweig et 
al., 2011). 
The duration models use parametric regression models to measure time to arrest in five different 
formats: time to arrest within the first 3 years with repeated events permitted, time to first arrest 
for any offense, and time to first arrest for three offense subtypes (drug, property, and violent 
offense).  The Gompertz distribution provided the best fit to the data in the repeated-events 
failure model.  To account for the dependence due to repeated observations for the same 
individual, standard errors use robust estimation with clustering at the individual level.  In the 
case of the four models estimating time to first arrest, the Weibull distribution provided the best 
fit to the data.  In these models, standard errors use robust estimation with clustering at the state 
level. 
3.5.5 Structural Equation Modeling 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) provides more flexibility than traditional regression-based 
approaches in modeling measurement error, time-specific parameter estimates, and cross-lagged 
effects (Bollen & Brand, 2010).  SEM can model explicitly the measurement error that results 
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from random noise (Bollen & Brand, 2010; Krohn et al., 2011).  The Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) submodel depicts relationships between the latent factor and indicators used to 
measure each latent factor (Bollen & Noble, 2011).  The CFA measurement submodel permits 
use of multiple indicators of the same construct to enhance measurement accuracy (Bollen & 
Bauldry, 2011).  It enables one to specify correlations between indicators.  The CFA permits 
error terms for indicators to be correlated when there is a theoretical or methodological reason 
for the error terms to correlate (Bollen & Noble, 2011). 
The structural submodel models the inter-relationships between latent factors and the observed 
indicators that reflect these latent constructs (Bollen & Brand, 2010; Krohn et al., 2011).  Figure 
2.2 presents the original proposed structural model.  Figure 3.5 presents the initial longitudinal 
structural equation model (LSEM).  Figure 4.10 presents the CFA results and Figure 4.11 
presents the results of the LSEM.  Ellipses represent latent constructs that were retained from the 
CFA.  Squares and rectangles represent observed variables. 
Assessing Factorial Invariance over Time 
Tests were conducted to assess whether the indicators exhibited factorial invariance over time.  
Indicators that exhibit consistent factor loadings, intercepts, and variances over time can be said 
to be measuring the same construct over time, with differences over time reflecting changes in 
the underlying construct.  To test this assumption, a series of nested models were conducted that 
imposed increasingly stringent requirements on model parameters.  Fit statistics for each nested 
model were compared to the fit statistics for the preceding model to assess whether the items met 
the assumption of invariance at each stage.  Meade, Johnson, and Braddy (2008) recommend 
using a change in the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .002 as the threshold for rejecting this 
assumption. 
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Figure 3.2 Parameter Labels for Four Time Points: The Configural Invariance Model. 
The configural invariance model estimated all parameters freely, with restrictions only on the 
patterns of loadings on factors (Figure 3.2).  The weak invariance model constrained factor 
loadings to equality at each time point, but intercepts and variances remain freely estimated 
(Figure 3.3).  The strong invariance model constrained factors and loadings to be equal at each 
period (Figure 3.4).  If the model passes the assumption of strong factorial invariance, the model 
can be used to examine changes in latent means over time. 
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Figure 3.3 Parameter Labels for Four Time Points: The Weak Invariance Model. 
Structural Equation Path Model 
This study adapts the path model depicted in Thornberry & Christenson (1984).  Prior criminal 
activity is predicted to influence men’s current labor force participation and job conditions 
through changes in men’s stock of human and social capital (Heckman et al., 2006; Sickles & 
Williams, 2008; Thornberry & Christenson, 1984).  The path model is estimated by Mplus 
version 7.3, using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors, because the 
employment, crime, and recidivism measures are binary indicators. 
 
  
51 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Parameter Labels for Four Time Points: The Strong Invariance Model. 
Control variables were regressed on latent and observed endogenous variables from the final 
analysis period and on work and crime outcomes at each follow-up wave.  Models’ AIC values 
were used to compare competing non-nested models to determine which one provided the best fit 
to the data.  The final sample size for the general structural equation model was 1,243 cases. 
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Figure 3.5 Initial Longitudinal Structural Equation Path Model. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter presents results of the trajectory group modeling, propensity score matching, 
duration models, and structural equation modeling.  This chapter begins by presenting 
descriptive characteristics of the study sample at the time of the baseline interview.  This chapter 
next presents results of the trajectory group model, propensity score matching process, and 
duration models, all of which are used to test the effect of employment programs on arrest 
outcomes following release from prison.  Information from the trajectory group model is 
included in the logit model used to model the probability of receiving employment-focused 
services.  The matched sample obtained from propensity score matching is used to model time to 
rearrest in the repeated-event and single-event failure models. 
The second half of the chapter presents results of the longitudinal structural equation model.  The 
CFA model is tested for invariance over time, and the best-fitting model meets the assumptions 
of strong invariance over time.  Using the strong invariant CFA model, the longitudinal SEM 
includes four interview waves.  The best-fitting model regresses all endogenous constructs and 
observed variables on covariates from the baseline interview and NCIC arrest record files.   
Primary outcome measures are presented at the beginning of each analysis section: pre-SVORI 
arrests are used to fit the group-based trajectory model, employment-focused service receipt is 
used in the logit participation model, several time-based rearrest measures are included in 
duration models, and work and crime outcomes at each follow-up interview are included in the 
structural equation model.  
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Table 4.1 Demographic Characteristics at Baseline. 
 
Total sample 
 N / M % (SD) 
   
Pre-SVORI criminal record (NCIC records)   
Age at first arrest (range 7-66) 19.57 (3.86) 
Lifetime sum of recorded arrests (range 1-66) 8.66 (7.76) 
Years since first arrest (at time of release) (range 0-52) 10.04 (6.65) 
Number of years with any recorded arrest (range 1-30) 5.03 (3.49) 
SVORI status offense   
Sentencing offense (percentages do not sum to 1)   
Drug offense 541 34.55 
Property offense 376 24.01 
Person/violent offense 644 41.12 
Missing SVORI sentencing offense 9 0.57 
Parole/probation violation 460 29.21 
Time served, years (range 0.16-26) 2.66 (2.61) 
Pre-release interview: Self-reported criminal record   
Age at first arrest (SR) (range 7-67) 16.13 (4.99) 
Ever spent time in juvenile corrections facility 772 49.02 
Pre-SVORI arrests (SR) (range 0-45, cap 95%) 12.41 (11.07) 
Missing data 105 6.67 
Prior convictions (SR) (range 0-20, cap 95%) 5.09 (4.85) 
Missing data 38 2.41 
Prior prison terms (SR) (range 0-5, cap 95%) 1.25 (1.44) 
No previous terms 649 41.44 
1 previous term 394 25.16 
2 previous terms 243 15.52 
3 or more previous terms 280 17.88 
Pre-SVORI income: Illicit wages 691 43.87 
Program participation   
Employment-focused program participation 871 55.30 
Educational services alone 565 40.07 
Job training/vocational education alone 79 5.61 
Prison industry/work release alone 62 4.40 
More than one type of program 165 10.48 
   
Note: N = 1,575.  Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  NCIC = National Crime Information Center.  
SR = Self-report.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.   
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4.2 Descriptive Results 
4.2.1 Demographic Characteristics at Baseline 
Table 4.1 presents data on baseline characteristics of the sample.  Men’s average age at first 
arrest was 16 years old; by release, men were 30 years old on average and had served nearly 3 
years in prison.  Minorities composed 70% of the sample (55% African American, 33% White, 
4% Hispanic, and 8% other).  At the time of the baseline interview, 40% of men reported that 
they were currently married or involved in a steady relationship (n = 628).  Sixty percent of men 
(n = 947) reported that they were fathers of minor children; and 30% of them held child support 
orders before entering prison (Lattimore et al., 2012; Lattimore & Visher, 2009). 
Four in ten respondents left prison with less than a twelfth-grade education, having not 
completed the GED while incarcerated (n = 633).  Men were more likely to have received GEDs 
than to have graduated from high school (29% vs. 14%), indicating the possible completion of 
the GED during the current (or previous) prison sentence.  Two-thirds of men had been 
employed at some point during the 6 months leading up to prison (n = 1,040).  Those 
predominantly full-time positions paid average hourly wages of $10.51 (SD 7.62).  However, 
most men had not held consistent employment before prison, as 60% of men had never held a job 
for more than 2 years. 
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Table 4.2 Demographic Characteristics of Program Participants before Matching. 
 
Participants 
(n = 809) 
Nonparticipants 
(n = 766) 
χ2 / t-test p 
 
N / M % (SD) N / M % (SD) 
 
 
Demographic characteristics       
Age at release 27.80 (6.04) 31.50 (8.04) 10.38*** <.001 
18-25 years old 322 39.80 194 25.33 98.57*** <.001 
26-30 years old 259 32.01 205 26.76   
31-35 years old 166 20.52 190 24.80   
36+ years old 62 7.67 187 23.10   
Education 11.71 (2.18) 11.98 (2.11) 2.48 .013 
Less than HSD 369 45.72 264 34.46 88.14*** <.001 
HSD 54 6.69 174 22.72 
 
 
GED 259 32.09 197 25.72 
 
 
College attendance 125 15.49 131 17.10 
 
 
Race 
    
12.17** .002 
African American 434 53.65 438 57.18 
 
 
White 256 31.64 259 33.81 
 
 
Hisp, multi, other, miss 119 14.71 69 9.01 
 
 
Criminal risk factors       
SVORI status offense 
     
 
Drug offense 256 31.92 285 37.30 5.01 .025 
Property offense 193 24.06 183 23.95 0.00 .959 
Person/violent offense 375 46.76 269 35.21 21.55*** <.001 
Parole/probation violation 195 24.10 265 34.60 20.95*** <.001 
Time served 3.35 (3.02) 1.94 (1.83) -11.15*** <.001 
Age at first arrest (NCIC data) 19.08 (3.37) 20.09 (4.26) 5.22*** <.001 
Age at first arrest (SR) 15.45 (4.47) 16.85 (5.39) 5.59*** <.001 
Years since first arrest (NCIC) 8.71 (5.44) 11.44 (7.48) 8.30*** <.001 
Prior arrests count (NCIC) 6.98 (5.75) 10.43 (9.11) 9.03*** <.001 
Prior arrests (SR) 11.75 (10.91) 13.11 (11.19) 2.37* .018 
Prior convictions (SR) 4.83 (4.68) 5.37 (5.02) 2.19* .029 
Prior prison terms (SR) 0.95 (1.25) 1.56 (1.56) 8.55*** <.001 
No previous terms/missing 408 50.43 250 32.64 77.00*** <.001 
1 previous term 197 24.35 197 25.72   
2 previous terms 102 12.61 141 18.41   
3 or more previous terms 102 12.61 178 23.23   
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Table 4.2 Demographic Characteristics of Program Participants before Matching. 
 
Participants 
(n = 809) 
Nonparticipants 
(n = 766) 
χ2 / t-test p 
 
N / M % (SD) N / M % (SD) 
 
 
Work history       
Pre-SVORI income       
Family 278 34.49 204 26.67 11.30** .001 
Friends 133 16.50 107 13.99 1.92 .166 
Government 75 9.31 83 10.85 1.04 .309 
Illegal activity 391 48.51 300 39.22 13.76*** .000 
Recent work before prison 511 63.16 529 69.06 6.10* .014 
Recent job: Permanency     7.05 .029 
Permanent position 370 45.79 397 51.96   
Temporary employment 140 17.33 130 17.02   
Recent job: Stability     11.20** .004 
Formal pay 390 48.27 370 48.43   
Casual pay/self-employment 120 14.85 157 20.55   
Recent job: Hourly wage 9.78 (6.41) 11.21 (8.58) 2.98** .003 
Longest period at one job 
    
44.79*** <.001 
Never worked 89 11.11 54 7.09   
Less than 6 months 182 22.72 127 16.67 
 
 
6 to under 12 months 147 18.35 118 15.49   
1 to under 2 years 156 19.48 132 17.32   
2 to under 5 years 148 18.48 192 25.20 
 
 
More than 5 years 79 9.86 139 18.24   
Prior terminations (if worked)     11.04* .026 
0 times 355 49.65 301 42.45   
1 times 186 26.01 193 27.22   
2+ times 174 24.34 215 30.32   
Mental and physical health       
Pre-SVORI recent alcohol use 548 67.82 506 66.32 0.40 .526 
Pre-SVORI recent drug use 563 69.59 490 64.05 5.45* .020 
Global Severity Index (GSI) 66.34 (21.47) 67.59 (23.37) 1.10 .270 
Positive Symptoms Total 12.56 (9.61) 12.92 (10.29) 0.72 .468 
General mental health score 49.24 (9.95) 48.40 (11.20) -1.57 .116 
General physical health score 54.42 (8.03) 52.29 (10.17) -4.61*** <.001 
Prior MH/AOD use treatment 378 46.72 424 55.50 12.10** .001 
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Table 4.2 Demographic Characteristics of Program Participants before Matching. 
 
Participants 
(n = 809) 
Nonparticipants 
(n = 766) 
χ2 / t-test p 
 
N / M % (SD) N / M % (SD) 
 
 
SVORI site characteristics       
SVORI participant status 471 58.22 330 43.08 36.08*** <.001 
Probability SVORI status 52.44 (8.31) 49.45 (8.74) -6.97*** <.001 
Mandatory enrollment 201 24.85 104 13.58 32.00*** <.001 
Avg. unemp. rate, 2000-2005 5.29 (0.93) 5.49 (1.04) 4.04*** <.001 
SVORI site location       
Iowa 99 12.24 69 9.01 138.38*** <.001 
Indiana 58 7.17 99 12.92   
Kansas 27 3.34 42 5.48   
Maryland 66 8.16 181 23.63   
Missouri 61 7.54 21 2.74   
Nevada 89 11.00 57 7.44   
Ohio 65 8.03 18 2.35   
Oklahoma 54 6.67 36 4.70   
Pennsylvania 57 7.05 59 7.70   
South Carolina 182 22.50 158 20.63   
Washington 51 6.30 26 3.39   
State civil disabilities index 4.79 (0.65) 4.82 (0.58) 1.02 .307 
Driver’s license 0.52 (0.38) 0.46 (0.40) -3.28** .001 
TANF benefits 0.48 (0.32) 0.53 (0.30) 3.27** .001 
Public records 0.45 (0.19) 0.43 (0.20) -2.23* .026 
Employment restrictions 0.71 (0.26) 0.75 (0.26) 3.00** .003 
       
Note: N = 1,575.  Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  GED = General Equivalency Diploma.  HSD 
= High School Diploma.  MH/AOD = Mental health, alcohol, or drug.  NCIC = National Crime Information 
Center.  SR = Self-report.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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4.3 Assessing Initial Bias before Matching 
4.3.1 Bivariate Statistics before Matching 
Table 4.2 presents baseline characteristics by participation status before matching.  Education 
and employment program participants were significantly younger than nonparticipants were 
(Mpart = 27.80, SDpart = 6.04; Mnon = 31.50, SDnon = 8.04; t = 10.38, p < .001) and were less likely 
to have completed high school (6.69% of participants vs. 22.72% of nonparticipants).  
Participants were also more likely than were nonparticipants to have been convicted of a violent 
offense (46.76% and 35.21%, respectively) and to report having recently earned income from 
illegal activity (48.51% vs. 39.22%).  Reflecting their youth, participants were more likely to be 
completing their first prison term and less likely to be completing a sentence for a technical 
parole/probation violation.  They had also acquired shorter work histories than nonparticipants 
had, and a higher percentage reported having received financial support from family members 
before entering prison (34.49% of participants, compared to 26.67% of nonparticipants). 
Using data from official arrest records, participants had acquired shorter criminal records than 
nonparticipants had, in terms of prior arrests (Mpart = 6.98, SDpart = 5.75; Mnon = 10.43, SDnon = 
9.11; t = 9.03, p < .001) and years since first arrest (Mpart = 8.71, SDpart = 5.44; Mnon = 11.44, 
SDnon = 7.48; t = 8.30, p < .001).  Despite this, average age at first arrest was younger among 
participants (Mpart = 19.08, SDpart = 3.37; Mnon = 20.09, SDnon = 4.26; t = 5.22, p < .001), and 
they had acquired nearly the same number of convictions as nonparticipants, albeit within a 
shorter timeframe (Mpart = 4.83, SDpart = 4.68; Mnon = 5.37, SDnon = 5.02; t = 5.22, p < .001). 
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4.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Participants Differ from Nonparticipants 
The first column of Table 4.5 presents standardized biases before matching across an array of 
demographic, criminal background, employment, and health factors.  The results support the first 
hypothesis: mean and median standardized biases both exceeded acceptable thresholds before 
matching (5% mean/median bias).  Key demographic and risk factors exhibited the largest 
biases, including age at release (52.3), sentence length (56.7), and prior prison experience (37.9).  
These pre-matching biases suggest that the participant group was composed of younger, higher-
risk individuals; their self-report and official arrest records indicate earlier onset of criminal 
activity, and their young age placed them at heightened risk of reoffending following release 
from prison. 
 
Figure 4.1 Pre-SVORI Arrest Rates by Offense Type. 
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4.4 Group-Based Trajectory Model 
4.4.1 Pre-SVORI Arrest Rates 
Figures 4.1-4.5 present arrest rates during the 14-year period preceding the start of the SVORI 
prison term.  Arrest rates increased throughout the period, in part reflecting the rising 
involvement in criminal activity that led to men’s eventual convictions and imprisonments, but 
also reflecting the relatively young ages of many sample members during the initial years of 
observation.  Arrests by specific offense rose at approximately the same rates over time, 
primarily because men often received charges for multiple offenses during the same arrest.  
African American men were arrested at higher rates throughout the observation period.  With the 
exception of property offenses during the final years before the SVORI term, African Americans 
were more likely to be charged with all offense types than were other men. 
 
Figure 4.2 Pre-SVORI Arrest Rates by Racial/Ethnic Status. 
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4.4.2 Group-Based Trajectory Model Results 
Table 4.3 presents results of the trajectory model (n = 1,575).  The model derived three latent 
trajectory groups that appear to exhibit distinctive pre-SVORI offending trajectories and 
associated risk factors.  Men assigned probabilistically to a given trajectory group differ 
significantly from men assigned to the other groups on key characteristics associated with 
participation status, post-release employment, and risk of recidivism.  The trajectory results 
suggest that the SVORI sample is composed predominantly of high-rate drug and property 
offenders (Groups 1 and 3), with a smaller group of relatively low-rate offenders who had been 
convicted of violent offenses (Group 2).  Figure 4.6 presents the modeled arrest trajectories for 
each latent trajectory group. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Pre-SVORI Drug Arrest Rates by Racial/Ethnic Status. 
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Figure 4.4 Pre-SVORI Property Arrest Rates by Racial/Ethnic Status. 
 
Figure 4.5 Pre-SVORI Violent Arrest Rates by Racial/Ethnic Status. 
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Table 4.3 Group-Based Trajectory Model Results. 
 
B se t-stat. P 
Logit trajectory model     
Group 1 (n = 864)     
Linear age at arrest 13.04*** 0.69 19.00 <.001 
Squared age at arrest -0.55*** 0.03 -17.75 <.001 
Cubed age at arrest 0.01*** 0.00 16.47 <.001 
Drug arrest in prior year 0.10 0.10 1.07 .28 
Property arrest in prior year 0.18 0.09 1.91 .06 
Violent arrest in prior year 0.06 0.10 0.65 .52 
Intercept -101.40*** 5.00 -20.27 <.001 
Group 2 (n = 307)     
Linear age at arrest 1.80*** 0.20 8.87 <.001 
Squared age at arrest -0.05*** 0.01 -8.12 <.001 
Cubed age at arrest 0.00*** 0.00 7.47 <.001 
Drug arrest in prior year 0.52* 0.23 2.29 .022 
Property arrest in prior year 0.87*** 0.25 3.46 <.001 
Violent arrest in prior year 0.02 0.27 0.06 .949 
Intercept -21.62*** 2.08 -10.38 <.001 
Group 3 (n = 404)     
Linear age at arrest 1.14*** 0.11 10.04 <.001 
Squared age at arrest -0.03*** 0.00 -9.33 <.001 
Cubed age at arrest 0.00*** 0.00 8.54 <.001 
Drug arrest in prior year 0.35*** 0.08 4.29 <.001 
Property arrest in prior year 0.59*** 0.08 7.35 <.001 
Violent arrest in prior year 0.31*** 0.09 3.63 <.001 
Intercept -11.85*** 1.11 -10.64 <.001 
Multinomial model     
Group 2     
Age at first arrest 1.09 0.15 7.51 <.001 
Number of years, any arrests -0.44 0.23 -1.91 .056 
Total lifetime arrests -0.35 0.17 -2.02 .044 
Racial/ethnic status (ref. AfAm)     
White -0.11 0.39 -0.29 .775 
Hisp, multi, other, miss 0.75 0.53 1.40 .161 
SVORI offense: Tech. violation 0.36 0.40 0.91 .365 
Prison sentence (ref. 3 or more)     
First prison sentence -0.51 0.54 -0.96 .338 
Second prison sentence -0.10 0.54 -0.18 .859 
Intercept -11.85 1.11 -10.64 <.001 
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Table 4.3 Group-Based Trajectory Model Results. 
 
B se t-stat. p 
Group 3     
Age at first arrest 0.86*** 0.18 4.86 <.001 
Number of years, any arrests 3.70** 1.39 2.67 .008 
Total lifetime arrests 0.23 0.15 1.52 .128 
Racial/ethnic status (ref. AfAm)     
White 1.14 1.16 0.99 .324 
Hisp, multi, other, miss 5.82* 2.71 2.15 .032 
SVORI offense: Tech. violation -5.18 2.68 -1.94 .053 
Prison sentence (ref. 3 or more)     
First prison sentence 1.86 1.21 1.54 .123 
Second prison sentence 2.02 1.26 1.61 .108 
Intercept -43.19*** 12.51 -3.45 <.001 
     
Note: N = 1,575; 20,475 obs.  se = Standard errors.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry 
Initiative.  Ref. groups: Group 1, African American, Two or more previous prison terms.  BIC = -8,591.96. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Arrest Trajectories during Years Preceding SVORI Prison Term. 
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4.4.3 Trajectory Group Characteristics 
Table 4.4 presents bivariate statistics comparing differences by trajectory group.  The results 
show large differences between groups for most demographic characteristics, criminal risk 
factors, employment history, and SVORI site characteristics.  The high-rate offenders in Groups 
1 and 3 differ from each other in the length of their criminal histories; men in Group 3 were 
chronic high-rate offenders, and their arrest records and interview responses revealed extensive 
criminal involvement over several years.  In contrast, the men in Group 1 had only recently 
embarked on criminal activity; their high pre-prison arrest rates reflected escalating criminal 
involvement during the last few years leading up to their prison term. 
Group 1 
The first, largest group (n = 864) is composed of men who exhibited a relatively recent onset into 
criminal activity.  These individuals had the highest predicted probability of being enrolled in 
SVORI-funded services (52.57% vs. 48.55-49.73% for the other groups).  As a result, Group 1 
members had the highest participation rates in education (55.09%) and employment (15.97%) 
programs, and men in this group exhibited many characteristics that distinguished participants 
from nonparticipants.  Men in this group were significantly younger (MG1 = 26.10, SDG1 = 4.34) 
than men in groups 2 and 3 were (MG2 = 31.08, SDG2 = 7.98; MG3 = 35.95, SDG3 = 7.21; F = 
382.04, p < .001).  They were significantly more likely than were men in other groups to have 
received income from illegal activity before prison entry (48.84% of G1 men vs. 35.50% and 
39.60% of G2 and G3 men). 
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Table 4.4 Demographic Characteristics of Three Trajectory Groups. 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 χ2 / F-test 
 
N / M % / SD N / M % / SD N / M % / SD 
 
 
864 54.86 307 19.49 404 25.65 
 
        
Demographic characteristics       
Age 26.10 (4.34) 31.08 (7.98) 35.95 (7.21) 382.04*** 
Education 11.73 (2.14) 12.40 (2.10) 11.68 (2.15) 12.99*** 
Less than HSD 375 43.45 85 27.78 173 42.82 55.07*** 
HSD 93 10.78 61 19.93 74 18.32  
GED 274 31.75 85 27.78 97 24.01  
Trade/some coll. 121 14.02 75 24.51 60 14.85  
Race       63.73*** 
African American 495 57.29 113 36.81 264 65.35  
White 281 32.52 138 44.95 96 23.76  
Hisp/multi/other/miss   88 10.19 56 18.24 44 10.89  
Has minor child 498 58.25 170 55.74 279 69.40 18.06*** 
Child care/support 421 48.73 142 46.25 229 56.68 9.45** 
Criminal risk factors        
Age at 1
st
 arrest 18.14 (1.26) 23.68 (5.89) 19.52 (3.34) 331.81*** 
Age at 1
st
 arrest (SR) 14.76 (3.15) 18.82 (7.46) 17.00 (4.80) 92.87*** 
Years since 1
st
 arrest 7.98 (4.24) 7.41 (6.45) 16.43 (6.88) 370.21*** 
Years with arrests 3.81 (1.55) 2.46 (1.39) 9.58 (3.44) 1233.82*** 
Lifetime arrests 6.31 (3.40) 3.36 (2.14) 17.70 (9.59) 752.17*** 
Lifetime arrests (SR) 10.63 (10.27) 7.66 (8.64) 16.59 (12.75) 68.84*** 
Convictions (SR) 4.59 (4.38) 3.33 (3.73) 7.02 (5.83) 60.26*** 
Prev. prison (SR) 1.00 (1.22) 0.67 (1.07) 2.20 (1.65) 150.15*** 
First prison term 391 45.57 183 59.61 75 18.70 268.31*** 
Second prison term 234 27.27 79 25.73 81 20.20  
Third prison term 135 15.73 26 8.47 82 20.45  
Fourth/more term 98 11.42 19 6.19 163 40.66  
SVORI status offense        
Drug offense 293 33.91 85 27.69 163 40.35 12.56** 
Property offense 229 26.50 50 16.29 97 24.01 13.02** 
Violent offense 359 41.55 152 49.51 133 32.92 20.21*** 
Parole/probation viol. 271 31.37 93 30.29 96 23.76 7.91* 
Time served 3.04 (2.85) 2.74 (2.72) 1.81 (1.58) 31.64*** 
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Table 4.4 Demographic Characteristics of Three Trajectory Groups. 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 χ2 / F-test 
 
N / M % / SD N / M % / SD N / M % / SD 
 
 
864 54.86 307 19.49 404 25.65 
 
        
Work history        
Pre-SVORI income        
Family 300 34.72 96 31.27 86 21.29 23.48*** 
Friends 162 18.75 36 11.73 42 10.40 18.51*** 
Government 67 7.75 27 8.79 64 15.84 20.59*** 
Illegal activity 422 48.84 109 35.50 160 39.60 20.39*** 
Recent work 540 62.50 235 76.55 265 65.59 19.97*** 
Last job: Permanency       23.96*** 
Permanent position 387 44.90 184 59.93 196 48.64  
Temp employment 151 17.52 51 16.61 68 16.87  
Recent job: Stability       38.79*** 
Formal pay 403 46.70 188 61.44 169 41.94  
Casual/self-employ 136 15.76 46 15.03 95 23.57  
Maximum job tenure       235.30*** 
Never worked 107 12.51 14 4.61 22 5.45  
Less than 1 year 414 48.42 74 24.34 86 21.29  
1 to under 2 years 152 17.78 58 19.08 78 19.31  
2 to under 5 years 135 15.79 95 31.25 110 27.23  
More than 5 years 47 5.50 63 20.72 108 26.73  
Job terminations       22.78** 
0 times 377 50.13 122 41.78 157 41.32  
1 times 199 26.46 82 28.08 98 25.79  
2+ times 176 23.41 88 30.13 125 32.90  
Mental and physical health       
Recent alcohol use 580 67.29 195 63.52 279 69.40 2.76 
Recent drug use 595 68.87 188 61.24 270 67.00 5.95+ 
General mental health 48.65 (10.49) 49.55 (10.02) 48.68 (11.20) 0.86 
General phys. health 54.36 (7.94) 52.96 (9.39) 51.61 (11.08) 12.71*** 
Rec’d MH/AOD treat. 427 49.48 148 48.21 227 56.33 6.33* 
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Table 4.4 Demographic Characteristics of Three Trajectory Groups. 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 χ2 / F-test 
 
N / M % / SD N / M % / SD N / M % / SD 
 
 
864 54.86 307 19.49 404 25.65 
 
        
SVORI site characteristics       
SVORI participant 446 51.62 163 53.09 192 47.52 2.61 
Probability SVORI 52.57 (8.61) 49.73 (8.32) 48.55 (8.27) 35.26*** 
Mandatory enrollment 177 20.49 66 21.50 62 15.35 5.77+ 
Unemployment rate 5.31 (0.97) 5.13 (0.90) 5.75 (1.02) 43.19*** 
Recidivism rate 37.21 (0.09) 35.07 (0.08) 40.63 (0.08) 42.94*** 
SVORI state       236.30*** 
Iowa 104 12.04 37 12.05 27 6.68  
Indiana 58 6.71 47 15.31 52 12.87  
Kansas 45 5.21 10 3.26 14 3.47  
Maryland 102 11.81 18 5.86 126 31.44  
Missouri 60 6.94 9 2.93 13 3.22  
Nevada 83 9.61 48 15.64 14 3.71  
Ohio 52 6.13 7 2.28 23 5.69  
Oklahoma 54 6.25 29 9.45 7 1.73  
Pennsylvania 66 7.64 41 13.36 9 2.23  
South Carolina 205 23.73 52 16.94 83 20.54  
Washington 34 3.94 9 2.93 34 8.42  
State civil disabilities 4.80 (0.62) 5.00 (0.52) 4.66 (0.65) 26.08*** 
Driver’s license 0.52 (0.38) 0.53 (0.35) 0.41 (0.41) 12.19*** 
TANF benefits 0.49 (0.31) 0.48 (0.34) 0.55 (0.27) 5.63** 
Public records 0.45 (0.19) 0.47 (0.20) 0.40 (0.18) 16.32*** 
Employment bans 0.72 (0.26) 0.73 (0.26) 0.75 (0.25) 2.46+ 
Participation        
Emp-focused services 528 61.11 148 48.21 133 32.92 89.09*** 
Education 476 55.09 127 41.37 114 28.22 82.83*** 
Voc Ed/Job training 138 15.97 35 11.40 35 8.68 13.82** 
Educ & Job training 114 13.2 28 9.1 23 5.7 17.26*** 
        
Note: N = 1, 575.  Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  GED = General Equivalency Diploma.  HSD 
= High School Diploma.  MH/AOD = Mental health, alcohol, or drug.  NCIC = National Crime Information 
Center.  SR = Self-report.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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In other respects, however, men in Group 1 were not distinguishable from men in the other two 
groups: They shared demographic characteristics with Group 3 members (e.g., level of 
education, racial/ethnic status, recent work history, and rates of pre-SVORI substance use), but 
their criminal records more closely resembled those of men in Group 2.  In many ways, Group 1 
members appeared to be younger versions of men in Group 3. 
Group 2 
The second group obtained from the model was the smallest group of men (n = 307), and this 
group exhibited the most differences from groups 1 and 3.  Their average age at first arrest was 
significantly older than for the other two groups (MG2 = 23.68, SDG2 = 5.89, compared to M = 
18.14-19.52, SD = 1.26-3.34 for groups 1 and 3), and they had acquired shorter criminal histories 
(e.g., fewer lifetime arrests, fewer years since first arrest, and fewer years with any arrests).  
They were more likely to have been convicted of a violent offense than men in the other two 
groups were (49.51% vs. 32.92% and 41.55% of men in groups 3 and 1, respectively). 
On average, these men were returning to communities in states with lower recidivism rates than 
men in the other two groups were (based on 2004 state recidivism rates) (MG2 = 35.07%; MG1 = 
37.21%; MG3 = 40.63%).  They also showed the strongest engagement in primary sector 
employment prior to entering prison.  Men in this group had completed the highest levels of 
education (MG2 = 12.40, SDG2 = 2.10, compared to M = 11.68-11.73, SD = 2.14-2.15 for groups 1 
and 3), and they were significantly less likely to be African American than men in the other two 
groups were (36.81% of G2 men, vs. 57.29% of G1 men and 65.35% of G3 men).  They reported 
the highest rates of employment during the months leading up to their prison sentence, and most 
of the jobs had been permanent positions with benefits (76.55% of G2 men had worked recently, 
compared to less than two-thirds for the other two groups). 
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Group 3 
The third group included chronic offenders who had acquired lengthy criminal records during the 
years preceding the SVORI status offense (n = 404).  Longer time had passed on average since 
first arrest among Group 3 members (MG3 = 16.43, SDG3= 6.88), relative to men in the other 
groups (MG1 = 7.98, SDG1 = 4.24; MG2 = 7.41, SDG2 = 6.45; F = 370.21, p < .001).  At the time of 
the baseline interview, they were the oldest group on average (MG3 = 35.95, SDG3 = 7.21), and 
they had acquired the most lifetime arrests (MG3 = 17.70, SDG3 = 9.59).  They also had the lowest 
average level of education, with most indicating that they had completed fewer than 12 years of 
education.  On average, they had been imprisoned more times in the past than the men in the 
other two groups had been, but technical violations of previous supervision did not explain their 
recent return to prison (23.76% of G3 men had violated parole or probation requirements before 
entering prison, in contrast to 31% of G1 and G2 men).  These chronic offenders were more 
likely to come from Maryland or South Carolina than from other states, and in general, they were 
returning to states with higher mean recidivism rates than were men in the other groups (2004 
rates). 
Summary of Findings 
Based on observed characteristics, men in Groups 1 and 3 exhibited more risk factors than did 
the men in Group 2.  The men in Group 3 had longer criminal records then men in Group 1, and 
they could be described as chronic adult offenders who would be likely to remain engaged in 
persistent criminal activity upon release.  However, men in Group 1 were younger, more active 
offenders, and their escalating rates of arrest before prison entry suggested the possibility of 
more serious criminal activity upon release. 
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Men in Group 1 differed sharply from men in Group 3 in the likelihood of receiving 
employment-focused services.  Most Group 1 men received some form of employment-focused 
programming, in contrast to men in the other two groups.  Despite low educational attainment 
and weak attachment to primary sector employment, men in Group 3 reported the lowest rates of 
program participation. 
The distinct compositions of the three trajectory groups may reflect the fact that prisons involved 
in the SVORI evaluation used differing selection criteria when recruiting participants into the 
study.  There is evidence to suggest that the 3-group trajectory model diminished some of the 
pre-existing differences between employment-focused program participants and nonparticipants 
(reducing mean standardized bias to 10%).  Despite this, participants in all three trajectory 
groups continued to exhibit significant differences from nonparticipants, so propensity score 
matching is used to reduce lingering observed heterogeneity. 
4.5 Propensity Score Matching 
4.5.1 Multilevel Logit Model Results 
Table 4.5 presents results of the multilevel logit model (n = 1,571).  Individuals’ propensity 
scores were calculated from the fitted (expected) value of this logit regression, which estimated 
the probability of program participation based on the fixed- and random-level effects.  The 
resulting propensity score ranges from .02 to .98, with a mean of .64 for participants and .38 for 
nonparticipants. 
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Table 4.5 Logit Participation Model Results. 
 
OR se z-stat. p 
Trajectory Group (ref. Group 1)     
Group 2 0.60* 0.13 -2.42 .015 
Group 3 0.58* 0.15 -2.09 .036 
Linear age at release
a 
0.93*** 0.02 -3.91 <.001 
Traj. Group*Age at release
 
    
Group 2*Age at release
a
 1.04 0.03 1.71 .088 
Group 3*Age at release
a
 1.02 0.03 0.70 .485 
Education
a
 0.92* 0.04 -2.01 .044 
Traj. Group*Education
 
    
Group 2*Education
a
 0.97 0.08 -0.36 .722 
Group 3*Education
a
 0.86* 0.06 -2.12 .034 
Racial/ethnic status (ref. AfAm)     
White 1.10 0.16 0.66 .509 
Hisp, multi, other, miss 1.62* 0.33 2.37 .018 
SVORI term: Drug offense 0.92 0.17 -0.44 .662 
SVORI term: Property offense 0.96 0.17 -0.23 .816 
SVORI term: Violent offense 0.70* 0.12 -2.07 .038 
SVORI term: Ln time served
a
 3.62*** 0.49 9.50 <.001 
Number of prior prison terms 0.79** 0.06 -3.39 .001 
Traj. Group*Prior prison terms
 
    
Group 2*Prison terms 1.28 0.19 1.66 .097 
Group 3*Prison terms 1.27* 0.13 2.30 .022 
Drug arrest, year pre-SVORI 0.83 0.14 -1.06 .289 
Property arrest, year pre-SVORI 0.74 0.12 -1.92 .054 
Violent arrest, year pre-SVORI 1.45* 0.22 2.42 .015 
Sum arrests, year pre-SVORI 1.16* 0.08 2.08 .038 
Pre-SVORI income: Family 1.35* 0.18 2.20 .028 
Health limits (ref. None)     
Limits activities a little 0.62** 0.11 -2.74 .006 
Limits activities a lot 0.55** 0.13 -2.62 .009 
General physical health status 0.91* 0.04 -2.27 .023 
SVORI participant 1.71** 0.21 4.40 <.001 
Intercept 1.59 0.56 1.31 .189 
State-level variation 0.62 0.29   
     
Note: N = 1,571, 11 groups (SVORI states).  Level 2: ICC = 0.16 (0.06), LR = 93.72, p < .001.  Level 1: 
Mean-Variance adaptive Gauss-Hermite integration, 7 integration points.  Wald χ
2 
(26) = 241.02, Log 
likelihood = -876.02, BIC = 1,958.12.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  Ref. 
groups: Group 1, African American, No health limitations.  “a” indicates continuous variables centered on 
state means.   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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4.5.2 Nearest Neighbor Matching with Caliper 
Participants and nonparticipants were matched on their predicted probability of employment-
focused program participation using nearest neighbor matching with caliper.  The caliper size 
used was 0.1 times the standard deviation of the propensity score obtained from the multilevel 
logit model.  Replacement was permitted and up to five matches were permitted, although the 
results were unchanged when fewer matches were permitted. 
Nearest neighbor matching with caliper successfully reduced mean standardized biases to below 
5%.  Forty nonparticipants were excluded from the final sample, due to the inability to find 
appropriate matches within the participant sample (34 nonparticipants from Group 3, 4 from 
Group 1, and 2 nonparticipants from Group 2).  The final sample consisted of 805 participants 
and 726 nonparticipants (n = 1,531).  Figure 3.1 presents the sample selection process used to 
identify trajectory groups, model participation status, and match participants and nonparticipants. 
4.5.3 Bivariate Statistics after Matching 
Table 4.6 presents pre- and post-matching standardized biases for key predictors of participation 
and post-release rearrest.  The nearest neighbor matching process eliminated much of the 
observed bias.  Mean standardized bias declined from 19.1 to 3.8, and the maximum 
standardized bias for individual items declined from 56.7 to 18.2.  Most importantly, 
standardized bias for linear age at release declined from -52.3 to -1.7, and bias for time served, 
which had exhibited the largest bias before matching, declined from 56.7 to 2.0.  Other variables 
that exhibited large reductions in imbalance include age at first arrest (from -26.3 to -0.3), years 
since first arrest (-41.8 to -2.2), lifetime number of arrests (-45.6 to -3.7), and trajectory group 
membership (44.1 to -0.3 among Group 1 members; -44.4 to 0.3 among Group 3 members). 
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Table 4.6 Demographic Characteristics of Program Participants after Matching. 
 
Pre. SB Post. SB 
Non. 
(n = 726) 
Part. 
(n = 805) 
Educ. 
(n = 714) 
Emp. 
(n = 207) 
Demographics       
Linear age at release -52.3 -1.7 
27.91 
(0.30) 
27.79 
(0.21) 
27.58 
(0.22) 
27.92 
(0.39) 
State-centered -37.2 -2.1     
18-25 years old 31.4 -2.8 41.17 39.88 41.32 40.58 
26-30 years old 11.4 -0.5 32.17 31.93 31.79 29.47 
31-35 years old -10.0 0.1 20.59 20.62 20.31 20.77 
36+ years old -44.1 4.3 6.07 7.58 6.58 9.18 
Education, years -12.3 0.5 
11.71 
(0.12) 
11.72 
(0.08) 
11.59 
(8.08) 
12.51*** 
(0.14) 
State-centered -18.5 -0.5     
Race       
African American -7.3 1.1 52.99 53.54 54.48 52.17 
White -4.3 1.1 31.28 31.80 30.53 33.82 
Hisp, multi, other, miss 17.6 -3.3 15.73 14.66 14.99 14.01 
Criminal history       
SVORI sentencing offense      
Drug -11.9 -1.3 32.18 31.55 30.53 36.71 
Property -0.1 0.3 23.74 23.85 23.25 25.12 
Person/violent 23.5 -1.5 47.30 46.58 47.48 44.93 
Violation -23.5 -7.0 27.16 23.98 23.81 20.77 
SVORI: Time served 56.7 2.0 
3.31 
(0.18) 
3.36 
(0.11) 
3.46 
(0.12) 
3.08 
(0.17) 
State-centered 56.3 -1.7     
Age at first arrest -26.3 -0.3 
19.09 
(0.16) 
19.08 
(0.12) 
18.90 
(0.11) 
19.42 
(0.27) 
State-centered -21.0 0.3     
Age at first arrest (SR) -28.4 -2.4 
15.56 
(0.28) 
15.44 
(0.16) 
15.21 
(0.15) 
16.00 
(0.36) 
State-centered -21.1 -0.4     
Years since first arrest -41.8 -2.2 
8.85 
(0.29) 
8.71 
(0.19) 
8.68 
(0.20) 
8.50 
(0.33) 
State-centered -27.7 -2.9     
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Table 4.6 Demographic Characteristics of Program Participants after Matching. 
 
Pre. SB Post. SB 
Non. 
(n = 726) 
Part. 
(n = 805) 
Educ. 
(n = 714) 
Emp. 
(n = 207) 
Criminal history       
Lifetime arrests -45.6 -3.7 
7.24 
(0.27) 
6.96 
(0.20) 
6.93 
(0.22) 
6.76 
(0.35) 
State-centered -33.3 -6.9     
Lifetime arrests (SR) -9.4 11.1 
9.85 
(0.57) 
11.09 
(0.39) 
10.99 
(0.41) 
10.77 
(0.74) 
State-centered -7.6 8.7     
Prior convictions (SR) -10.3 5.3 
4.47 
(0.24) 
4.73 
(0.17) 
4.68 
(0.17) 
4.72 
(0.31) 
State-centered -11.8 2.9     
Prior prison terms (SR)       
No previous terms 37.9 -2.7 51.51 50.18 51.54 48.31 
1 previous term -3.2 1.7 23.59 24.35 24.23 21.26 
2 previous terms -15.9 -4.5 14.31 12.67 11.62 14.98 
3 or more terms -28.5 6.6 9.92 12.42 12.18 15.46 
Trajectory group       
Young rising 44.1 -0.3 65.48 65.34 66.53 66.18 
Low rising -6.3 0.1 18.24 18.26 17.65 16.91 
High chronic -44.4 0.3 16.29 16.40 15.83 16.91 
Work history       
Income: Family 16.7 6.8 31.15 34.29 35.01 35.75 
Income: Friends 6.8 -2.8 17.41 16.40 17.09 17.87 
Income: Government -5.5 6.5 7.25 9.19 9.80 8.70 
Income: Illegal activity 18.5 3.5 46.59 48.32 47.06 51.21 
Recent work -12.1 -7.4 66.87 63.35 62.46 68.12 
Last job: Permanency       
Permanent position -12.0 -6.4 49.02 45.84 45.80 50.72 
Temp. employment 1.1 -1.0 17.76 17.39 16.53 17.39 
Last job: Stability       
Formal pay 0.0 -2.8 49.74 48.32 48.60 51.21 
Casual/self-employ -14.7 -5.1 16.86 14.91 13.73 16.91 
Longest period worked       
Never worked 13.6 1.2 10.58 10.93 11.76 7.73 
Less than 12 months 18.3 -2.0 41.71 40.75 42.44 34.30* 
1 to under 2 years 5.2 11.1 14.97 19.25 18.35 25.60** 
2 to under 5 years -16.2 -7.9 21.62 18.39 17.23 21.26 
More than 5 years -24.6 -0.3 9.78 9.69 9.24 10.14 
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Table 4.6 Demographic Characteristics of Program Participants after Matching. 
 
Pre. SB Post. SB 
Non. 
(n = 726) 
Part. 
(n = 805) 
Educ. 
(n = 714) 
Emp. 
(n = 207) 
Health/substance use       
Recent alcohol use 3.9 7.8 64.49 68.16 67.32 69.08 
Recent drug use 12.0 18.2 61.11 69.69* 69.61* 67.63 
Mental health score 8.3 3.2 
48.93 
(0.78) 
49.27 
(0.35) 
49.19 
(0.38) 
50.16 
(0.62) 
Physical health score 23.2 1.4 
54.29 
(0.45) 
54.41 
(0.28) 
54.39 
(0.31) 
54.50 
(0.53) 
SVORI participation       
SVORI participant 30.7 0.3 58.11 58.26 56.58 75.36*** 
Probability SVORI 35.5 -2.1 52.65 52.48 52.66 53.13 
SVORI site       
Mandatory enroll 28.9 7.1 22.07 24.84 25.49 22.22 
Avg. unemp. rate, 
2000-2005 
-20.5 -4.7 
5.33 
(0.05) 
5.29 
(0.03) 
5.32 
(0.03) 
4.98*** 
(0.07) 
SVORI site location       
Iowa 10.7 4.8 10.83 12.30 10.22 29.47*** 
Indiana -19.1 2.6 6.43 7.20 7.84 3.86* 
Kansas -10.4 3.3 2.67 3.35 3.64 2.90 
Maryland -43.6 1.2 7.63 8.07 8.40 6.28 
Missouri 21.5 2.2 6.97 7.45 7.84 3.86 
Nevada 12.5 0.0 11.05 11.06 11.06 14.49 
Ohio 26.0 1.3 7.79 8.07 7.98 6.76 
Oklahoma 8.2 -1.2 5.31 6.58 6.30 6.28 
Pennsylvania -2.4 -11.6 10.11 7.08 7.70 5.31 
South Carolina 4.5 -7.6 25.62 22.48 22.41 16.91** 
Washington 13.7 10.7 4.05 6.34 6.58 3.86 
State civil disab. index -5.2 -6.4 
4.83 
(0.04) 
4.79 
(0.02) 
4.78 
(0.02) 
4.92* 
(0.04) 
Driver’s license 16.6 -9.0 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.52 
TANF benefits -16.5 8.1 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.46 
Public records 11.4 -1.8 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Work restrictions -15.2 1.6 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.80*** 
Mean standardized bias 19.1 3.8     
Med. standardized bias 15.9 2.7     
Max. standardized bias 56.7 18.2     
Note: N = 1,531.  Standard errors appear in parentheses. Estimates generated using weights obtained from 
nearest neighbor matching.  NCIC = National Crime Information Center.  SR = Self-report.  SVORI = 
Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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The matching process did not eliminate all pre-matching differences, however.  Four variables 
exhibited lingering imbalance, with bias statistics that exceeded 10.0 after matching: These were 
a dummy variable for longest job tenure before prison (11.1), the dummy variable for 
Washington State (10.7), self-reported number of lifetime arrests (11.1), and self-reported drug 
use during the month preceding prison entry (18.2). 
4.6 Duration Models 
4.6.1 Post-Release Arrest Rates 
Rearrest rates among men in the SVORI sample closely resembled rearrest rates that have been 
observed for state prison populations as a whole (Durose et al., 2014).  Three-quarters of the men 
were arrested at least once during the first 3 years of release (n = 1,129; 74%).  On average, these 
men were arrested 2.96 times (SD = 2.46).  Thirty-five percent were arrested at least once for a 
drug offense, 32% had one or more property arrests, and 28% were arrested for violent offenses.  
Men were frequently charged with more than one type of offense during a single arrest, so these 
percentages are not mutually exclusive. 
4.6.2 Employment Programs Increase Labor Force Participation 
Table 4.10 presents post-release labor force activity by participation status.  The results suggest 
that employment-focused programs do have beneficial effects on employment, although results 
do not persist over time.  Men who participated in vocational education/job training programs 
were significantly more likely to seek work during the first 9 months of release from prison than 
were nonparticipants and participants receiving educational services alone.  Enrollees in 
vocational education/job training programs exhibited the lowest rates of labor force exit at the 
first two follow-up interviews.  Employment program participants also exhibited the highest 
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rates of stable employment (measured as having worked each month that they were living in the 
community). 
In contrast, men who received educational services alone exhibited similar rates of employment 
as nonparticipants.  Education participants were less likely to enter the labor force to seek work 
than were employment program participants (13.75% vs. 5.00% at Wave 2; 15.88% vs. 11.29% 
at Wave 3).  Approximately the same proportion of education program participants held stable 
employment during the first 3 months, as did nonparticipants (roughly 30% of each group). 
By the time of the third interview (approximately 9 months after release), rates of labor force 
entry and employment declined among employment participants, although they remained 
significantly higher than for nonparticipants and education participants.  By the time of the 
fourth interview (approximately 15 months after release), there were no significant differences in 
labor force activity by participation status. 
4.6.3 Hypothesis 2: Employment Programs Reduce Recidivism 
Findings provide limited support for the second hypothesis.  Table 4.7 presents rearrest rates by 
participation status during the first 3 years of release.  The weighted percentages reflect the 
proportion of each group within the matched sample who had been arrested at least once within 
the given reference period.  During the first 9 months of release, education and employment 
program participants had significantly lower rates of rearrest than nonparticipants did.  
Participants receiving vocational education/job training programs alone were least likely to have 
been rearrested within that time (34.07%), compared to participants receiving education and 
employment services (38.79%), participants receiving educational services alone (41.30%), and 
nonparticipants (43.80%).  These differences dwindled over time; by 1 year after release, the 
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proportions of men within each group who had been rearrested were no longer significantly 
different from each other.  There were also no differences in average number of arrests. 
Table 4.7 Post-Release Arrest Rates by Participant Status. 
 
Non 
Part. 
(n = 722) 
Educ. 
Part. 
(n = 593) 
Emp. 
Part. 
(n = 90) 
Educ. & 
Emp. 
(n = 116) 
F p 
% with first arrest within
a
      
3 months 19.39 14.67 12.22 15.52 13.69*** <.001 
6 months 32.69 28.16 21.11 30.17 11.94** .001 
9 months 43.91 41.32 33.33 38.79 8.05** .005 
12 months 50.28 48.57 45.56 49.14 1.62 .204 
15 months 56.23 54.81 50.00 56.90 2.61 .107 
21 months 65.10 63.74 60.00 65.52 1.88 .171 
24 months (n = 1,486) 69.73 69.10 64.04 68.42 2.35 .126 
36 months (n = 427) 78.44 78.95 77.27 77.14 0.14 .709 
Number of arrests
b
 
1.95 
(0.12) 
2.13 
(0.09) 
1.84 
(0.21) 
1.94 
(0.20) 
0.63 .427 
       
Note: N = 1,521.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates generated using weights obtained from 
nearest neighbor matching.  “a” indicates rearrest items created for the original SVORI evaluation.  “b” 
indicates rearrest items created from NCIC arrest record files for this study.  Design-based F statistic 
based on weighted data.  NCIC = National Crime Information Center.  SVORI = Serious and Violent 
Offender Reentry Initiative. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
4.6.4 Duration Model Results 
Repeated-Event Failure Models 
Results of the repeated-events duration model are consistent with the bivariate findings.  Results 
of the repeated events model are presented as nested findings in Table 4.8 to indicate changes in 
parameter estimates as additional variables are included.  When controlling for group trajectory 
membership and probability of participation, engagement in either education or employment 
programs was not associated with time to rearrest.  As additional variables were introduced into 
the model, education and employment program participation both remained unassociated with 
time to rearrest (education: HR = 1.15, p = .201; employment: HR = 1.06, p = .483). 
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Figure 4.7 Rearrest Rates by Participation Status after Release from SVORI Prison Term. 
In the full model, significant predictors include criminal risk factors, previous work experience, 
previous alcohol/drug use, racial/ethnic status, and state location.  Past criminal involvement 
significantly increased the likelihood that men would be arrested at least once following release.  
Each additional arrest during the last year before men entered prison to complete the SVORI 
sentence was associated with a 9% increase in the baseline hazard of rearrest (HR = 1.09, p < 
.001).  Property convictions and previous technical violations reduced the length of time that 
men remained in the community before rearrest: Property convictions increased the baseline 
hazard by 27% (HR = 1.27, p = .009), and men who had violated parole or probation before 
entering prison on the SVORI status offense had a 30% increase in the baseline hazard (HR = 
1.30, p < .001).  Substance use before the SVORI term also increased men’s relative risk of 
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rearrest by 22% (HR = 1.22, p = .030).  When controlling for other factors, the relative risk of 
rearrest remained 45% larger among men in Group 3 (HR = 1.45, p = .044, ref. Group 1). 
Table 4.8 Duration Model: Nested Results for Time to Arrest with Repeated Failures. 
 HR HR HR HR HR HR HR 
Educ programs 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.09 1.09 1.13 1.15 
Voc/job training 0.91 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.06 
Prob. of participation 0.72       
Group 1 Nonpart.  0.58 0.53 0.88 0.95 1.00 1.81 
Group 1 Part.  0.58** 0.54** 0.77 0.81 0.79 1.35 
Group 2 Nonpart.  0.86 0.63 0.89 0.77 0.81 0.96 
Group 2 Part.  1.09 0.80 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.90 
Group 3 Nonpart.  1.04 0.60 0.90 0.91 0.89 1.62 
Group 3 Part.  0.99 0.58* 0.68 0.71 0.67 1.06 
Trajectory group (ref. Group 1)      
Group 2 0.54*** 0.39** 0.54* 0.75 0.83 0.82 1.18 
Group 3 1.28** 0.94 1.42 1.40 1.46* 1.48* 1.45* 
Age at releasea   0.97*** 0.97*** 0.98 0.98 0.99 
Educationa   0.93*** 0.95*** 0.96** 0.95** 0.97 
Drug offense    0.96 0.93 0.92 0.93 
Property offense    1.08 1.08 1.07 1.27** 
Violent offense    1.09 1.05 1.05 1.00 
Prob/parole violation   1.21** 1.22** 1.22** 1.30*** 
SVORI: Time serveda   0.98 0.96 0.96* 0.95* 
Age at first arrest    0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Arrest sum (year before term)   1.16*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.09*** 
Prison terms (ref. First term)       
1 previous term   1.16 1.15 1.11 1.17* 
2 previous terms   1.41*** 1.34** 1.29** 1.31** 
3+ previous terms    1.52*** 1.39** 1.32** 1.40*** 
Longest job tenure (ref. Less than 1 year)     
1 to 2  years     0.79** 0.79** 0.84* 
2 to 5 years     0.71** 0.71** 0.76** 
5 years or more     0.69** 0.67** 0.74* 
Work-release job     0.56* 0.58* 0.80 
Prison industry job     1.01 1.01 0.93 
Personal mastery scale     0.87* 0.90 
Global Severity Index (GSI)     1.00 1.00 
Alcohol/drug use before prison    1.26* 1.22* 
Racial/ethnic status (ref. African American)     
White       0.84* 
Hisp, multi, other, miss     0.79 
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SVORI site location (ref. South Carolina)      
Iowa       0.72* 
Indiana       1.23 
Kansas       0.91 
Maryland       1.46*** 
Missouri       0.71* 
Nevada       1.15 
Ohio       0.96 
Oklahoma       0.87 
Pennsylvania       0.39*** 
Washington       1.60*** 
        
Log likelihood -1855.2 -1849.7 -1773.6 -1671.1 -1628.8 -1612.6 -1480.0 
BIC 3768.04 3798.19 3662.29 3539.69 3496.16 3488.32 3322.01 
Note: N = 1,521; 3,734 obs. HR = Hazard ratio.  Gompertz distribution with robust standard errors and 
clustering to account for repeated observations.  “a” indicates continuous variables centered on state 
means.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  Ref. groups: Group 1, No previous 
prison term, Less than 1 year at any job, African American, South Carolina. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Some characteristics reduced men’s hazard of rearrest during the 3-year observation period.  
Compared to African American men, White men had a 16% reduction in the baseline hazard (HR 
= 0.84, p = .021).  Increasingly long periods of employment at one job before prison also reduced 
men’s risk of rearrest, in part because older men were more likely than young men to have held 
jobs for longer than a year (HR = 0.74-0.84, p < .050).  Similarly, men who had completed 
longer prison terms were more likely to remain in the community: Each additional year served 
reduced men’s relative risk of rearrest by 5% (HR = 0.95, p = .014).   
Single-Event Failure Models 
Results of the single-event failure models partially contradict results of the repeated-events 
duration model.  Participants in education programs were arrested for non-violent arrests at faster 
rates than were employment program participants or nonparticipants (HR = 1.33-1.67, p < .050).  
The hazard ratios for education participation correspond to a 33% increase in the baseline hazard 
of any arrest, 52% increase for property arrest, and a 67% increase in the baseline hazard of drug 
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arrest.  In contrast, education participants showed longer times to first violent arrest, when 
compared to employment program participants or nonparticipants (HR = 0.76, p = .044).  These 
results may provide evidence for reductions in violent offending among education participants, 
but the significant findings in the single-event models may be due to chance (e.g., measurement 
error due to separating out arrests by offense).  Vocational education/job training programs were 
not associated with time to first arrest for any offense type (HR = 0.94-1.16, p > .100).  Table 4.9 
presents results of the single-failure duration models. 
 
Table 4.9 Duration Models: Results for Time to First Arrest by Offense Type. 
 Any arrest Drug arrest Property arrest Violent arrest 
 HR (se) HR (se) HR (se) HR (se) 
Educ. programs 1.33** (0.12) 1.67* (0.41) 1.52* (0.30) 0.76* (.10) 
Voc/job training 1.16 (0.15) 1.36 (0.28) 1.10 (0.15) 0.94 (0.11) 
G1 Nonpart. 3.08** (1.28) 2.09 (1.18) 1.25 (1.27) 0.71 (0.58) 
G1 Part. 1.57 (0.60) 0.79 (0.45) 0.71 (0.37) 1.59 (1.06) 
G2 Nonpart. 1.52 (1.25) 0.88 (0.71) 0.69 (0.94) 0.75 (0.77) 
G2 Part. 0.96 (0.73) 0.24* (0.15) 0.66 (0.78) 1.29 (1.22) 
G3 Nonpart. 2.26 (1.19) 1.56 (1.09) 4.76 (5.51) 1.42 (1.31) 
G3 Part. 1.61 (0.84) 0.43 (0.30) 1.30 (0.95) 2.38 (1.67) 
Traj (ref. Grp 1)     
Group 2 1.39 (0.48) 1.88*** (0.33) 1.17 (0.59) 0.94 (0.49) 
Group 3 1.51 (0.44) 1.71 (0.69) 1.13 (0.74) 0.98 (0.37) 
Age at releasea 0.99 (0.02) 0.97* (0.02) 0.99 (0.02) 0.97 (0.02) 
Educationa 0.98 (0.02) 0.94 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03) 1.01 (0.03) 
Drug offense 0.99 (0.16) 1.86** (0.38) 0.72 (0.14) 0.77 (0.17) 
Property offense 1.39 (0.23) 0.90 (0.15) 2.40** (0.61) 1.06 (0.18) 
Violent offense 1.04 (0.16) 1.03 (0.16) 0.75 (0.20) 1.23 (0.21) 
Prob/parole viol. 1.29** (0.10) 1.16 (0.25) 1.27* (0.15) 1.48** (0.21) 
Time serveda 0.93* (0.03) 1.00 (0.04) 0.98 (0.03) 0.95 (0.03) 
Age at 1st arrest 0.97 (0.02) 0.99 (0.04) 0.91*** (0.02) 0.97 (0.02) 
Arrests, last year 1.12** (0.04) 1.13 (0.08) 1.10** (0.04) 1.00 (0.09) 
Prison (ref. None)     
1 prior term 1.19 (0.12) 1.42 (0.26) 1.08 (0.21) 0.85 (0.14) 
2 prior terms 1.37** (0.13) 2.06*** (0.41) 1.30 (0.19) 1.24 (0.25) 
3+ prior terms 1.40 (0.28) 1.59** (0.27) 1.61* (0.34) 1.30 (0.29) 
Job tenure     
1 to 2  years 0.79 (0.10) 0.66* (0.12) 0.64** (0.09) 0.87 (0.15) 
2 to 5 years 0.73** (0.08) 0.62** (0.09) 0.53*** (0.07) 0.93 (0.25) 
5 years/more 0.75* (0.10) 0.68 (0.20) 0.80 (0.26) 1.11 (0.24) 
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Work-release 0.64 (0.17) 0.63 (0.16) 1.32 (0.52) 0.54 (0.22) 
Prison job 0.85 (0.22) 0.62 (0.23) 0.75 (0.27) 0.98 (0.35) 
Mastery scale 0.89 (0.06) 0.90 (0.21) 1.03 (0.22) 0.70*** (0.05) 
GSI 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Alc/drug use 1.29 (0.17) 1.11 (0.20) 1.36 (0.25) 0.80 (011) 
Race (ref. AfAm)     
White 0.69*** (0.07) 0.66* (0.14) 1.15 (0.13) 0.81 (0.19) 
Hisp/other/miss 0.63*** (0.08) 0.87 (0.12) 0.69 (0.16) 0.57** (0.11) 
SVORI site (ref. SC)     
Iowa 0.86* (0.05) 1.34** (0.15) 0.58*** (0.04) 0.78 (0.10) 
Indiana 1.04 (0.05) 1.23** (0.10) 0.88 (0.08) 1.63*** (0.16) 
Kansas 1.03 (0.08) 0.75* (0.10) 1.18 (0.12) 1.19 (0.14) 
Maryland 1.35*** (0.11) 1.84*** (0.24) 1.45* (0.25) 1.11 (0.14) 
Missouri 0.72*** (0.03) 1.27** (0.09) 0.37*** (0.04) 0.32*** (0.04) 
Nevada 1.24 (0.15) 1.05 (0.07) 1.82*** (0.24) 1.18 (0.13) 
Ohio 0.77*** (0.04) 1.20 (0.13) 0.85 (0.12) 0.82 (0.12) 
Oklahoma 1.07 (0.05) 1.48*** (0.12) 0.67*** (.0.06) 0.78** (0.07) 
Pennsylvania 0.60*** (0.05) 1.24* (0.13) 0.30*** (0.06) 0.45*** (0.06) 
Washington 1.82*** (0.12) 1.94*** (0.25) 1.60*** (0.20) 1.52*** (0.12) 
P 4.56 4.55 4.62 5.33 
     
Log likelihood -589.76 -697.18 -622.85 -593.47 
BIC 1,252.79 1,467.64 1,318.98 1,260.20 
Note: N = 1,521.  HR = Hazard ratio.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Weibull distribution with robust 
standard errors and clustering at state site.  “a” indicates continuous variables centered on state means.  
SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  Ref. groups: Group 1, No previous prison term, 
Less than 1 year at any job, African American, South Carolina. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
4.6.5 Hypothesis 3: Increased Participation has Diminishing Benefits 
The results provide support for Hypothesis 3.  The duration models show that the effects of 
educational and job training programs are not consistent across offense types.  However, rearrest 
rates for participants who received both education and employment programming were virtually 
identical to rearrest rates for participants receiving either education or employment services 
alone (presented in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.10).  When compared to men who received only one 
type of service, men who engaged in educational and employment services exhibited more risk 
factors.  These factors may have selected men to receive more services, but greater service 
receipt did not lead to significant differences in rearrest. 
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Table 4.10 Post-Release Labor Force Participation by Participant Status. 
 
Non 
Part. 
(n = 722) 
Educ. 
Part. 
(n = 593) 
Emp. 
Part. 
(n = 90) 
Educ. & 
Emp. 
(n = 116) 
F 
 
p 
Wave 2 (n = 899)       
Labor force exit 15.07 13.75 5.00 8.33 11.82*** <.001 
No work since release 26.32 25.79 11.67 18.06 9.28*** <.001 
Worked some months 43.06 42.69 48.33 40.28   
Worked all months 30.62 31.52 40.00 41.67   
Wave 3 (n = 939)       
Labor force exit 20.96 15.88 11.29 13.92 10.34** .002 
No work since release 26.20 21.45 14.52 21.52 5.86** .003 
Worked some months 45.10 47.35 51.61 43.04   
Worked all months 28.70 31.20 33.87 35.44   
Wave 4 (n = 1,008)       
Labor force exit 31.46 33.94 25.71 30.67 3.67 .057 
No work since release 35.42 37.08 28.57 33.33 2.48 .086 
Worked some months 34.38 32.38 34.29 33.33   
Worked all months 30.21 30.55 37.14 33.33   
       
Note: N = 899 at W2; N = 939 at W3; N = 1,008 at W4.  Percentages generated using weights obtained 
from nearest neighbor matching.  Design-based F statistic based on weighted data. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
4.7 Structural Equation Modeling 
4.7.1 Outcome variables 
Post-Release Labor Force Participation  
Approximately 31% of men worked consistently during each follow-up interview reference 
period (32.32% for months 1-3 [W2], 30.51% for months 4-9 [W3], 31.17% for months 10-15 
[W4]).  Average number of hours worked each week increased over the three follow-up periods, 
but the proportion of men who held permanent jobs with formal pay declined between the third 
and fourth interviews.  The jobs men held at months 10-15 (W4) were also slightly less likely to 
provide health benefits and paid time off than the jobs men held during months 4-9 (W3), but 
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these differences may reflect simple variations in the composition of employed men during each 
reference period. 
Post-Release Crime and Criminal Justice Involvement  
Self-reported criminal activity increased from the second to third wave interviews (from months 
1-3 to months 4-9).  Approximately one in five respondents admitted to any crimes during the 
first 3 months of release (21.11%), but this percentage increased to one in three by Waves 3 and 
4 (36.89% at W3, 35.44% at W4).  Rates of rearrest and return to prison increased throughout the 
observation period.  After 21 months following release from prison, 63.45% of the men in the 
sample had been arrested at least once, and 39.84% had returned to prison on a technical 
violation or new charge. 
Table 4.11 Model Fit Statistics for the Tests of Configural Invariance over Four Waves. 
Model tested χ2 df ∆χ
2
 p RMSEA 90% CI CFI ∆CFI TLI ∆TLI 
Configural 301.00 208 
  
.019 .014;.024 .993 
 
.987 
 Weak  322.67 219 21.24 .031 .019 .015;.024 .992 .001 .987 .000 
Strong  364.45 230 41.78 <.001 .022 .017;.026 .990 .002 .984 .003 
           
Note: N = 1,245.  CI = Confidence Interval for RMSEA.  CFI = Comparative Fit Index.  ∆CFI = Change in the 
CFI.  df = Chi square degrees of freedom.  RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.  TLI = 
Tucker-Lewis Index (Non-Normed Fit Index).  ∆TLI = Change in the TLI.  Configural = configurally invariant 
model; weak = weak invariant model; strong = strong invariant model.   
 
4.7.2 Confirmatory Factor Model 
Tests of Factorial Invariance 
The measurement model fit 11 latent factors, encapsulating financial need and psychological 
distress at each analysis period, and job quality at the second, third, and fourth waves.  Table 
4.11 presents model fit statistics for the tests of factorial invariance.  The results suggest that the 
11-factor measurement model met the requirements of strong factorial invariance. 
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Construct Items Definition 
Labor force attachment   
Primary sector employment 6, 13, 20 
Standardized index of recent job quality: 
permanency, formal pay, benefits 
Work week 7, 14, 21 
Standardized scale: Average hours worked 
each week at most recent job 
Financial needs   
Parcel 1 1, 8, 15, 22 
Average need: place to live, clothing 
banks/food pantries, financial assistance  
Parcel 2 2, 9, 16, 23 
Average need: transportation, public financial 
assistance, public healthcare insurance 
Psychological distress   
Anxiety subscale 3, 10, 17, 24 Log-transformed average: Anxiety items 
Depression subscale 4, 11, 18, 25 Log-transformed average: Depression items 
Hostility subscale 5, 12, 19, 26 Log-transformed average: Hostility items 
   
Figure 4.8 Parameter Estimates for Four Time Points: The Configural Invariance Model. 
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The configurally invariant model showed good model fit (RMSEA = .019 [.014;.024], CFI = 
.993, TLI = .987).  The items exhibited similar pattern loadings over time; for the financial needs 
factor, the second item had the largest loading, the first item had the smallest loading, and the 
third item was in the middle.  Among psychological distress indicators, the depression parcel 
loaded strongest on the latent factor, followed by the anxiety and hostility parcels.  For the job 
quality factors, the standardized primary sector employment item had larger loadings than did the 
standardized workweek item.  Figure 4.8 presents results of the configural invariance model. 
The indicators and factors also passed the test for weak factorial invariance.  When factor 
loadings were constrained to equality at each wave, the fit statistics indicated no decline in the fit 
of the overall model (RMSEA = .019 [.015;.024], CFI = .992, TLI = .987).  Figure 4.9 presents 
results of the weak factorial invariance model. 
To test strong factorial invariance, the factor loadings and intercepts were constrained to equal 
the values for the first observation period.  The intercepts for financial need items at Wave 1 
were slightly higher than intercepts at subsequent waves, so constraining the intercepts to equal 
the Wave 1 items had the most notable effect on the change.  Nonetheless, the model fit statistics 
indicate that the strong invariance model showed good fit (RMSEA = .022 [.017;.026], CFI = 
.990, TLI = .984), the change in CFI of .002 did not exceed the .002 maximum change that 
Meade, Johnson, and Braddy (2008) recommend.  Table 4.12 presents parameter estimates for 
different levels of factorial invariance.  Figure 4.10 presents the retained CFA model, and it is 
used to build the longitudinal structural equation model. 
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Construct Items Definition 
Labor force attachment   
Primary sector employment 6, 13, 20 
Standardized index of recent job quality: 
permanency, formal pay, benefits 
Work week 7, 14, 21 
Standardized scale: Average hours worked 
each week at most recent job 
Financial needs   
Parcel 1 1, 8, 15, 22 
Average need: place to live, clothing 
banks/food pantries, financial assistance  
Parcel 2 2, 9, 16, 23 
Average need: transportation, public financial 
assistance, public healthcare insurance 
Psychological distress   
Anxiety subscale 3, 10, 17, 24 Log-transformed average: Anxiety items 
Depression subscale 4, 11, 18, 25 Log-transformed average: Depression items 
Hostility subscale 5, 12, 19, 26 Log-transformed average: Hostility items 
   
Figure 4.9 Parameter Estimates for Four Time Points: The Weak Invariance Model. 
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Table 4.12 Comparison of Parameter Estimates across the Levels of Invariance. 
Parameter Factor Item Symbol Configural Weak Strong 
Factor loadings  
Financial  1 1 λ1,1 0.484 0.459 0.472 
Needs  2 λ2,1 0.517 0.542 0.530 
 4 8 λ8,4 0.486 0.459
a
 0.472
a
 
  9 λ9,4 0.576 0.542
a
 0.530
a
 
 7 15 λ15,7 0.469 0.459
a
 0.472
a
 
  16 λ16,7 0.584 0.542
a
 0.530
a
 
 10 22 λ22,10 0.513 0.459
a
 0.472
a
 
  23 λ23,10 0.602 0.542
a
 0.530
a
 
Psychological  2 3 λ3,2 0.276 0.277 0.277 
Distress  4 λ4,2 0.314 0.312 0.313 
  5 λ5,2 0.183 0.183 0.181 
 5 10 λ10,5 0.261 0.277
a
 0.277
a
 
  11 λ11,5 0.310 0.312
a
 0.313
a
 
  12 λ12,5 0.157 0.183
a
 0.181
a
 
 8 17 λ17,8 0.299 0.277
a
 0.277
a
 
  18 λ18,8 0.326 0.312
a
 0.313
a
 
  19 λ19,8 0.216 0.183
a
 0.181
a
 
 11 24 λ24,11 0.308 0.277
a
 0.277
a
 
  25 λ25,11 0.350 0.312
a
 0.313
a
 
  26 λ26,11 0.202 0.183
a
 0.181
a
 
Job quality 3 6 λ6,3 0.975 0.960
 
0.960
 
  7 λ7,3 0.831 0.848 0.849 
 6 13 λ13,6 0.943 0.960
a
 0.960
a
 
  14 λ14,6 0.848 0.848
a
 0.849
a
 
 9 20 λ20,9 0.981 0.960
a
 0.960
a
 
  21 λ21,9 0.876 0.848
a
 0.849
a
 
Variances  
Financial  1 1 θ1,1 0.176 0.194 0.185 
needs  2 θ2,2 0.124 0.101 0.115 
 4 8 θ8,8 0.220 0.220 0.213 
  9 θ9,9 0.089 0.088 0.102 
 7 15 θ15,15 0.204 0.198 0.191 
  16 θ16,16 0.089 0.099 0.110 
 10 22 θ22,22 0.186 0.188 0.179 
  23 θ23,23 0.097 0.095 0.107 
Psychological  2 3 θ3,3 0.040 0.040 0.040 
distress  4 θ4,4 0.065 0.065 0.065 
  5 θ5,5 0.051 0.051 0.051 
 5 10 θ10,10 0.028 0.027 0.027 
  11 θ11,11 0.045 0.049 0.048 
  12 θ12,12 0.044 0.043 0.043 
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Table 4.12 Comparison of Parameter Estimates across the Levels of Invariance. 
Parameter Factor Item Symbol Configural Weak Strong 
Variances       
Psychological  8 17 θ17,17 0.024 0.024 0.024 
distress  18 θ18,18 0.058 0.057 0.056 
  19 θ19,19 0.050 0.051 0.052 
       
       
       
 11 24 θ24,24 0.023 0.023 0.023 
  25 θ25,25 0.057 0.057 0.057 
  26 θ26,26 0.055 0.055 0.055 
Job quality 3 6 θ6,6 0.060 0.086 0.086 
  7 θ7,7 0.316 0.297 0.297 
 6 13 θ13,13 0.113 0.102 0.103 
  14 θ14,14 0.281 0.289 0.289 
 9 20 θ20,20 0.044 0.037 0.037 
  21 θ21,21 0.239 0.245 0.245 
Financial  1 Latent  ψ1,1 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 
needs 4 factor ψ4,4 1.000* 1.129 1.128 
 7  ψ7,7 1.000* 1.110 1.110 
 10  ψ10,10 1.000* 1.239 1.244 
Psychological  2 Latent  ψ2,2 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 
Distress 5 factor ψ5,5 1.000* 0.896 0.896 
 8  ψ8,8 1.000* 1.174 1.172 
 11  ψ11,11 1.000* 1.239 1.239 
Job quality 3 Latent  ψ3,3 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 
 6 factor ψ6,6 1.000* 0.979 0.979 
 9  ψ9,9 1.000* 1.054 1.054 
Intercepts  
Financial  1 1 τ1 1.052 1.052 1.029 
needs  2 τ 2 1.089 1.089 1.104 
 4 8 τ 8 0.848 0.847 1.029
a
 
  9 τ 9 0.950 0.950 1.104
a
 
 7 15 τ 15 0.832 0.832 1.029
a
 
  16 τ 16 0.895 0.894 1.104
a
 
 10 22 τ 22 0.811 0.811 1.029
a
 
  23 τ 23 0.865 0.865 1.104
a
 
Psychological  2 3 τ3 0.347 0.347 0.335 
distress  4 τ4 0.428 0.428 0.430 
  5 τ5 0.195 0.195 0.209 
 5 10 τ10 0.240 0.239 0.335
a
 
  11 τ11 0.309 0.309 0.430
a
 
  12 τ12 0.147 0.147 0.209
a
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Table 4.12 Comparison of Parameter Estimates across the Levels of Invariance. 
Parameter Factor Item Symbol Configural Weak Strong 
Intercepts       
Psychological  8 17 τ17 0.270 0.270 0.335
a
 
distress  18 τ18 0.373 0.373 0.430
a
 
  19 τ19 0.187 0.186 0.209
a
 
 11 24 τ24 0.288 0.288 0.335
a 
  25 τ25 0.386 0.386 0.430
a 
  26 τ26 0.190 0.190 0.209
a 
Job quality 3 6 τ 6 -0.044 -0.044 -0.043 
  7 τ 7 -0.033 -0.035 -0.036 
 6 13 τ 13 -0.045 -0.045 -0.043
a 
  14 τ 14 -0.035 -0.034 -0.036
a 
 9 20 τ 20 -0.006 -0.006 -0.043
a 
  21 τ 21 -0.005 -0.005 -0.036
a 
Financial  1 Latent  α1 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
Needs 4 factor α4 0.000* 0.000* -0.320 
 7  α7 0.000* 0.000* -0.401 
 10  α10 0.000* 0.000* -0.455 
Psychological  2 Latent  α2 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
Distress 5 factor α5 0.000* 0.000* -0.360 
 8  α8 0.000* 0.000* -0.206 
 11  α11 0.000* 0.000* -0.158 
Job quality 3 Latent  α3 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 6 factor α6 0.000* 0.000* -0.001 
 9  α9 0.000* 0.000* 0.039 
Χ2  301.004 322.669 364.445 
df  208 219 230 
RMSEA  .019  .019 .022 
RMSEA 90% CI  .014;.024 .015;.024 .017;.026 
CFI  .993 .992 .990 
TLI/NNFI  .987 .987 .984 
Note.  N = 1,245.  Configural = configurally invariant model; weak = weak invariance model; strong = 
strong invariance model.  *Indicates that the value is fixed to set the scale of the constructs’ parameter 
estimates.  “a” indicates that the estimate is constrained to be equal to the preceding time point. 
 
Measurement Model 
The financial need factor loadings ranged from .47 to .53, psychological distress parcels ranged 
from .18 to .31, and the loadings for job quality ranged from .85 to .96.  Intercepts for each 
construct were constrained to equal the intercepts for the first observation period (Wave 1 for 
financial needs and psychological distress, Wave 2 for job quality).  Intercepts for the financial 
need parcels ranged from 1.03 to 1.10.  The job quality intercepts were constrained to their Wave 
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2 values (-0.04 for standardized number of hours work each week, -0.04 for standardized 
primary sector employment index), with negligible impact on model parameter estimates. 
The mean value for latent financial needs declined from 0.00 at release to -0.46 by the fourth 
interview.  The results suggest that financial needs declined slightly over time, with financial 
needs at their highest as men were preparing to leave prison.  Mean psychological distress 
declined from 0.00 at the first wave to its lowest level at Wave 2 (-0.36), after which it increased 
slightly by the third and fourth interviews (Wave 3 = -0.21, Wave 4 = -0.16).  The mean values 
for latent job quality at Waves 3 and 4 were not significantly differently from 0.00 (Wave 3 = -
0.00, Wave 4 = 0.04). 
 
Figure 4.10 Parameter Estimates for Four Time Points: The Strong Invariance Model. 
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4.7.3 Structural Equation Path Model 
Findings from the longitudinal structural equation model provide partial support for the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.  Tables 4.13 and 4.14 present results of the longitudinal 
structural equation model, controlling for the effect of covariates described in the Measures 
section.  Table 4.13 presents unstandardized coefficients for all paths between the latent factors 
and observed variables.  Table 4.14 presents odds ratios for work, crime, and recidivism 
outcomes at each follow-up interview.  Figure 4.11 presents the final longitudinal structural 
equation model. 
 
Figure 4.11 Final Longitudinal Structural Equation Path Model. 
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4.7.4 Hypothesis 4: Criminal Activity Reduces Human and Social Capital 
Results provide limited evidence to assess whether ongoing criminal involvement reduces men’s 
stock of human and social capital.  The final path includes paths from prosocial peer influences 
to crime and criminal justice involvement, not from crime to later investments in human and 
social capital.  However, the path model shows an association between positive peer influences 
(friends who work and do not get in trouble) and reduced odds of having committed crimes 
recently.  Compared to men who reported that most of their friends were positive influences, 
men who said that all of them were had 29% lower odds of having committed crime during the 
interview reference period (Waves 3 and 4: OR = 0.71, b = -0.34, p < .001).  Similarly, prosocial 
peer influences at the Wave 3 interview (months 3-9) reduced men’s odds of returning to prison 
during the first 21 months of release (OR = 0.77, b = -0.27, p = .005). 
Men who were arrested within the first 90 days were significantly less likely than other men to 
remain employed during the subsequent 6-month period (OR = 0.47, b = -0.75, p < .001).  
Arrests that occurred within the first 9 months had a similar effect of Wave 4 employment, 
reducing the odds of remaining stably employed between months 10 and 15 by 53% (OR = 0.47, 
b = -0.75, p < .001).  Reincarceration further reduced men’s odds of maintaining stable 
employment by the time of the Wave 4 interview (OR = 0.44, b = -0.83, p = .014). 
4.7.5 Hypothesis 5: Human and Social Capital Increases Employment 
Path model results support this hypothesis.  Men who had worked at the same place for longer 
than 1 year, at any point before entering prison, continued to have more success in maintaining 
employment upon release, compared to men who had never worked anywhere for longer than a 
year (OR = 1.81-3.32).  Men who experienced greater job difficulties during each reference 
period had reduced odds of maintaining stable employment.  Men who reported experiencing all 
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six barriers to employment had 85-90% lower odds of working each month (OR = 0.15, b = -
1.91, p < .001).  During each observation period, prosocial peer influences increased men’s labor 
force attachment.  Compared to men who reported that most of their friends were positive 
influences, men who said all of them were had 30% higher odds of maintaining stable 
employment (OR = 1.34, b = 0.29, p < .001). 
4.7.6 Hypothesis 6: Labor Force Participation Increases Job Quality 
Several pathways within the longitudinal structural equation model provide support for this 
hypothesis.  Consistent employment (e.g., working each month) was associated with improved 
job quality within the same interview reference period.  The largest coefficient for stable 
employment was at the first follow-up interview (Wave 2, 3 months after release).  Mean job 
quality was 1 standard deviation increase higher among men who had worked each month since 
release, in comparison to men who worked intermittently or not at all. 
The association between stable employment and job quality was smaller at subsequent 
interviews, although the effect of stable employment on job quality increased slightly from 
months 4-9 (Wave 3) to months 10-15 (Wave 4).  Men who worked consistently during the 
Wave 3 reference period reported higher quality jobs than did men who had not maintained 
stable employment during the same timeframe (b = 0.68, p < .001).  During the subsequent 6 
months (months 10-15), stable employment was associated with slightly larger improvements in 
job quality (b = 0.82, p < .001). 
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Table 4.13 Longitudinal Structural Equation Model. 
 
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
 
b (se) b (se) b (se) 
Stable employment    
Recent job difficulties  -1.91*** (0.27) -1.91***
a
 (0.27) 
Recent prosocial peers  0.29*** (0.08) 0.29***
a
 (0.08) 
Stable employment, Wave 2  0.39 (0.22) 0.33 (0.28) 
Stable employment, Wave 3   0.85** (0.25) 
Job quality, Wave 2  0.72*** (0.11) -0.34 (0.16) 
Job quality, Wave 3   0.72***
a
 (0.11) 
Criminal activity, Wave 2  -0.56** (0.18) 0.08 (0.32) 
Criminal activity, Wave 3   -0.56**
a
 (0.18) 
Job quality    
Recent stable employment 1.15*** (0.07) 0.68*** (0.07) 0.82*** (0.07) 
Prior job quality  0.37*** (0.03) 0.37***
a
 (0.03) 
Financial need    
Prior financial needs 0.61***
 
(0.03) 0.61***
a 
(0.03) 0.61***
a 
(0.03) 
Recent criminal activity 0.29***
 
(0.04) 0.29***
a 
(0.04) 0.29***
a 
(0.04) 
Current job quality -0.24***
 
(0.02) -0.24***
a 
(0.02) -0.24***
a 
(0.02) 
Psychological distress    
Current financial needs 0.15*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.03) 0.23***
a
 (0.03) 
Prior psych distress 0.60*** (0.03) 0.72*** (0.05) 0.60***
a
 (0.03) 
Recent criminal activity 0.34*** (0.04) 0.34***
a
 (0.04) 0.34***
a
 (0.04) 
New crime    
Recent prosocial peers  -0.34*** (0.06) -0.34***
a
 (0.06) 
Stable employment, Wave 2  -0.11 (0.19) -0.13 (0.21) 
Stable employment, Wave 3   0.44* (0.21) 
Criminal activity, Wave 2  1.24*** (0.14) 1.02*** (0.24) 
Criminal activity, Wave 3   1.24***
a
 (0.06) 
Recidivism  Arrest (12 Mth) Return (21 Mth) 
Prosocial peers  -0.12 (0.09) -0.27** (0.09) 
Stable employment, Wave 2  0.12 (0.23) -0.02 (0.25) 
Stable employment, Wave 3  -0.63** (0.22) -0.70** (0.23) 
Job quality, Wave 2  0.16 (0.13) 0.50** (0.16) 
Job quality, Wave 3  -0.55*** (0.11) -0.78*** (0.14) 
Criminal activity, Wave 2  -0.12 (0.23) -0.25 (0.23) 
Criminal activity, Wave 3  1.02*** (0.18) -0.92*** (0.18) 
    
Note: N = 1,243.  AIC = 40,461.142.  Covariates regressed on endogenous constructs and observed variables.  
Covariates include age, education, racial/ethnic status, criminal record, risk factors, pre-SVORI alcohol or drug 
use, and state location.  SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  “a” indicates that the 
estimate is constrained to be equal to the preceding time point. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Labor force participation also had an indirect effect on later job quality, through its effect on 
later employment and through lagged effects of job quality on both later employment and later 
job quality.  First, consistent employment during the Wave 3 reference period (months 4-9) more 
than doubled the odds of maintaining employment throughout the following 6 months (OR = 
2.34, b = 0.85, p = .001).  This association persisted after accounting for self-reported criminal 
activity at Waves 2 and 3, employment status at Wave 2, and criminal justice involvement (arrest 
within the first 3 months of release, return to prison within the first 3 months).  In contrast, when 
controlling for criminal activity and criminal justice involvement during the first few months of 
release, stable employment during the Wave 2 reference period had no effect on the likelihood of 
remaining employed during the subsequent 6 months (OR = 1.47, b = 0.39, p = .073). 
Second, men who held higher-quality jobs at the current interview were more likely to work 
consistently each month of the next interview period.  A 1-unit increase in latent job quality 
doubled the odds of working consistently during the subsequent 6 months (OR = 2.06, b = 0.72, 
p < .001).  Finally, the lagged effect of job quality on later job quality was significant at each 
wave (b = 0.37, p < .001).  In sum, the results show that men who obtained work immediately 
upon release from prison were more likely to remain employed and to obtain higher quality 
employment over time.  Attributes about the individuals, and about the jobs they obtained, may 
help explain the significant associations between consistent labor force participation and higher 
quality, primary sector employment. 
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Table 4.14 Odds Ratios for Work, Crime, and Recidivism. 
 
Work Crime Arrest Return 
 
W3 W4 W3 W4 12 Mth 21 Mth 
Recent job difficulties 0.15*** 0.15*** --- --- --- --- 
Recent positive peers 1.34*** 1.34*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.89 0.77** 
Stable employment, Wave 2 1.47 1.39 0.90 0.88 1.13 0.98 
Stable employment, Wave 3 --- 2.34** --- 1.56* 0.54** 0.50** 
Job quality, Wave 2 2.06*** 0.71* --- --- 1.17** 1.65** 
Job quality, Wave 3 --- 2.06*** --- --- 0.58*** 0.46*** 
Criminal activity, Wave 2 0.57** 1.09 3.45*** 2.78*** 0.89 0.78 
Criminal activity, Wave 3 --- 0.57** --- 3.45*** 2.77*** 2.52*** 
Age at release 0.80 1.48* 0.82 1.00 0.72* 0.66* 
Education 0.57 2.17 0.76 0.96 0.56 0.75 
White (ref. African American) 0.74 1.31 1.73** 1.50* 0.71* 0.86 
Hisp, multi, other, miss 0.93 1.10 1.37 1.27 0.88 1.43 
Trajectory group 2 (ref. Group 1) 1.00 0.93 0.84 0.93 0.70 1.09 
Trajectory group 3 0.65 0.48* 0.78 0.91 1.26 1.86** 
Sum arrests, year before prison 0.81* 1.06 1.23* 1.06 1.16 1.04 
SVORI term: Drug offense 0.78 0.84 1.42 0.95 0.80 0.80 
SVORI term: Property offense 1.07 0.63 1.37 1.40 1.03 0.99 
SVORI term: Violent offense 0.80 0.97 1.12 1.04 0.87 0.98 
SVORI term: Parole/prob. viol. 0.76 0.97 1.46* 1.38 1.02 1.02 
SVORI term: Time served 1.40 1.22 0.87 0.65 0.69 1.88 
1 prior prison term (ref. None) 1.14 0.73 1.17 0.81 1.12 1.10 
2 prior prison terms 0.66 0.55* 1.69* 0.85 1.56* 1.59* 
3+ prior prison terms 1.13 0.90 1.58 0.72 1.43 1.37 
Job tenure: 1-2  years (ref. < 1) 1.85* 1.31 0.83 0.81 1.13 1.08 
2 to 5 years 1.81* 1.51 1.02 0.85 0.82 0.87 
5 years/more 3.32*** 0.94 0.92 0.72 0.79 1.12 
Rearrest, previous period 0.47*** 0.47*** 1.21 0.84 --- --- 
Return to prison, previous period 0.68 0.44* 0.25** 0.63* --- --- 
Pre-SVORI alcohol/drug use 0.86 0.92 1.50* 2.47*** 1.43 1.30 
Completed interviews 3.91*** 1.12 1.00 0.68** 0.63*** 0.94 
Iowa 0.53 1.17 1.31 1.07 0.76 5.04*** 
Indiana 1.52 1.20 0.61 1.07 1.18 0.71 
Kansas 0.29* 0.70 2.26 1.17 0.55 1.00 
Maryland 0.70 1.21 1.45 1.11 1.31 0.83 
Missouri 0.30* 0.39 1.63 1.57 0.52 1.69 
Nevada 0.96 0.58 1.12 1.53 2.35** 2.79** 
Ohio 1.22 1.53 1.65 1.44 0.88 0.85 
Oklahoma 1.98 0.68 1.54 2.18* 0.43* 0.41* 
Pennsylvania 0.38* 0.67 1.51 0.71 0.26*** 3.06*** 
Washington 0.64 0.20** 2.82** 2.43* 1.19 0.08*** 
Note: N = 1,243.  AIC = 40,461.142.  Covariates regressed on endogenous constructs and observed variables.  
SVORI = Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative.  Ref. groups: African American, Group 1, No 
previous prison term, Less than 1 year at any job, South Carolina.  “a” indicates that the estimate is constrained 
to be equal to the preceding time point. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
  
101 
 
4.7.7 Hypothesis 7: Quality Jobs Reduce Men’s Financial Needs 
The structural equation path models provide support for this hypothesis.  At each follow-up 
analysis period, job quality was significantly associated with reduced financial needs (Waves 2-
4: b = -0.24, p < .001).  Nonetheless, improved job quality did not fully address existing financial 
needs, as previous financial need remained significantly associated with current need (b = 0.61, p 
< .001). 
4.7.8 Hypothesis 8: Financial Needs Increase the Probability of Reoffending 
The results provide mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis.  The original theoretical model 
specified that financial needs predicted concurrent criminal involvement.  The model was revised 
to reflect the temporal ordering of financial need and crime items, so the paths go from prior 
financial need to recent criminal involvement and from recent criminal involvement to current 
financial needs. 
The paths from recent criminal activity to current financial needs were significant at each follow-
up interview period (constrained to equality, b = 0.29, p < .001).  The coefficient suggests that 
current financial need was 1/2 standard deviation higher among those who had engaged in 
criminal activity during the preceding 3-6 month period.  The LSEM results presented exclude 
the paths from prior financial need to recent self-reported criminal involvement, as these paths 
were not significant and diminished model fit (higher AIC). 
4.7.9 Hypothesis 9: Financial Needs Increase Psychological Distress 
The 15 indicators for psychological distress (5 indicators of anxiety, 5 of distress, and 5 of 
hostility) fit weakly on a latent factor.  The hostility items exhibited the lowest factor loadings (λ 
= 0.18), but the anxiety and depression parcels were also extremely low (λ = 0.27 and λ = 0.31, 
respectively).  The self-efficacy and locus of control items did not fit a CFA model at all.  These 
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personal mastery items were excluded from the final model because they correlated more 
strongly with other items (e.g., personal peer networks, psychological distress, and financial 
needs) than with each other. 
Despite these revisions, results support this hypothesis.  Men who reported more unmet financial 
needs also reported higher mean levels of psychological distress at each time point (Wave 2, b = 
0.15, p < .001; constrained to equality at Waves 3 and 4, b = 0.23, p < .001).  However, previous 
psychological distress accounted for much of the variation in current psychological distress at 
each follow-up period (Waves 2 & 4: b = 0.60, p < .001; Wave 3: b = 0.72, p < .001). 
4.7.10 Hypothesis 10: Psychological Distress Contributes to Reoffending 
The pathways from latent psychological distress to new crime within the next 3-6 months were 
not significant at each wave and were excluded from the final model.  However, men who 
admitted to crime within the preceding 6 months reported heightened feelings of psychological 
distress.  At each follow-up interview, self-reported criminal activity was associated with a 0.34 
increase in latent psychological distress (b = 0.34, p < .001).  In contrast, involvement in the 
criminal justice system during the months preceding each interview’s 6-month reference period 
(for Wave 3, months 3-9: arrest or return to prison before 3 months; for Wave 4, months 10-15: 
arrest or return to prison before 9 months) had no effect on men’s feelings of psychological 
distress.  Psychological distress was not associated with likelihood of rearrest within the first 12 
months or return to prison within the first 21 months (paths omitted from the final model). 
4.7.11 Work-Crime Association 
The results provide limited support for unidirectional theories of work and crime.  The effect of 
work on crime varied across waves.  Stable employment at Wave 2 was not associated with 
criminal activity at Wave 3 (OR = 0.90, b = -0.11, p = .578) or at Wave 4 (OR = 0.88, b = -0.13, 
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p = .534).  However, men who worked each month before the Wave 3 interview (months 4-9) 
had a 56% increase in the odds of committing crimes during the fourth interview reference 
period (months 10-15: OR = 1.56, b = 0.44, p = .033). 
Criminal activity had a more consistent, persistent effect on later work and crime.  Engaging in 
crime more than tripled the odds of reoffending within the following interview period (Waves 3 
and 4, constrained to equality: OR = 3.45, b = 1.24, p < .001).  After accounting for previous 
labor force and criminal activity, the lagged effect of Wave 2 crime on Wave 4 crime was nearly 
as large (OR = 2.78, b = 1.02, p < .001).  In contrast, engaging in crime was associated with a 
43% decline in the odds of remaining employed during the next wave (OR = 0.57, b = -0.56, p = 
.002).  The effect of Wave 2 crime on later employment did not persist to Wave 4, when 
controlling for criminal activity during Wave 3 (OR = 1.09, b = 0.08, p = .793). 
Significant associations between stable employment and criminal justice involvement did 
provide support for theories that link labor force participation to reduced recidivism.  After 
controlling for labor force and criminal activity during the first 9 months of release (Waves 2 and 
3), consistent employment at Wave 3 was associated with a 46% reduction in the odds of arrest 
during the first 12 months of release (OR = 0.54, b = -0.63, p = .005).  Stable employment 
during that period had a similar effect on the likelihood of returning to prison within the first 21 
months (OR = 0.50, b = -0.70, p = .002). 
4.7.12 Trimmed Pathways from the Final Longitudinal SEM 
The final model excludes paths from employment status and the latent job quality factor to 
psychological distress.  These paths were not significant at any stage of model-fitting, and 
overall fit of the model improved when these paths were eliminated (based on log-likelihood and 
AIC values).  Psychological distress was also not associated with subsequent labor force 
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participation or job quality.  The other main paths that were eliminated from the model were 
from prior job quality to current criminal activity.  These paths were not significant at any wave. 
4.7.13 Significant Covariates 
Criminal Activity 
Men who reported using alcohol or illicit drugs during the final month before their SVORI 
prison term were significantly more likely to remain engaged in crime during the three follow-up 
periods (Wave 3: OR = 1.50, b = 0.41, p = .047; Wave 4: OR = 2.47, b = 0.90, p < .001).   
Whites were significantly more likely than African American men were to report having 
committed crimes since release from prison: 73% higher odds at Wave 3 (OR = 1.73, b = 0.55, p 
= .004) and 50% higher odds at Wave 4 (OR = 1.50, b = 0.40, p = .034).  However, White men 
had a decline of 29% in the odds of rearrest within the first 12 months, when compared to 
African American men (OR = 0.71, b = -0.34, p = .047). 
4.8 Conclusion 
Overall, the results show that the trajectory and propensity score models reduced pre-existing 
differences that had biased the initial SVORI evaluation findings.  After matching participants 
and nonparticipants, the duration models show that education and employment programs have no 
long-term effects on employment and rearrest.  Employment program participants were slightly 
more likely to seek and maintain employment during the first 9 months of release than other men 
were, and they were less likely to be arrested during the same timeframe.  Conversely, education 
participants exhibited slightly increased risk of rearrest for certain crimes, but they showed 
slightly reduced risk of rearrest for violent crimes.  Educational programming did not appear to 
improve men’s post-release work outcomes, when compared to nonparticipants. 
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The results of the longitudinal structural equation model help explain the null effects of 
education and employment programming on recidivism.  Criminal activity reduced the odds that 
men would maintain employment during subsequent waves, and the effects of early criminal 
involvement persisted over time.  In contrast, employment did not appear to reduce the odds of 
engaging in crime at any Wave; consistent employment during the third wave even appeared to 
increase men’s risk of engaging in crime during the fourth wave.  However, the overall results 
suggest that the effects of criminal activity are more stable and persistent than are the effects of 
work on criminal activity.  These findings are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
After controlling for pre-imprisonment characteristics and selection into employment-focused 
programming, the results show that vocational education and job training services do not have 
long-term effects on labor force participation or likelihood of rearrest.  Men who received these 
services exhibited short-term increases in employment, as well as short-term delays in rearrest, 
but no significant differences persisted after the first 9 months of release.  Furthermore, the five 
duration models consistently showed that employment programs had no effect on times to 
rearrest. 
Results of the cross-lagged LSEM provide limited evidence to support theories of crime (or 
program logic models) that link increased labor force activity to reductions in later offending.  
When recidivism was measured as new arrest within 12 months, and as reincarceration within 21 
months, increased labor force attachment was significantly associated with reductions in criminal 
justice involvement.  However, stable employment had either no effect, or a small significant 
positive effect, on the likelihood of reoffending.  Job quality was not associated with self-
reported criminal activity at any point, in contrast to previous research (Uggen, 1999; van der 
Geest et al., 2011). 
The final path model results reveal that, contrary to the original conceptual model (Figure 2.2), 
criminal activity emerged as the key explanatory variable driving men’s labor force activity, 
financial difficulties, psychological distress, and persistence in crime.  Criminal activity had a 
stable, persistent effect on later labor force and criminal activity, diminishing the odds that men 
remained employed during subsequent interview periods and increasing the odds that they 
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persisted in criminal activity.  Men who remained engaged in criminal activity experienced 
heightened financial need and emotional reactivity, and they were less involved in the labor force 
than were men who reported no criminal activity.  In sum, the results suggest that, among active 
offenders with extensive criminal records, the path from crime does not begin with employment 
(van der Geest et al., 2011), but rather, the paths to employment and financial stability begin with 
desistance from crime (Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014). 
5.1.1 Identifying Selection Processes into Treatment 
The pre-matching statistics revealed significant differences between men in the sample who 
engaged in educational, vocational or job training programs and men who had not received these 
services while imprisoned.  When programs targeted to high-risk prisoners successfully recruit a 
high-risk treatment group, it can be difficult to locate nonparticipants in the prison who can form 
an appropriate comparison sample (Braga, Piehl, & Hureau, 2009; Peters, Hochstetler, DeLisi, & 
Kuo, 2015).  Initial SVORI evaluations included propensity score weights that accounted for 
differences between SVORI participants and nonparticipants (e.g., enrollment in SVORI-funded 
reentry services) (Lattimore et al., 2012; Lattimore & Steffey, 2009).  When applied to models 
that evaluated the effectiveness of employment programs (Lattimore et al., 2012), these weights 
did not adequately reduce observed differences between employment program participants and 
nonparticipants.  As a result, initial evaluations concluded that educational programs benefited 
individuals who received those services, but that employment programs had detrimental effects 
on participants’ subsequent labor force and criminal activity (Lattimore et al., 2012). 
In the absence of randomization, observed treatment effects are subject to bias due to selection 
into treatment (D. B. Wilson et al., 2000).  Selection processes commonly favor individuals who 
are predisposed to benefit from the treatment, as these individuals are often the most interested in 
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and motivated to receive the treatment (Davis et al., 2013).  In the case of the programs evaluated 
in this study, however, the factors that selected men into treatment favored men who exhibited 
greater service needs.  These pre-existing deficits (e.g., high school dropout, low educational 
attainment, and limited work experience) suggest that enrollment in prison-based educational and 
employment services identifies individuals who entered prison with the most serious human 
capital deficits (Harlow, 2003).  This selection process is troubling because low educational 
attainment and limited work experience are causally related to the primary outcomes of interest 
in evaluations of prison-based education and employment programs: post-release labor force 
participation, reoffending, and recidivism (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Duwe, 2012; Latessa, 2012). 
As a result, this study contributes to the literature on prison-based programming (Bushway, 
2003; Bushway & Apel, 2012).  It shows that selection into some forms of prison programming 
reflects heightened need (Peters et al., 2015).  However, it is more likely that nonparticipants in 
this sample were able to select out of the treatment under study (i.e., programs providing 
remedial education and job skills training), than that participants voluntarily opted to attend 
educational and employment programs (Chamberlain, 2012; Heckman & Hotz, 1989). 
The literature on prison programming provides evidence to support this conclusion (Brewster & 
Sharp, 2002; Chamberlain, 2012; Harlow, 2003; Steurer et al., 2001).  In many prisons, GED 
classes are mandatory for all prisoners with less than a high school education (Duwe & Clark, 
2014), so these classes are composed predominantly of men who are compelled to enroll in these 
services in place of other alternatives (Heckman, Humphries, & Mader, 2011).  Furthermore, 
enrollment does not equate to regular attendance, let alone consistent attention and engagement.  
In many cases, remedial education, job readiness, and GED programs function as silos that 
contain the neediest prisoners, but which are not designed to deliver the intensive support needed 
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for these participants (Bushway, 2003).  Finally, enrollees in these services are unlikely to show 
responsivity to the treatment, given the compulsory nature of enrollment, limited ability to 
compel participant engagement, and limited ability to individualize content to participants’ needs 
(Andrews & Bonta, 2010). 
In contrast, high school graduates, GED holders, and prisoners who have acquired sufficient 
work experience before prison may be directed away from remedial education and job training 
programs toward services that address other challenges these individuals may face, such as 
substance abuse treatment or cognitive behavioral therapy.  Certain prison programs, such as the 
popular Puppies for Parole dog-training programs, include stringent enrollment criteria that 
restrict participation to the most successful, model prisoners.  Prisoners are often aware of which 
programs available to them are viewed most favorably by prison staff and parole boards 
(Brewster & Sharp, 2002; Steurer et al., 2001).  In this case, selection out of education and 
employment programs may in fact reflect selection into other programs among prisoners most 
equipped to succeed upon release. 
To some extent, this explanation remains speculative because men in this sample did not indicate 
whether they were voluntary or mandatory enrollees.  However, men who were imprisoned in 
states that used mandatory enrollment into SVORI-funded services were more likely to report 
educational or employment service receipt. 
5.1.2 Balancing across Trajectory Groups 
The propensity score matching process deviated from the proposed method in permitting 
matches across trajectory groups.  It is worth examining why matching across groups reduced 
observed biases, and whether this modification casts doubt first, on the validity of the latent 
groups, and second, on the quality of the matches. 
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The retained trajectory model included observations on arrests over a 14-year period preceding 
the SVORI prison entry.  Models that used shorter pre-SVORI observation periods (i.e., fewer 
than 10 years), yielded two latent trajectory groups: a high-rate group and a low-rate group.  The 
high-rate groups derived from these 2-group models consisted of nearly all of the men assigned 
to Groups 1 and 3 of the final 3-group model, whereas men in Group 2 populated most of the 
low-rate groups in the 2-group models.  A small proportion of the sample changed group 
membership when trajectory models used shorter observation periods:  Men shifted from low-
rate groups in 2-group models to the chronic offending group (group 3) of the 3-group model, 
and conversely from the chronic offending group (group 3) of the 3-group model to the low-rate 
groups in the 2-group models. 
The stability in the pattern of these results suggests two important points.  First, as has been 
found in previous studies, longer observation periods yield additional latent trajectory groups.  
Previous studies suggest that longer observation periods yield more accurate, stable trajectory 
groupings, so the literature supports the retention of the 3-group model over shorter 2-group 
models (Eggleston et al., 2004; Nagin & Tremblay, 2005). 
This leads to the second point.  The main effect of the longer observation period was to 
distinguish Group 1 men from Group 3 men, by focusing more on the length of the criminal 
history than on the level of involvement during the final years leading up to prison entry.  The 
bivariate statistics revealed many similarities between these two groups, most notably 
demographic and criminal risk factors.  They also exhibited similar post-release arrest rates, 
despite significant differences in age and length of the criminal record. 
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The bivariate statistics do suggest that the men in Groups 1 and 3 were fundamentally different 
from each other in certain risk factors relevant to the study of post-release work and crime.  
Namely, group 1 and group 3 men appeared to be located at opposite points along the 
hypothesized age-crime curve, with group 1 men entering the prime years of offending and 
group 3 men expected to be in the process of desistance from crime.  Given these groups’ 
opposing expected trajectories upon release, it would appear to be of paramount importance to 
restrict matches across groups.  However, the post-release arrest rates show that group 3 men 
were hardly on the path toward desistance from crime; in fact, these men exhibited increased 
hazard rates of rearrest.  Across models, there is ample evidence to suggest that men in Group 3 
remained persistently high-risk and marginalized, relative to men in Groups 1 and 2.  As a result, 
the trajectory groupings provide insight into the factors that led to men’s SVORI imprisonment 
and enrollment in the sample, but there is limited reason to think that the groupings are 
fundamentally distinct (Nagin & Tremblay, 2005). 
Furthermore, the factors selecting men into treatment did not differ substantively for men in 
Groups 1 and 3; men in Group 3 were less likely to receive services, but participant-
nonparticipant differences were comparable across these two groups.  The same is not exactly 
true for men in Group 2, as factors selecting men into treatment for this group were not exactly 
identical to those for the other groups. 
In this case, the use of the group-based trajectory modeling complemented the propensity score 
matching process and appeared to improve the overall quality of the matches.  At the very least, 
the group-based trajectory model provided an efficient way to capture distinct pre-prison arrest 
trajectories.  The dummy variables for group membership (and related interaction terms with 
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age, education, and prison term) captured relevant differences among groups across multiple 
domains. 
5.1.3 Maintenance of the Status Quo 
Viewed as a whole, the significant coefficients in the duration models in this study provide 
evidence to suggest that risk factors for rearrest reflect stable characteristics that existed before 
men entered prison (Duwe, 2012; Horney et al., 1995).  The significant positive coefficients in 
the repeated-events duration model reflect stable criminal risk factors (e.g., previous prison 
terms, violation of supervision); ongoing factors correlated with criminal activity (recent alcohol 
or drug use), and structural factors that influence the likelihood and timing of rearrest (state 
location, racial/ethnic status). 
The significant negative coefficients for longest job tenure before prison and length of the 
SVORI prison term suggest that maturational reform may account for differences in time to 
rearrest.  Men who had maintained jobs for longer periods before prison were less likely to be 
rearrested than were men who had never worked or had only held jobs briefly before entering 
prison.  Similarly, longer prison terms were associated with reduced odds of rearrest.  As age did 
not influence the likelihood and timing of rearrest, it appears likely that job tenure and prison 
term partially reflect the effect of aging out of crime.  However, if maturational reform does 
account for delays in rearrest among men who had previously held stable employment, then it is 
clear that the process toward desistance had been underway prior to entering prison. 
5.1.4 Understanding Why Employment Programs do not Work 
The results generally show that men continue to engage in fundamentally the same behaviors that 
they had exhibited prior to entering prison.  From this perspective, it is easy to understand why 
prison-based education and employment programs often have limited success in improving 
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men’s labor force outcomes.  To use educational programming as an example, Adult Basic 
Education and GED programs cover the same content that is covered in secondary schools, and 
the teaching methods used replicate the traditional lecture-based classroom environments 
common among American high schools.  The high school dropouts enrolled in these programs 
have essentially received, and not been responsive to, the educational treatment offered, so there 
is limited reason to think that the programs will have a significant effect on their behavior.  To 
yield improved outcomes, the teaching methods used in remedial and GED programs may need 
to undergo significant revisions to address participants’ specific needs and learning styles 
(Andrews & Bonta, 2010). 
Risk-Need-Responsivity Framework 
Programs that target individuals with the highest risks of reoffending offer the potential for the 
greatest returns on investment, in terms of reduced crime, victimization, and correctional costs 
(Braga et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2015; Zweig et al., 2011).  Zweig and colleagues (2011) 
reanalyzed outcome data from the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO), a subsidized 
jobs program serving former prisoners in New York City.  When the authors categorized 
participants by risk of recidivism, they found that high-risk participants were most responsive to 
the intervention (reducing the probability of arrests and convictions, and the frequency of arrests, 
among high-risk participants).  Participation had no corresponding effects on the low- and 
medium-risk participants (Zweig et al., 2011). 
Older studies provided partial support for job training and vocational programs (Saylor & Gaes, 
1997; D. B. Wilson et al., 2000), but methodological weaknesses in some studies suggest that 
observed benefits result from selection into treatment (Brewster & Sharp, 2002).  Current studies 
suggest that it is not the employment readiness or job training components of these programs that 
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reduce recidivism risk (Jacobs, 2012; Redcross et al., 2012; Zweig et al., 2011).  In the case of 
the CEO program noted above, the high-risk participants were no more likely to locate 
unsubsidized employment than were the high-risk nonparticipants, so other programmatic factors 
appear responsible for the recidivism reductions among the high-risk subgroup (Zweig et al., 
2011). 
Intervention components that appear to reduce criminogenic risk factors include chemical 
dependency treatment (Peters et al., 2015), mentorship (Braga et al., 2009; Redcross et al., 2012; 
Zweig et al., 2011), case management (Braga et al., 2009; Zweig et al., 2011), and postsecondary 
education (Duwe & Clark, 2014; Kim & Clark, 2013; D. B. Wilson et al., 2000).  Interventions 
that include therapeutic components and apply cognitive behavioral and social learning 
techniques exhibit improved outcomes over programs that lack this therapeutic focus (Andrews 
& Bonta, 2010). 
Weak Program Design and Implementation 
The weak effects of education and employment programs in this study may have resulted from 
variations in the quality and intensity of services offered by each state (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; 
Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Smith, 2006; Peters et al., 2015).  Unfortunately, the SVORI evaluation 
lacked the administrative data needed to evaluate whether some states provided higher quality 
programs than other states did.  As a result, it is difficult to assess whether null findings reflect 
poor program design, mismatch to participants’ needs, or poor delivery (Bouffard, Taxman, & 
Silverman, 2003; Lowenkamp et al., 2006; Peters et al., 2015; J. A. Wilson & Zozula, 2012). 
Demonstration projects often yield much larger effect sizes than do comparable interventions 
that are applied rigorously in correctional settings, suggesting that correctional systems face 
logistical challenges in scaling up effective programs (Andrews & Bonta, 2010).  Prison 
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administrators in the SVORI evaluation overestimated the extent to which prisoners had received 
services before release from prison (Lattimore, Visher, & Steffey, 2011), and it is quite possible 
that they overestimated how quickly they would be able to scale up existing programs or 
introduce new services.  Some states had limited existing reentry services in place for prisoners, 
so correctional staff in these sites faced the additional hurdle of developing programs for SVORI 
participants.  States with existing services in place could focus their efforts on increasing access 
to a greater range of services (Lattimore et al., 2011). 
Failure to obtain buy-in from correctional staff may have hindered the effective delivery of 
services to education and employment participants (Bonta, Rugge, Scott, Bourgon, & Yessine, 
2008; Lowenkamp et al., 2006; Van Voorhis, Cullen, & Applegate, 1995).  Staff may recruit 
ineligible people into the treatment group, provide services to comparison group members, 
and/or modify components of the intervention based on staff members’ perception of how the 
program should work (Peters et al., 2015).  The institutional culture in some prisons emphasizes 
security and control over rehabilitative programming (Bushway, 2003), so newly designed 
programs may have contradicted or challenged existing correctional procedures, leading 
administrators to abandon essential components of the reentry model.  Logistical challenges 
often hamper participation, as when participants transfer abruptly to other correctional 
institutions or leave prison at the completion of their sentence (Bushway, 2003; Steurer et al., 
2001). 
Evaluators rarely conduct process evaluations during the early stages of an intervention, to 
ensure that the program is being implemented as designed.  Process evaluations may require that 
prison staff collect data on program components that previously went unmeasured by prison 
staff, including detailed information on program attendance, content, participant engagement, 
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and completion (Bouffard et al., 2003; Lattimore et al., 2011; Steurer et al., 2001).  If these data 
collection procedures are not integrated into existing tasks, prison staff may fail to collect data 
consistently and reliably (Bouffard et al., 2003). 
Work Doesn’t Work, and Perhaps It Never Did 
If employment programs are going to be evaluated by their ability to reduce recidivism, the 
literature suggests that employment services may need to be wrapped around the primary 
intervention (e.g., chemical dependency treatment, postsecondary education) (Duwe & Clark, 
2014; Kim & Clark, 2013; Peters et al., 2015).  Observational data suggest that employment has, 
at best, a weak causal effect on crime, so the potential benefits of even the strongest prison-based 
employment program will be modest (Bushway, 2011; Farabee et al., 2014).  Programs that 
successfully increase participants’ labor force attachment may reduce overall recidivism rates, 
but the observed reductions may be too small to be of statistical, let alone practical, significance 
(Bushway & Apel, 2012; Lattimore, Steffey, & Visher, 2010). 
Lattimore, Steffey, and Visher (2010) present the following example of an employment program 
that boosts participants’ employment rate by 20% (to 60% from the baseline 50% rate for 
nonparticipants).  By helping participants gain employment, the intervention reduces their rate of 
criminal involvement by 20% as well (to 40%, from the 50% baseline rate).  However, these 
sizable improvements may have only a small effect on rearrests, if the 20% reduction in 
reoffending manifests as 1 fewer arrest per 100 participants (2.2% reduction in recidivism) 
(Bushway & Apel, 2012).  Indirect interventions, such as the one described by Lattimore and 
colleagues (2010), may be more equipped to show their effectiveness by incorporating proximal 
outcomes (e.g., skills gained, attitudinal changes, job search activities) that plausibly link 
program completion to the key, often distal, outcomes (e.g., labor force participation, 
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reoffending) (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Farabee et al., 2014).  Given the relative lack of support 
for employment programs as currently provided, evaluations that assess whether programs 
actually improve participants’ hard and soft skills, prior to release from prison, could provide 
preliminary evidence to support programs that otherwise show limited effects on post-release 
work and crime. 
Weak Signals 
The negligible observed effects of education and employment programming may have resulted 
from the inability to identify men in the SVORI evaluation who completed programs and/or 
received credentials while imprisoned (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Lowenkamp et al., 2006).  
Successful completion of certain degree programs confers on graduates a credential that may 
improve their employment prospects (Duwe & Clark, 2014).  Completion status provides useful 
information for evaluators as well; in many cases, unobserved risk factors influence the 
likelihood of completing the program and of reoffending (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Miller, 2014; 
Peters et al., 2015).  Even where program designers believe that the program will improve 
outcomes, regardless of completion status, knowledge of which participants achieve the 
credential can be used to minimize unobserved variable bias (Peters et al., 2015). 
Postsecondary education completion appears to provide the most useful credential for reentering 
former prisoners (Brown, 2015; Duwe & Clark, 2014), but this option appears to have been out 
of reach for most men in the SVORI evaluation.  Education participants may not have been 
academically prepared for college classes, as four in ten men had less than a high school 
education at release from prison.  Furthermore, only a minority of them likely resided in prisons 
that offered post-secondary education.  As of 2015, only 6 of the 11 states provided degree-
  
118 
 
granting college education programs to select groups of individuals (Prison Studies Project, 
2015). 
In the case of prisoners enrolled in GED programs, it is unclear whether passing the GED test 
actually provides a useful credential upon release (Heckman & LaFontaine, 2006; Heckman & 
Rubinstein, 2001; Tyler, Murnane, & Willett, 2000).  Among a sample of Minnesota state 
prisoners, completing post-secondary education in prison significantly reduced the odds of 
rearrest, reconviction, and return to prison (Duwe & Clark, 2014).  Completing the GED or high 
school diploma while imprisoned had no effect on recidivism outcomes (Duwe & Clark, 2014).  
Other studies suggest that, absent pursuit of further education, GED completion does little to 
improve labor force outcomes for GED holders, relative to high school dropouts (Brown, 2015; 
Heckman et al., 2011). 
From the perspective of potential employers, the GED credential may not offset former 
prisoners’ negative credentials: their criminal records, removal from the labor market, and 
lingering human capital deficits (Brown, 2015; Miller, 2014; Tyler & Kling, 2007; Tyler et al., 
2000).  Holding a GED may even hinder employment prospects for some former prisoners, based 
on comparisons among high school dropouts, GED graduates, and high school graduates.  Based 
on tests of cognitive ability, such as the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), GED graduates 
appear to be as intelligent as high school graduates who do not attend college, and more 
intelligent than high school dropouts who do not obtain GED certification .  However, when 
controlling for cognitive skills and number of years in school (before dropout), GED holders 
actually experience greater job instability, earn lower hourly wages, and accumulate less work 
experience over time than do uncredentialed high school dropouts.  These patterns hold even 
when samples exclude former prisoners (Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001). 
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The paradoxical findings for GED completion suggest that noncognitive factors, such as internal 
locus of control, self-esteem, and sociability, adversely differentiate GED holders from both high 
school dropouts and high school graduates (Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman et al., 
2006).  Low-skill job markets prioritize noncognitive skills over cognitive skills, in contrast to 
high-skill job markets, which value the latter over the former (Heckman et al., 2006).  Lacking 
postsecondary education or trade certification, GED holders remain unqualified for high-skilled 
jobs, for which their low noncognitive skills would present less of a liability.  However, in 
attaining the GED credential, GED holders differentiate themselves from uncredentialed high 
school dropouts, and this may explain GED holders’ disadvantaged position in the formal labor 
market (Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman et al., 2006). 
5.1.5 Structural Factors Trump Human Capital Factors 
Social structures (e.g., racial/ethnic status, state of residence) appear to have stronger effects on 
arrest outcomes among this sample than theoretically relevant predictors do, such as age and 
level of education.  When racial/ethnic status and SVORI site were excluded from the nested 
duration models, higher levels of educational attainment increased the time that men remained in 
the community before rearrest.  Further education was no longer significantly associated with 
rearrest when racial/ethnic status and state of residence were included in the model.  These 
findings may reflect state-level differences in arrest rates; it is not clear to what extent higher 
rates of arrests among African Americans are the result of racial profiling or similar justice 
practices (see Figures 4.1-4.6 for graphs of pre-SVORI arrest rates by racial/ethnic status; Tables 
4.8 and 4.9 for duration model results). 
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Racial/Ethnic Differences in Rates of Offending and Arrest 
Disproportionate minority involvement in the criminal justice system likely reflects real 
differences in levels of policing, prosecutorial discretion, and criminal justice sanctioning, 
especially for less serious crimes that may go unreported or unobserved by police  (the 
“differential criminal justice system selection hypothesis”) (Piquero & Brame, 2008).  However, 
racial/ethnic differences in arrest rates may also reflect differential rates of involvement, if 
minorities are more likely to remain involved in criminal activity over the life course (the 
“differential involvement hypothesis”) (Anderson, 1999; D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 2003; 
McNulty & Bellair, 2003; Piquero & Brame, 2008). 
Between these two divergent perspectives, a middle position exists, which hypothesizes that 
police and criminal justice processes discriminate against minorities, but that individual, social, 
and structural factors contribute to higher rates of serious crime among minorities (Piquero & 
Brame, 2008; Piquero, MacDonald, & Parker, 2002).  For instance, racial differences between 
African American and White male former prisoners in timing to first violent felony disappeared 
when controlling for local unemployment rate and access to manufacturing jobs (Bellair & 
Kowalski, 2011).  The association between unemployment and violent offending has also been 
observed among African American prisoners in Florida; for these men, rising African American 
unemployment increased the likelihood of a new felony offense within 2 years of release (Mears, 
Wang, & Bales, 2014). 
The results of studies using self-reported information often differ from studies that use official 
records, which consistently show higher arrest rates among African Americans and other 
minorities than among Whites (Piquero & Brame, 2008).  Ideally, self-report measures would 
provide insight into the source of the racial disparities in criminal justice involvement.  
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Unfortunately, older studies that have collected official records and self-reported information on 
official records revealed significant differences by racial/ethnic status in the accuracy of self-
reported information (Farrington, Stouthamer-Loeber, Van-Kammen, & Schmidt, 1996; 
Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 1981; Huizinga & Elliott, 1986).  These original studies often used 
adolescent samples that engaged in less serious forms of delinquent behavior, so the results may 
not generalize to adult prisoners with extensive criminal records (Piquero & Brame, 2008).  
Recent studies have provided mixed evidence to support the validity of self-report measures 
(Jolliffe et al., 2003; Maxfield, Luntz Weiler, & Spatz Widom, 2000; Piquero & Brame, 2008; 
Piquero, Schubert, & Brame, 2014; Sampson, Morenoff, & Raudenbush, 2005). 
State-Level Differences in Arrest Rates 
The duration and path models revealed significant differences in the odds of arrest by state 
location.  These differences likely reflect differential rates of criminal activity by individuals 
within each state, although multiple potential sources of variation also exist at the local and state 
levels.  First, policing practices vary across localities and states, which in turn influence the 
likelihood and timing of arrest.  Second, prosecutorial discretion at the local level influences the 
odds that an arrest leads to prosecution, conviction, and eventually imprisonment.  The length of 
time imprisoned for a given offense varies across states, as do prison conditions and access to 
programming within prisons. 
State recidivism rates reflect the cumulative impact of these local and statewide variations in 
criminal justice practices, rendering it difficult to compare outcomes across states.  In the case of 
the repeated-events duration model, residents from two states (Maryland and Washington) 
showed large increases in the baseline hazard of rearrest.  Recidivism rates for these two states 
were the second- and third-highest rates, respectively, of the 11 states included in the duration 
  
122 
 
models (Pew Center on the States, 2011; Rosenwald, 2011).  The reduced time to first arrest for 
Maryland and Washington prisoners therefore reflects, in part, the policing or supervision 
practices in these states. 
Finally, states appeared to recruit participants into the SVORI evaluation using different aspects 
of the SVORI enrollment criteria.  Several states enrolled high proportions of men with recent 
drug convictions, most notably Iowa (58%) and Maryland (66%).  Property offenders frequently 
exhibit the highest rates of rearrest and return to prison, relative to drug and property offenders, 
but none of the states appeared to use property convictions as criteria for enrollment into the 
SVORI evaluation (Lattimore & Steffey, 2009). 
States that enrolled the highest proportions of violent offenders included Kansas (61%), Nevada 
(88%), Ohio (58%), and Washington (65%).  Violent offenders often exhibit the lowest 
recidivism rates, in comparison to drug and property offenders.  This is born out for Nevada, 
which had the lowest statewide recidivism rate in 2004, of the states in the sample (Sentencing 
Project, 2010). 
However, in the case of Washington State, the enrollment criteria were designed to recruit a 
high-risk, high-needs sample (e.g., under 35 years old and fitting one or more categories 
reflecting heightened risk or needs).  Men from Washington State who fit these criteria and were 
selected for the SVORI intervention were then mandated to receive services (Lattimore & 
Steffey, 2009).  The LSEM results showed that men from Washington State were significantly 
more likely to have reoffended within each 6-month reference period, so policing practices do 
not fully account for state-level differences in rearrest. 
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5.1.6 Limited Support for Causal Theories of Work and Crime 
The LSEM results generally refute the turning point hypothesis outlined in Section 1.1.3, but it is 
not clear to what extent the findings may be interpreted as supporting maturational reform in 
place of the hook-for-change hypothesis (Giordano et al., 2002; Laub & Sampson, 2001; 
Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014).  Employment did not reduce the odds of later offending, 
suggesting that the jobs attained by prisoners in this sample lacked the requisite qualities needed 
to foster social bonds and reduce criminal activity (Laub & Sampson, 2001).  The fact that stable 
employment never reduced the odds of subsequent criminal activity (in fact, it predicted higher 
odds of committing crime during the last interview wave) appears to suggest that maturational 
reform had not yet taken place among men in this sample.  The results do leave open the 
possibility that stable employment could have provided the hooks-for-change needed to support 
men’s path toward desistance, had men in this sample expressed (implicitly or explicitly) 
intentions to “go straight” (Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014). 
Results from a longitudinal study that followed work and offending trajectories during early 
adulthood among a sample of former juvenile delinquents provide a possible explanation for 
stable employment’s negligible effects on crime in the LSEM.  Among high-frequency offenders 
in the sample, stable employment had no effect on convictions during the same 1-year period 
(van der Geest et al., 2011).  In a separate study that examined the timing of employment and 
reoffending for a sample of serious offenders, steep declines in criminal activity preceded 
employment spells for most men in the sample (Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014).  The delay 
between prior offense and most entries into stable employment (lasting at least 6 months) was 
extensive, spanning 2 years or more, lending credence to the conclusion that desistance precedes 
stable employment (Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014). 
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5.1.7 Testing Theoretical Concepts 
Strength of Weak Ties 
Results of this study support human and social capital theories of work and crime.  Odds of 
maintaining stable employment, and resisting criminal activity, were higher among men who 
reported social networks comprising higher proportions of employed and prosocial peers.  The 
opposite pattern emerged when items measuring time spent with employed and prosocial peers 
were included in the model: Socializing with peers, even those who were employed and likely to 
help men avoid trouble, reduced the odds that men maintained employment, and increased their 
odds of reoffending. 
Findings from a recent study examining parolees’ job search activities and emotional wellbeing 
during the first 90 days of release provide insight into the role of social networks (Sugie, 2014).  
As theorized by human and social capital theories, men who expanded their social networks 
during the reentry period enjoyed greater success in finding work, and of finding work paying 
more than a minimum wage.  However, men who felt close to people in their post-release social 
network spent more time unemployed.  Strong ties to contacts also extended the time until men 
located formal labor market employment and jobs paying more than the minimum wage (Sugie, 
2014).  Men who felt strong ties to people in their social network had likely maintained contact 
with people they had known before entering prison, and these existing peer networks may not 
have facilitated men’s connections to the labor market.  Overall, the results suggest the 
importance of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), and the potential importance of replacing past peer 
networks with new, possibly more prosocial peer networks (Hagan, 1993). 
Managing Financial Needs During the Reentry Period 
Results of this study suggest that greater focus should be paid to the financial and psychological 
consequences of remaining engaged in criminal activity (Bucklen & Zajac, 2009; Felson et al., 
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2012).  When controlling for men’s prior levels of psychological distress, prior labor force 
activity, and peer support networks, self-reported recent criminal activity was associated with 
concurrent unmet financial needs and psychological distress.  However, remaining engaged in 
the labor force, or even finding higher-quality employment, had limited effects on men’s feelings 
of financial and emotional wellbeing.  For men in this sample, consistent employment led to 
improved job quality, and higher quality jobs diminished men’s financial needs, but there were 
no reciprocal paths leading from financial need or psychological distress to later labor force and 
criminal activity. 
Heightened financial need among men who persisted in criminal activity may reflect a 
shortsighted inability, or lack of interest, in taking control of their finances.  In a study that 
examined factors influencing parolee success, Bucklen and Zajac (2009) observed that financial 
management and coping strategies differentiated parole violators from parole successes (those 
who had no parole violations or returns to prison during the first 3 years of release).  Individuals 
who eventually violated parole or returned to prison perceived significantly greater financial 
difficulties than did parole successes, even though median debt levels were much lower among 
parole violators than among parole successes. 
5.1.8 Fostering Desistance among Former Prisoners 
The LSEM results provide limited evidence to suggest that men can work themselves into 
desistance from crime.  Previous sections in this chapter have noted the path dependent nature of 
men’s post-release activities, which can be seen most clearly in the duration models, yet also 
seems present in the path model results.  Men in the sample had been involved in criminal 
activity before entering prison, and many of them resumed quickly upon release.  Similarly, 
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unstable unemployment characterized the majority of men’s labor force activity during the 
months leading up to and following release from prison. 
Findings from this and other recent studies refute long-standing assumptions about the crime-
reducing effect of employment that had been supported by studies using data from the mid- to 
late-20th century (Laub & Sampson, 2001; Uggen, 2000).  In previous decades, when union-
protected manufacturing jobs paid good wages to men with limited education and soft skills, 
employment likely did reduce crime, by keeping men occupied on a regular basis and increasing 
their stakes in conformity (Hirschi, 1969; Laub & Sampson, 2001).  Studies have shown that, 
even in the 21st century, postindustrial United States, former prisoners who live in areas with 
higher levels of manufacturing jobs have lower odds of committing new violent offenses (Mears 
et al., 2014).  The loss of manufacturing jobs during the latter part of the 20th century has 
decimated the low-skilled labor market, with predictable consequences for low-educated former 
prisoners’ long-term employability. 
Even though former prisoners in the SVORI sample exhibited no signs of desisting from crime 
and only limited engagement with the labor force, it merits consideration whether men leaving 
prison in coming years will be able to find the kinds of jobs that had once provided hooks-for-
change, if not also turning points, for former prisoners.  It may be that these jobs simply do not 
exist in sufficient quantities to provide viable options for former prisoners, especially when 
people without criminal records are competing for the same positions. 
Identity, Agency, and the Desistance Process 
The relative absence of strong social factors that may foster desistance, such as high-quality 
employment, means that subjective, internal factors play a large role in bolstering former 
prisoners’ intentions to “go straight” (LeBel, Burnett, Maruna, & Bushway, 2008).  As a result, 
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research on desistance from crime has increasingly focused on the personal, often private, 
cognitive transformations that lead former prisoners to cast former friends aside, take on 
previously ignored financial and personal responsibilities, and accept the inevitability of legal 
work as their best long-term option (Bucklen & Zajac, 2009).  Desistance scholars traditionally 
envision personal agency as an intrinsic characteristic within individuals that shapes their 
behavior and ability to carry out long-range plans.  In many cases, persistent offending reflects 
the fact that men feel they lack agency over their own behavior.  Successful desisters seem better 
equipped than do non-desisters to perceive a credible new self, and then to marshal internal 
agentic forces toward pursuit of the imagined self (Healy, 2014; Maruna, 2001). 
It may be possible to design reentry interventions that build upon former prisoners’ inherent 
ability to redirect their own actions toward desired goals.  Prisons have experimented with 
entrepreneurial training programs for prisoners, as a way to overcome the informal and formal 
restrictions on employment for people with felon records.  Preliminary research suggests that 
entrepreneurship training programs have the capacity to differentiate prisoners who enter the 
program with the requisite “personal agency mind-set” needed for entrepreneurial success upon 
release (Patzelt, Williams, & Shepherd, 2014).  Case studies have shown that successful 
completion of an entrepreneurial training program identifies prisoners who feel high levels of 
self-efficacy and have taken responsibility for the actions that led them to prison.  For these 
individuals, the training program increases their orientation to the future, and this future 
orientation is fostered through the use of program activities that provide participants with 
opportunities to practice behaviors that will help them achieve their long-term goals (Patzelt et 
al., 2014). 
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5.2 Challenges and Limitations 
5.2.1 Group-Based Trajectory Model 
The sample is composed of men who were completing prison sentences in 11 US prison systems.  
Most of the men who were recruited into the sample began their prison terms months, even 
years, before SVORI was designed and implemented.  Although two states did randomly assign 
men to participate in SVORI-funded programs, the other states selected their nonparticipant 
samples from similar sites within their states (Lattimore & Steffey, 2009).  The years preceding 
men’s release from prison varied significantly, depending on the lengths of their prison term, 
offense type, and characteristics about the states in which they were completing their prison 
terms.  As a result, the use of men’s pre-SVORI arrest records to identify latent trajectory groups 
may have ignored or minimized important state-level differences. 
5.2.2 Defining Participation Status 
The baseline interview provided information on services men had received during their entire 
SVORI-related prison terms, including services received before the design and implementation 
of SVORI-funded services.  Men who had served longer prison terms had greater access to 
education and employment services, especially more intensive higher education and job training 
programs.  The lack of administrative data, and limited detail from respondents on program 
participation, limits the extent to which this study can assess the quality of the services provided.  
The SVORI evaluation did not obtain detailed information about the intensity, content, or 
duration of the services men received, and men were not asked whether they had received any 
certification or credentials while imprisoned.  Despite this, the services men received are 
comparable to the education and employment programs offered by most US prisons, and it is 
worth noting that all of the services that nonparticipants received, and perhaps most of the 
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services received by nonparticipants, had been implemented in the absence of SVORI funding.  
In this respect, service receipt by the serious and violent offenders in this sample is likely 
representative of service receipt for comparable men in all US prisons. 
5.2.3 Duration Models 
The single- and repeated-event duration models use recorded dates from official arrest record 
files to depict failure rates following release from prison.  Rearrests are distal measures of 
reoffending following release from prison, so duration models that included time to first self-
reported offense could provide stronger evidence about the short-term effects of program 
participation (Davis et al., 2013). 
Although the arrest records were cleaned to remove charges that preceded men’s release from 
prison (e.g., arrests recorded on their day of release, which likely reflected pre-existing charges), 
it is possible that the remaining arrest records included charges that had occurred prior to men’s 
release date.
1
  It is also possible that states and local jurisdictions varied in the speed and 
accuracy with which they arrested individuals and recorded the arrests.  Furthermore, it is not 
possible to assess whether the arrest records fairly reflect differences in individuals’ levels of 
criminal activity following release.  Most notably, significant differences in time to arrest by 
racial/ethnic status may reflect differences in crime rates by racial/ethnic status, but they also 
likely reflect differences in local policing, community crime rates, and state corrections systems. 
                                                 
1
 Defining arrests that occurred on men’s first day of release (time 0) as having occurred before release resulted in 
differences for six matched cases.  The SVORI arrest indicators code these men as having been arrested within the 
first 3 months of release, whereas the continuous time measures used in this study code them as never being 
arrested.  Three of the men were participants and three were nonparticipants; none had arrests recorded after their 
day of release, so all six men are included in the sample as survivors during the first 3 years of release.  In this sense, 
they were not failures in that they were never arrested following the first day of release, but it may be that their 
arrests led to new prison terms that prevented them from returning to the community during the 3-year period. 
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5.2.4 Structural Equation Modeling 
Measures 
Labor force participation.  The main results of this study operationalize labor force participation 
as stable employment, in which men worked each month that they were living in the community.  
The general findings are supported when labor force participation is defined as a continuous 
measure (proportion of months working) or categorical measure (none, some, or all months 
working).  However, the variable numbers of months in which men were living in the 
community between interview periods may render these items less reliable than if men had been 
in the community for the same lengths of time.  It was also not possible to distinguish between 
men who worked only once within a given month from men who worked consistently throughout 
the month.  The descriptive statistics indicate that when even this weak measure for stable 
employment was used, less than 1/3 of respondents at each wave met the criteria. 
Job quality.  The CFA and LSEM included two scaled items for job quality.  The items measure 
features about respondents’ most recent jobs, whether they were currently employed or not: 
hours worked during the average week and attributes of primary sector employment (van der 
Geest et al., 2011).  Other studies have measured job quality using mean job satisfaction scores 
that reflect the objective desirability of given occupations (Uggen, 1999).  The continuous hourly 
wage items at each wave were not reliably measured and showed weak associations with the 
other items and the latent factor for job quality. 
Financial needs.  This study hypothesized that financial strain was the key concept linking 
employment to criminal activity.  By reducing financial difficulties and the resulting 
psychological distress that men experienced, stable employment would reduce the odds that men 
persisted in criminal activity.  Studies traditionally define financial strain by individuals’ self-
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reported inabilities to afford basic goods and necessities in the present, and the extent to which 
they anticipate financial constraints in the future.  In contrast, the measures available from the 
SVORI interviews indicate respondents’ self-assessed need for assistance in obtaining basic 
goods and services. 
It is possible that men’s responses would have been different if the questions had focused on 
men’s ability to obtain goods and services on their own (or with the help of their family), not on 
men’s need for assistance.  Furthermore, the six financial needs items used in this study were 
selected from a list of approximately 25 items that measured a range of service needs, from legal 
assistance to anger management counseling.  When answering these questions, men may have 
considered their financial needs relative to other non-financial needs they may have had. 
Psychological distress.  The 15 psychological distress items did not fit strongly on one latent 
factor, nor did items within subscales load unidimensionally on their own factors.  In most 
instances, the 5-level items approximated binary indicators, with most respondents reporting no 
experiences of each symptom within the previous 7 days.  As a result, the CFAs fit using the 15 
original ordinal items showed poor fit, with only one or two items loading strongly on the latent 
factor.  Due to low cell counts for the top three categories within each item (especially for the 
hostility indicators), new 3-level variables were created that collapsed these most serious 
responses into one category.  These new items also showed poor model fit when modeled as 
ordinal-level items. 
It is not clear whether the poor fit resulted from the use of a 7-day window, the phrasing of the 
items and range of response options, or from sensitivity about the concepts being measured.  
Research suggests that questions about general mental health overestimate the extent to which 
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former prisoners experience psychological distress, and underestimate the extent to which they 
experience positive emotional states (Sugie, 2014).  The use of interview items capturing 
negative emotional states may not provide accurate measures of men’s general emotional 
wellbeing. 
It is also possible that the psychological distress items used in this study did not in fact measure 
emotional states resulting from prior financial need and criminal involvement.  Instead, these 
parceled items may reflect individuals’ emotional reactivity, which in turn influenced their 
financial wellbeing and likelihood to engage in crime.  Nonetheless, the theoretical significance 
of psychological distress, or emotional reactivity, drives home the need to validate indicators of 
psychological functioning for use in large-scale prisoner studies. 
Crime.  The binary measures for any type of criminal involvement since the previous interview 
limited the extent to which one can differentiate individuals who remained persistently engaged 
in crime from those who had only offended once or twice since release.  Indicators for specific 
type of crimes committed, most notably property offenses, may have yielded significant results 
for stable employment, as previous studies have found property offending to be associated with 
unemployment and financial strain (Aaltonen et al., 2013; Felson et al., 2012).  It was also not 
possible to assess whether men answered the questions honestly, although men were often 
forthcoming about illicit substance use and illicit earnings at each wave. 
Results for criminal justice involvement show divergent results from findings for self-reported 
criminal activity; this may reflect policing patterns or may reflect differences in the severity of 
offenses committed.  Previous research has suggested that racial/ethnic differences exist in the 
validity of self-report delinquency and crime measures (Farrington et al., 1996; Hindelang et al., 
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1981; Huizinga & Elliott, 1986).  Recent studies provide contradictory evidence for invariance 
by racial/ethnic status in the accuracy of self-report crime measures, especially among adult and 
high-rate offender samples (Piquero et al., 2014).  The results of this study may reflect the same 
general pattern of African American males underreporting criminal activity, albeit among adult 
male former prisoners.  However, the results may reveal real differences by racial/ethnic status in 
the association between crime and arrest. 
Temporal ordering 
The LSEM used a cross-lagged design, in which work and crime status were regressed on work 
and crime status during the next 6-month period.  This may not be the appropriate time lag for 
either concept; the paths for employment status at Wave 2 to both work and crime at Wave 4 
were not significant, so the effect of work may be short-lived.  For instance, van der Geest and 
colleagues (2011) observed that the effect of employment on offending among high frequency, 
chronic offenders was instantaneous, with limited enduring effects.  The 3- to 6-month lag 
between employment status and crime used in this study may have been too long to capture 
short-term changes in criminal activity that results from changes in employment status. 
In contrast, early criminal involvement at Wave 2 remained significant at Wave 4, even when 
controlling for Wave 3 crime and other predictors.  Future research should use monthly measures 
to assess whether the findings of this study hold when shorter lag periods are used. 
Most of the paths in the LSEM specified directions from the preceding to current waves.  The 
phrasing of the questions at each follow-up interview informed the selection of paths from crime 
to financial need, crime to psychological distress, and financial need to psychological distress.  It 
is possible that men’s psychological distress over the preceding 7 days was a fair representation 
of their psychological wellbeing over a longer period.  If that is the case, the path from crime to 
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psychological distress is misspecified.  It is also possible that current financial need had actually 
preceded criminal involvement during the same interview reference period.  However, it is not 
possible to make that assumption, due to the phrasing of the questions. 
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Chapter 6: Implications and Conclusion 
6.1 Implications for Policy 
6.1.1 Logic Models and Program Evaluations 
The logic models underpinning most prison- and community-based employment programs link 
employment services to increased labor force activity and reductions in criminal activity 
(Farabee et al., 2014; Redcross et al., 2012).  Theoretical models commonly suggest that 
increased labor force participation reduces men’s involvement in criminal activity, but mounting 
empirical evidence suggests that this association may be unfounded.  At the very least, it appears 
to be too optimistic (Hagan, 1993; Horney et al., 1995; Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014).  The 
results of this study emphasize the need to unlink recidivism outcomes from employment 
program evaluations (Bushway & Apel, 2012; Redcross et al., 2012). 
Current employment programs rely on cost-reductions in crime and criminal justice involvement 
to justify investments in employment training and assistance, so decoupling recidivism 
reductions from program completion may complicate efforts to sustain funding for employment 
programs.  Including proximal measures that capture the intermediate effects of program 
participation (e.g., attitudinal changes, cognitive gains, and job-seeking strategies) would 
increase our understanding of how successful education and employment programs influence the 
odds of later employment and crime.  Including these short-term outcomes in evaluations could 
help identify subgroups that are the most responsive to programming (Davis et al., 2013). 
6.1.2 Policy Changes to Improve Correctional Programming 
Evaluations should apply the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) framework to the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of correctional programs (Latessa, 2012; J. A. Wilson & Zozula, 
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2012).  A growing body of evidence suggests that weak labor force attachment among former 
prisoners reflects low levels of noncognitive skills more than the lack of cognitive ability 
(Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman et al., 2006; Lindqvist & Vestman, 2011).  Low-skill 
job markets prioritize noncognitive skills over cognitive abilities, an imbalance that leaves many 
young, male former prisoners at a disadvantage when seeking employment.  Employment 
programs may need to be designed to emphasize the development of soft skills (e.g., 
noncognitive skills) while providing participants with opportunities to complete their education 
or achieve job-training credentials (Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Lindqvist & Vestman, 2011; 
Miller, 2014). 
Correctional education programs may not be able to shift focus away from GED preparation, 
given the high rates of prisoners with less than a high school education (Harlow, 2003; Heckman 
et al., 2011).  However, the literature shows that helping prisoners obtain the GED credential 
alone is not sufficient to improve their reentry prospects (Brown, 2015; Heckman et al., 2011; 
Tyler & Kling, 2007).  Removing the restriction on Pell Grants for former prisoners would 
increase the provision of postsecondary education programs in state prisons (Batiuk, Lahm, 
Mckeever, Wilcox, & Wilcox, 2005; Brown, 2015).  College degrees appear to diminish the 
stigma associated with the criminal record, perhaps due to the shift in emphasis from 
noncognitive to cognitive skills in high-skill job markets (Heckman et al., 2006). 
6.1.3 Policy Changes to Increase Labor Force Attachment 
Removing employment restrictions that are not justified by public safety interests would help 
former prisoners find stable employment providing a living wage.  Subsidized insurance and tax 
credits for employers who hire former prisoners would increase employers’ willingness to 
consider applicants with felon records.  These incentives would have fewer unintended 
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consequences than policies that limit employers’ access to applicants’ criminal records.  In the 
absence of complete knowledge about applicants’ criminal backgrounds, employers already look 
for markers to identify former felons, and these markers lead employers to discriminate against 
young, minority men.  This would likely increase if employers knew that they were legislatively 
barred from learning about applicants’ criminal risk. 
Correctional departments should develop systems, in partnership with local service agencies, to 
share information about reentering prisoners’ job skills, program participation, and talents with 
potential employers.  This positive information could help offset information about prisoners’ 
criminal records that limit employers’ willingness to hire them. 
6.2 Implications for Future Research 
6.2.1 Improving Research Designs using Observational Data 
Recent meta-analyses show that prison-based postsecondary education programs do reduce 
recidivism rates, so it is not clear why education programs did not have any long-term effects on 
participants’ ability to maintain employment or reduce criminal involvement (Davis et al., 2013; 
Duwe & Clark, 2014).  Null findings may reveal ineffective programs, but they may also reflect 
low rates of participation among men receiving education and employment services.  Future 
research should examine program dosage, in terms of program intensity, duration, content, and 
delivery method (Davis et al., 2013; Steurer et al., 2001).  Existing studies have not consistently 
differentiated education programs by type, so it is not clear whether some types of correctional 
education yield more benefits than others (Steurer et al., 2001). 
Regression Discontinuity 
This study used propensity score weighting to balance participants and nonparticipants, but this 
method only reduces observed heterogeneity.  Regression discontinuity designs can diminish 
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observed and unobserved heterogeneity, thereby increasing the methodological rigor of future 
program evaluations.  To implement a regression discontinuity design, evaluators must have 
access to a continuous measure, such as Tests of Basic Adult Education (TABE), that reliably 
measures individuals’ latent ability.  Evaluators then use a cut-point to assign respondents to the 
treatment and comparison groups; scores that fall above the cut-point are included in the 
treatment group and scores that fall above the cut-point are assigned to the comparison group.  If 
there is a linear association between latent ability (as measured by the continuous scale) and the 
observed outcome, then the difference in outcomes for sample members above and below the 
cut-point should reflect the true effect of the program (Davis et al., 2013). 
Successful regression discontinuity designs may entail more planning during the research design 
stage than do some propensity score methods, which can be implemented successfully at the 
analysis stage.  It can be difficult to find an appropriate continuous variable in administrative 
records, so program evaluators may need to modify the sample selection process to include 
testing.  The internal validity of this method is reduced when program implementers violate the 
assignment rule, so it is critical that practitioners faithfully apply the rule when assigning 
participation status.  Furthermore, poorly implemented or designed programs may not meet the 
linearity assumption (Davis et al., 2013). 
Use of Smartphones to Collect Data  
Recent studies have experimented with the use of text messaging to collect data from 
respondents on a more frequent basis (Gaggioli et al., 2013; Sugie, 2014).  This technique has 
been successfully implemented in a study following parolees during the first 3 months of release 
from prison (Sugie, 2014).  Compared to men who were assigned to the traditional interview 
condition, men assigned to the smartphone condition were more likely to agree to participate in 
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the study (89% vs. 68%) and to remain involved in the project throughout the 3-month study 
period (Sugie, 2014).
1
  The completion rate for men who entered the study (82%) is higher than 
has been observed in other longitudinal studies following prisoners after release, including the 
SVORI evaluation (58% completion rate for the 3-month follow-up interview). 
Furthermore, the use of smartphones enabled the study investigators to collect data on 
participants’ job search activities, work activity, and current mood each day.  Participants 
received two text messages daily, each of which took only a few minutes to complete.  The first 
was sent randomly between 9am and 6pm, and it included questions about participants’ current 
activity and mood.  The second text was sent at 7pm and the questions addressed participants’ 
activities and mood for the whole day.  To encourage smartphone respondents to complete each 
survey within an hour of receiving the text, participants received a $15 bonus for completing at 
least 75% of the interviews each week.  As a result, men answered approximately 78% of all 
texts that they received, with two-thirds of the men reaching the 75% target completion rate.  In 
general, smartphone respondents preferred the use of text messaging to weekly interviews and 
they enjoyed having access to a smartphone (Sugie, 2014).
2
 
Most importantly, the smartphone interviews captured fine-grained data on changes in mood and 
job search activity during the early reentry period (Sugie, 2014).  The variables for labor force 
participation, job search difficulties, and psychological distress were among the weakest 
variables in the current study, due to the lag in measurement periods for employment, the weak 
                                                 
1
 These percentages reflect participation and completion rates for the full sample of eligible individuals.  Attrition 
from the study was higher among smartphone participants than among interview participants (70% complete rate 
among smartphone users who completed the initial interview, compared to 86% for those completing interviews 
(Sugie, 2014). 
2
 Given the high use of no-contract cell phones among former prisoners, and the importance of maintaining a stable 
contact number during the job search, the subsidized smartphone provided a form of reentry intervention that may 
improve men’s likelihood of gaining employment (Sugie, 2014). 
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measure of labor force participation (e.g., worked at least once within a given month), and the 
narrow 7-day reference period for psychological distress measures.  Using smartphones to 
capture men’s current status in non-research settings would provide far more reliable measures 
of job search activities and mood than by use of retrospective interviews (Gaggioli et al., 2013; 
Sugie, 2014).  For instance, men reported higher levels of anger, sadness, and stress at the first 
interview than were reported during smartphone interviews, and men’s daily happiness levels 
showed substantial variability that was not captured by weekly interview responses (Sugie, 
2014). 
6.2.2 Testing Theoretical Concepts 
Future research should examine the association between employment and crime using shorter 
observation periods, to assess whether the findings of this study hold with changes in lagged 
periods (Aaltonen et al., 2013; Horney et al., 1995; Skardhamar & Telle, 2012).  Research that 
used monthly observation periods would be better equipped to assess whether and how 
employment reduces crime or crime reduces employment (van der Geest et al., 2011).  Detailed 
information on employment status, including the number of weeks worked, average number of 
hours, type of job, and reasons for labor force exit, would provide insight into the associations 
between labor force participation, job quality, and criminal activity (Sugie, 2014; van der Geest 
et al., 2011). 
Future research should examine the temporal association between financial need/strain, criminal 
activity, and criminal justice involvement.  The results of this study provide cautious support for 
the negative effects of ongoing criminal activity on men’s financial status, psychological 
wellbeing, and employment status.  Despite this, the results provide limited support to suggest 
that financial strain contributes to later criminal activity.  The results presented also cannot 
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determine whether recent criminal activity was actually associated with current financial needs 
and psychological distress, and not vice versa, as strain theories would predict.  Future research 
using shorter observation periods would provide stronger evidence in support of or against 
existing theories of work, crime, and financial need. 
Future research with prisoner populations should include validated financial strain measures in 
surveys to be sure financial need/strain is being measured accurately.  Research is also needed to 
assess whether financial strain is a relevant concept among young former prisoners, who may 
perceive limited need for goods and services commonly included in questions (e.g., inability to 
pay bills on time, inability to obtain medical assistance).  It may be necessary to modify financial 
strain measures to reflect the social context faced by young and marginalized former prisoners. 
6.2.3 Validating Self-Report Crime Measures 
Future research should examine whether self-report measures are invariant across racial and 
ethnic status (Jolliffe et al., 2003; Thornberry & Krohn, 2003).  The ongoing inability to 
adjudicate between competing explanations for disproportionate minority involvement in the 
criminal justice system has blunted research using self-report offending measures (Hindelang et 
al., 1981).  Most existing studies ask respondents about delinquent and criminal activity, without 
also asking about criminal justice involvement.  Studies should ask men to report recent criminal 
justice involvement as well as recent criminal involvement, so that their responses can be 
compared to official measures (e.g., arrests, convictions, technical violations, and 
institutionalizations).  The correspondence between self-reported and official reports may 
provide insight into the reliability of self-report measures.  It would also provide researchers 
opportunities to assess whether differential item functioning occurs by age, educational 
attainment, gender, and racial/ethnic status. 
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Studies that examine the accuracy of self-reported information would have implications for 
policy as well as for our theoretical understanding of delinquency and crime.  In the case of this 
study, if it could be determined that there were no differences in the accuracy of self-reporting by 
racial/ethnic status, the interpretation of the findings here would change drastically.  The 
contradictory evidence for racial and ethnic status would have major implications for policing.  
Namely, the duration models show that minorities had shorter times to rearrest, in comparison to 
Whites.  However, the results of the LSEM show that Whites were significantly more likely than 
African Americans to have committed new crimes since release.  In combination, these findings 
would suggest that Whites are more likely than other minority groups to commit crimes, but 
African Americans are still more likely to be arrested following release.  This would provide 
unassailable support for the existence of racial bias in policing and the criminal justice system.  
Unfortunately, it is not clear to what extent one can draw these conclusions, absent further 
research on the validity of self-report measures. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This study has shown that previous employment program evaluations may have overstated the 
effects of prison-based education and employment programming.  After balancing a sample of 
adult male prisoners on the probability of receiving employment-focused services in prison, the 
results of this study showed that education and employment programs had no long-term effects 
on labor force participation, crime, and rearrest.  Null findings such as these may not appear 
promising, but recent employment program evaluations had concluded that such programs might 
have adverse consequences on participants’ labor force and criminal activity (Lattimore et al., 
2012).  The results of this study suggest that selection effects may explain weak and negative 
effects of similar employment-focused programs. 
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The results also cast doubt on the prospect of reducing criminal activity by increasing former 
prisoners’ labor force participation.  Criminal activity had a stronger negative effect on later 
employment than employment had on later criminal activity.  This reverses the directional effects 
hypothesized by many program logic models.  The findings suggest the need to revise the logic 
models used to design and evaluate prison- and community-based employment programs for 
reentering former prisoners. 
The study findings do not diminish the importance of employment and job training programs for 
men who have limited education and work experience (Bushway, 2003).  Men’s labor force 
status may not contribute to their decisions to engage in criminal activity following release from 
prison (Skardhamar & Savolainen, 2014), but the results do show that criminal activity severs 
men’s connections to the formal labor market. 
Finally, this study identified significant racial differences in criminal activity and criminal justice 
involvement after release.  The findings reveal sizable differences in the likelihood of offending 
and being arrested among African American and White men.  In the wake of Ferguson and 
related incidents of police brutality against young African American men, research on crime and 
delinquency must address the institutionalized racism that contributes to high rates of 
incarceration in the African American community.  However, the limited ability to confirm that 
the measures are valid limits the extent to which we can make conclusive statements about the 
findings. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Employment and financial wellbeing 
 
Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(Apel & 
Sweeten, 
2010b) 
Effect of 
incarc-
eration on 
labor 
outcomes, 
after 
controlling 
for selection 
bias 
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of 
Youth 1997; 
Youth 12-18 
YO followed 
until 20-26 
YO; n = 823 
incarcerated 
youth 
propensity 
score 
matching; 
fixed effects; 
logistic 
regression;  
Youth experiencing first incarceration were 
compared to soon-to-be incarcerated youth 
using propensity score that models the 
probability of incarceration at first conviction. 
Compared to convicted, not incarcerated youth, 
incarcerated youth showed an 11% reduction in 
probability of post-release formal work; 5% 
increase in prob. of illegal earnings; 12% 
increase in probability of labor force 
nonparticipation; and a 7-week increase in the 
length of time spent out of the labor market. 
Modal work status was stable unemployment, 
followed by stable employment and stable 
nonparticipation. 
Nonemployment 
among formerly 
incarcerated 
young men is 
mostly due to 
nonparticipation, 
not 
unemployment. 
(Bellair & 
Kowalski, 
2011) 
Whether 
unemploy-
ment and 
lack of jobs 
explain 
racial 
variations in 
recidivism 
1,568 Ohio 
male parolees 
released in 
1999;  
60% African 
American 
40% White 
mid-30s, 
mean educ. 
level 11th 
grade 
Cox 
proportional 
hazards 
model: # of 
days to new 
incarceration 
for new 
felony  
1. AA more likely than W to return on new felony 
when community factors excluded; 
racial/ethnic status no longer significant when 
controlling for community factors.  
2. Higher % employment in manufacturing 
reduces hazard of new felony conviction. 
3. AA living in neighborhoods with ~13%+ 
unemployment have much higher hazards of 
new felony return to prison than do W. 
4. AA living in neighborhoods with ~1-7% 
unemployment do not have higher hazards of 
new felony return to prison than do W. 
Neighborhood 
factors influence 
recidivism risk by 
influencing the 
probability of 
finding 
employment. 
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Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(Bucklen 
& Zajac, 
2009) 
Identify 
determin-
ants of 
parole 
success and 
failure 
542 parole 
violators (PV) 
186 parole 
successes 
(PS) in PA: 
93% M; 
Violators: 
M age = 35, 
28% AA, 
59% W,  
12% H;  
Successes:  
M age =  41, 
34% AA, 
53%W,  
13% H 
Mixed 
methods: 
bivariate 
analysis of 
survey data; 
interviews, 
focus groups, 
1. PS and PV both stated that they were least 
prepared to manage finances and fin issues 
2. PVs associated with antisocial peers more, PSs 
lived with spouse/partner more and reported 
better quality relationship: “family man” role 
3. No real differences in FINDING job, but 70% 
of PSs worked the whole time under parole (~3 
years) vs. 48% of PVs who did (~16 months). 
4. PVs less willing to take any job and had 
unrealistic expectations about pay, job options. 
5. Bank acct: 73% PSs, 39% PVs; PVs had more 
fin problems, despite lower median debt. 
6. Dysphoric emotions often preceded violation. 
7. Saw no benefit to violation: 91% PS, 42% PV; 
felt costs outweigh benefits: 95% PS, 31% PV. 
1. KEEPING the 
job is the real 
problem. 
2. Low basic 
financial 
management 
skills limit PVs 
coping 
strategies. 
3. Help with soft 
skills and 
budgeting may 
be more 
important than 
job assistance. 
 
(Crutch-
field & 
Pitchford, 
1997) 
Test that 
secondary 
labor market 
workers 
show higher 
prob. of 
criminal 
activity 
8,127  
18+ adults in 
NLSY 1979 
Correlation, 
OLS 
1. Expected time at current job was related to self-
reported criminal activity. 
2. Time spent out of the labor force (# weeks) was 
related to self-reported criminal activity. 
3. Significant differences between primary and 
secondary sector workers suggest selection into 
job type, not causal effect of employment. 
Job quality 
characteristics are 
related to criminal 
involvement. 
(Felson et 
al., 2012) 
Examine  
whether 
particular 
types of 
stress are 
related to 
particular 
695 male 
felons in 
Second 
Nebraska 
Inmate Study 
Life event 
calendar (36 
months 
preceding 
arrest); multi-
level regress-
ions: random 
1. Family stress related to assaults, not others. 
2. Financial stress related to property (116% 
higher odds), drug crimes (250% higher). 
3. Unemployment associated with drug and 
property offenses. 
4. Unstructured socializing was related to all three 
types of offenses. 
Findings support 
rational choice 
view of crime as 
instrumental 
response to stress.  
Emotion reduces 
ability to make 
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Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
types of 
crime  
intercepts, 
random 
coefficients 
5. Alcohol and drug use more related to 
financially motivated crimes than to assault. 
6. Links between family stress & assault, and 
financial motivations & financial crimes, 
support view of crime as goal-oriented and 
situational behavior. 
decisions and 
heightens 
perceived benefits 
of crime. 
(Grogger, 
1998) 
Examine 
whether 
wages 
influence 
crime and 
explain 
racial gaps 
1,134 men in 
NLSY79 in 
1980: not in 
school or 
military  (22% 
AA, 18% 
H,55% HSD) 
Multivariate 
probit 
models: 
wages, crime, 
time 
allocation 
1. Offenders earn 11% lower market wages and 
work approximately 6 weeks less over the year, 
based on total hours worked. 
2. Black-White crime rate differences reflect 
racial wage gap and decline in youth wages. 
3. Age-crime curve fits time-allocation model: As 
wages rise, diminishing benefits from crime. 
Support crime as 
work: Low wages 
make crime more 
attractive; racial 
crime gap 
partially reflects 
racial wage gap. 
(Harris et 
al., 2010) 
Identify 
LFO 
sanction 
amounts and 
debt levels 
over time 
500 convicted 
felons from 
Washington 
state (12% 
AA, 70% W, 
9% H, 7% 
other; 83% 
male; mdn 
age 32 YO) 
Descriptive 1. After 4 years, they still owed 77% of the 
amount assessed for legal financial obligations. 
2. Median debt was equivalent to 36-50% of their 
expected annual income. 
Legal financial 
obligations 
remain substantial 
financial burdens 
for many former 
prisoners. 
(Harris et 
al., 2010) 
Impact of 
LFOs on 
prisoners’ 
income, 
wellbeing, 
opportun-
ities, and 
criminal 
activity 
50 convicted 
felons from 
Washington 
state (52% 
AA, 36% W, 
12% other; 
82% male; 
mdn age 37 
YO) 
Qualitative 1. Legal financial obligation (LFO) payments 
reduced income and increased financial stress. 
2. LFOs impeded efforts to obtain education, 
employment, and housing. 
3. Lack of regular payments incurred further 
criminal justice involvement. 
4. Garnishments reduced their incentives to 
maintain legal employment and increased their 
incentives to commit crimes. 
Legal financial 
obligations and 
other debts reduce 
incentives to 
work and provide 
additional sources 
of financial strain. 
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Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(Pettit & 
Lyons, 
2009) 
Analyze the 
effects of 
incarc- 
eration on 
employment 
and log 
hourly 
wages 
Washington 
DOC and UI 
data on 
16,956 adult 
men (mean 
age 24 YO, 
22% AA, 
28% W, 15% 
H, 46% HSD) 
Pooled cross-
sectional time 
series: 
conditional 
fixed-effects 
logit model; 
fixed effects 
regression  
1. Short-term boost in employment rates after 
release: 15% up for 25-29YO, 31% up for 30-
34, and 38% up for 35+ YO (age at admission). 
2. Employment levels decline to pre-incarceration 
levels within 6-10 quarters after release. 
3. 5-7% decline wages for men in each age group, 
compared to pre-incarceration earnings. 
Reentry programs 
that offer the 
prospect of stable, 
well-paid jobs 
may work with 
older and/or 
highly motivated 
prisoners. 
(Skard-
hamar & 
Telle, 
2012) 
Investigate 
the 
relationship 
between 
post-release 
employment 
and 
recidivism 
7,476 
prisoners 
released from 
Norwegian 
prisons in 
2003 and 
followed 
monthly to 
2006 
Discrete-time 
survival 
models 
1. Employment delayed time to recidivism, but 
personal characteristics accounted for 
employment and reduced recidivism. 
2. Controlling for personal characteristics, 
employment remained negatively associated 
with recidivism. 
3. Benefit receipt reduced the association between 
employment and lower recidivism risk. 
4. Property and economic offenders were more 
responsive to crime-reducing effect of work 
than were violent and traffic offenders. 
Employment is 
negatively 
associated with 
recidivism.  
Results provide 
support for 
control and strain 
theories. 
(Visher et 
al., 2011) 
Predict 
amount of 
time spent 
employed 
during early 
release 
period 
740 men 
released from 
IL, OH, and 
TX prisons 
(74% AA, 
16% W, 9% 
H; mean age 
36 YO) 
OLS 1. Prior and more intensive work experience 
increased the amount of time men spent 
working after release. 
2. Having documentation and work arranged 
before released increased the amount of time 
men spent working. 
3. Prison work experience was related to longer 
time spent working after release, unlike 
education or job training activities in prison. 
Prior work 
experience 
identifies 
prisoners who 
will be more 
likely to find 
work upon 
release. 
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Appendix B. Programs and Interventions 
Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(Berk, 
Lenihan, 
& Rossi, 
1980) 
Evaluate 
Transitional 
Aid 
Research 
Project 
1,951 TX and 
GA released 
prisoners in 5 
study 
conditions  
2S and 3SLS: 
model fit to 
TX data and 
replicated 
using GA data 
1. Payments did not reduce prop/nonprop arrests. 
2. Pay reduced work: 5-10 weeks over 12 months. 
3. Parolees worked 3 more weeks than others: 
effect of parole on arrest through employment. 
4. TARP and employment reduced arrests, but 
TARP reduced work (due to 25-100% tax on 
TARP funds for working): no overall effect 
Work reduces 
crime by reducing 
unstructured 
socializing and by 
reducing financial 
incentives to 
commit crimes. 
(Brewster 
& Sharp, 
2002) 
Test the 
effects of 
prison 
programs on 
recidivism 
11,813 former 
OK DOC 
cases released 
1991-94; 
mean age = 
29YO;90% 
M; 33% AA; 
68% other 
Cox 
regression 
model 
1. 1,044/4,752 (18.2%) of nongraduates 
completed GED in prison. 
2. 805 (6.8% of all) completed VocEd program. 
3. GED program lengthened time to return. 
4. VocEd completion shortened time to return. 
5. VocEd comparison group may have contained 
participants who did not complete the program; 
this may have biased treatment estimates. 
6. Results likely reflect self-selection. 
Prison programs 
can have 
contradictory 
effects on 
recidivism. 
(Jacobs, 
2012) 
Evaluate the 
Transitional 
Jobs 
Reentry 
Demon- 
stration 
1,813 men 
(912 TJs, 901 
JS); mean age 
= 35 YO, 
82%AA, 10% 
W, 4% H 
 1. Transitional Jobs condition shows short-term 
boost in employment: 95% of TJ ever worked 
over 2 years vs. 65% of Job Search condition. 
2. Increase faded by Quarter 5: no difference in 
unsubsidized employment/earnings in year 2. 
3. No differences in various measures of 
recidivism across sites. 
4. Financial incentives may boost participants’ 
labor force participation. 
Transitional jobs 
programs do not 
appear to increase 
unsubsidized 
employment 
levels or reduce 
recidivism. 
  
161 
 
Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(Redcross 
et al., 
2012) 
Evaluate the 
Center for 
Employ-
ment 
Opportun-
ities 
977 parolees 
using the 
Center for 
Employment 
Opportunities 
(568 T, 409 
C); 93% male, 
64% AA, 
31% H, mdn 
age 34 YO 
Random 
assignment to 
program and 
control group; 
OLS 
1. Subsidized jobs did not lead to unsubsidized 
employment: Treatment members showed 
higher employment levels than did control 
members during the program, but employment 
rates decline to control group after first year. 
2. Recidivism reductions persisted over 3 years, 
even though employment levels declined after 
the first year. 
3. Treatment members who enrolled in the 
program within 3 months of released showed 
16-22% reductions in recidivism. 
Program 
modifications 
should address 
factors that keep 
participants from 
transitioning to 
unsubsidized 
employment. 
(Saylor & 
Gaes, 
1997) 
Evaluate 
Post-release 
Employ-
ment Project  
Inmates in 
PREP: 57% 
only prison 
industry 
work; 19% 
work and 
VocEd; 24% 
VocEd/ app-
renticeship 
comparison 
group 
identified 
using 
propensity 
scores; Cox 
proportional 
hazards 
1. 14% higher probability for program group to 
be working 12 months after release. 
2. 35% lower recidivism rate for program group 
after 12 months, relative to comp group. 
3. Program effects over 8-12 years: 24% 
recidivism reduction for prison industry group 
and 33% reduction for VocEd/app group. 
Controlling for 
selection effects, 
prison work and 
training programs 
help reduce 
recidivism. 
(Sedgley 
et al., 
2010) 
Impact of 
education 
and two 
types of 
prison work 
programs on 
recidivism 
4,515 male 
prisoners 
released from 
Ohio prisons 
in 1992 and 
followed to 
2002 
Propensity 
score 
matching, 
Weibull 
mixture 
model 
1. True nonparticipants appeared different from 
participants in one/more program types. 
2. Each activity delayed time to return to prison. 
3. Interaction terms showed diminishing returns 
to participation in more than one activity, but 
education programs appeared to complement 
skills obtained from work programs. 
4. Program coefficients remained significant 
when propensity scores were added to the 
model, and the prison industry propensity score 
coefficient was not significant. 
Each program 
appeared to 
reduce prison 
costs.  Evaluating 
programs 
separately can 
mask benefits due 
to contamination 
effects among 
nonparticipants. 
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Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(Steurer et 
al., 2001)  
Impact of 
prison 
education 
on post-
release 
employment 
and 
recidivism 
3,170 inmates 
from MD, 
MN, and OH 
in the 
OCE/CEA 
Recidivism 
Study (1,373 
educ, 1,797 
comparison) 
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
regression 
1. Education participants exhibited lower 
recidivism rates than the comparison group. 
2. Participants earned slightly higher wages each 
year, although employment rate was slightly 
higher for nonparticipants. 
3. Education participants were motivated less by 
labor outcomes than to please prison staff and 
parole boards. 
Education 
program 
participation 
appears to 
improve reentry 
outcomes. 
(Tyler & 
Kling, 
2007) 
Examine 
whether 
GED attain-
ment 
improves 
labor market 
outcomes 
among 
former 
prisoners 
12,956 former 
FL prisoners 
(1,967 GED 
holders, 1,400 
GED 
attempters, 
9,589 
dropouts) 
Panel data 
analysis of 
administrative 
earnings data 
using fixed 
effects 
estimation: 12 
quarters 
earnings data 
1. Non-White men who earned GEDs earned 
$200 more per quarter than demographically 
similar nonparticipants.  Non-White men who 
participated in GED programs without earning 
GEDs exhibited nearly the same increase in 
quarterly earnings. 
2. Earnings advantages among Non-White GED 
holders persisted for 2 years after release.  
3. White men accrued no labor market benefits 
from GEDs. 
GED programs 
may improve 
labor outcomes 
among the most 
severely 
disadvantaged in 
the labor market. 
(J. A. 
Wilson & 
Davis, 
2006) 
Evaluate the 
Project 
Greenlight 
Reentry 
Program 
735 New 
York state 
parolees (344 
GL, 278 TSP, 
113 Upstate); 
55% AA, 
37% H, 6%W, 
mdn age 33 
YO 
Cox 
proportional 
hazards model 
of time to 
arrest/time to 
felony arrest 
1. Project Greenlight did not substantially 
improve participants’ employment or housing. 
2. Higher proportion of GL participants were 
arrested during the first year (33% of GL, 27% 
of Upstate, and 24% of TSP group). 
3. GL participants showed significantly shorter 
time in weeks to first arrest, first felony arrest, 
and to parole revocation. 
Poor 
implementation 
can worsen 
reentry outcomes. 
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Source Purpose Sample Methods Results Implications 
(D. B. 
Wilson et 
al., 2000) 
Meta-
analysis of 
corrections 
programs: 
education, 
vocation, 
and work  
33 studies of 
corrections 
programs that 
measured 
recidivism 
and used a 
nonparticipant 
comparison 
group 
Meta-analysis  1. Postsecondary education programs showed 
largest reduction in recidivism (37% rate 
compared to 50% assumed rate). 
2. Recidivism reductions: vocational training 
(39%); Correctional work/industries (40%); 
Basic Educ/GED (41%); other (43%). 
3. Heterogeneity across programs indicates that 
within categories, some programs are more 
effective than others are. 
Weak 
methodology 
means that 
recidivism 
reductions could 
reflect participant 
characteristics, 
not program 
effects. 
(Zweig et 
al., 2011) 
Identify 
recidivism 
effects of 
the CEO 
program for 
low-, med-, 
and high-
risk former 
prisoners 
977 parolees 
using the 
Center for 
Employment 
Opportunities 
(568 T, 409 
C); 93% male, 
64% AA, 
31% H, mdn 
age 34 YO 
Create risk of 
recidivism 
score for each 
person and 
create 3 
subgroups; 
logistic and 
OLS 
regression 
1. Gender, age, and prior arrests predicted 
recidivism risk: low = under 25
th
 percentile, 
med = 25
th
-75
th
 percentile, and high-risk = 
above 75
th
 percentile. 
2. CEO participation reduced high-risk former 
prisoners probability of rearrest, reconviction, 
and number of arrests in year 2; the program 
did not affect recidivism outcomes among 
high-risk members in year 1, when participants 
held subsidized employment 
High-risk former 
prisoners were 
most responsive 
to the treatment: 
subsidized 
employment and 
case management 
for 12 months. 
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Appendix C.  Group-Based Trajectory Model 
This study models prior offending trajectories using annual arrest indicators for the years 
preceding their SVORI prison term (Haviland & Nagin, 2005; Lattimore & Steffey, 2009; Nagin, 
2005).  The SVORI adult male sample is assumed to comprise a mixture of J underlying 
trajectory groups.  The composition of groups can be described by 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) =  ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑗 𝑃
𝑗(𝑌𝑖), in 
which 𝑌𝑖 is a longitudinal sequence of annual arrest counts from age at first arrest to the SVORI 
term, 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = the probability of 𝑌𝑖, 𝜋𝑗 = the probability of group j, and 𝑃
𝑗(𝑌𝑖) = the probability 
of 𝑌𝑖 given membership in group j.  Conditional on group membership, subject i’s observations at 
times 𝑡 =  1, 2, 3, … , 𝑇 are random independent variables.  Probabilities of membership in each 
group are modeled using a multinomial logit function 𝜋𝑗 =  𝑒
𝜃𝑗 ∑ 𝑒𝜃𝑗𝐽1⁄ , where 𝜃1is set to 0 to 
ensure that 𝜋𝑗is estimated such that men’s probability of membership in each trajectory group 
falls between 0 and 1 (Jones & Nagin, 2007). 
Men’s arrest indicators are assumed to follow the logistic distribution.  The group-based 
trajectory model (GTM) is depicted by the equation 
ln(𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ) =  𝛽0
𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3
𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑡, 
in which 𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝑗 
= the expected number of arrests of subject i at time t in each year leading up the 
SVORI status incarceration, given membership in group j, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = subject i’s age at time t, 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2  and 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
3  = squared and cubed forms of 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡, and 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑖𝑡, and 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑡 are 
each indicators of arrest type for arrests at time t.  The model allows the vector of parameters 
(𝛽𝑗) to vary freely across groups (Jones & Nagin, 2007). 
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The number of trajectories identified by the model can depend upon the length of the 
observation period used to generate trajectories and the number of subjects in the sample (Nagin 
& Tremblay, 2005).  The GTM may identify groups even when all individuals in the sample are 
homogenous with respect to criminal background and offending propensity (Brame et al., 2012; 
Nagin, 2005; Nagin & Tremblay, 2005).  By design, the model will fit the number of groups 
specified, and it is the researcher’s responsibility to determine the appropriate number of groups 
by comparing the fit of models identifying different numbers of groups (Brame et al., 2012).  
The Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion (BIC) is used to compare non-nested trajectory 
group models, 𝐵𝐼𝐶 =  −2 ln 𝐿 + 𝐾 ln 𝑛.  The formula penalizes overfit models by increasing 
their BIC value, so low BIC values identify models that provide better fit to the data than other 
models. The most parsimonious model with an optimal BIC value is generally selected as the 
best model (Brame et al., 2012; Nagin, 2005; Nagin & Tremblay, 2005). 
Bayes theorem is used to generate for each individual a nonzero probability of 
membership in each identified group j. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = 𝑗|𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖) =
𝑓(𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑗)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑗)
∑ (𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑗)𝐽𝑗=1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑗)
= 𝑤𝑖𝑗 
These posterior predicted probabilities of group membership will be included in the propensity 
score models as continuous measures (Jones & Nagin, 2007). For duration models, individuals 
will be assigned to the group for which they have the highest posterior predicted probability of 
membership.  Predicted group membership will be used to examine whether missing data are 
ignorable, for purposes of the longitudinal structural equation model sample using follow-up data 
(Allison, 2012; Nagin, 2005; Piquero, Farrington, Nagin, & Moffitt, 2010). 
